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Introduction
This dissertation is composed of three studies of non-linear econometric models,
with applications to Health, Labor and Education Economics.
Chapter 1 studies the differences in the proportion of temporary employees of
domestic and foreign firms in the Spanish manufacturing sector. The objective of
the chapter is to determine if, after controlling for a large set of observable firm
characteristics and unobservable firm-specific time-invariant components, there is
still a relationship between firm nationality and the type of employment contracts
that firms offer.
For that purpose, I estimate standard censored Tobit and Heckman sample
selection models (also known as type I Tobit and Heckman two-step models, re-
spectively), using data from the Survey of Managerial Strategies (Encuesta so-
bre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE), which includes a representative number of
Spanish firms in the manufacturing sector during 1991-2005.
The estimations show that firm nationality has a significant effect over the
probability that firms hire temporary workers and over the proportion of temporary
workers for firms that choose to hire temporary workers. The size and significance
of the effects depend on firm size. In the case of the Heckman estimations, for
example, a higher proportion of foreign capital implies a lower average probability
of hiring temporary workers for small and medium firms, but not for large firms.
Likewise, a higher proportion of foreign capital implies a decrease in the average
proportion of temporary workers (for firms who choose to hire temporary workers)
for medium and large firms, but not for small firms.
Chapter 1 provides two contributions to the literature. First, it presents a fur-
ther account of the differences between domestic and foreign firms. In particular,
I show that domestic and foreign firms do not differ only in wages and productiv-
ity, but also on the types of labor contracts that they offer. Second, the chapter
provides a detailed study of the determinants of temporary employment in the
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Spanish manufacturing sector, focusing in particular on firm nationality and firm
size. My findings indicate that a labor reform trying to reduce the use of fixed-
term employment contracts should provide different incentives to firms of different
size.
Chapter 2 considers the estimation of a dynamic ordered probit with fixed
effects, and its application to the study of the determinants of self-assessed health
status (SAH).1
SAH has been used as a proxy for true overall individual health status in many
socioeconomic studies. Moreover, it has been shown to be a good predictor of mor-
tality and of subsequent demand of medical care (see for example van Doorslaer,
Koolman and Jones 2004).
Contoyannis, Jones and Rice (2004) studied the dynamics and effects of socioe-
conomic variables on SAH for the British Household Panel Survey, by performing
a random effects analysis on a dynamic ordered probit model. Among other aims,
they tried to determine the relative contribution of state dependence and unob-
served heterogeneity in explaining the observed persistence in SAH.
This chapter applies a ‘fixed effects’ approach instead, which allows us to leave
unrestricted the joint distribution of the two individual effects and their correlation
with the explanatory variables, and to avoid the initial conditions problem.
In addition to accounting for unobserved factors that affect health status (index
shifts), it is also important to take into account the possible heterogeneity in
reporting behavior (cut-point shifts), which may occur if individuals use different
thresholds when assessing their health and reporting it in the SAH categorical
variable (i.e. two individuals may report a different value of SAH even though
they have the same level of true health).
Despite the advantages of fixed effects over random effects estimations, there
have been only few applications in non-linear models in health economics (as can
be seen by reading Jones’s 2007 handbook chapter). This is due to the difficulty
in dealing with the incidental parameters problem, which is specially severe in
the model studied in the chapter because it contains two fixed effects (index and
cut-point shifts).
To account for the incidental parameters problem, we apply Carro’s (2007) ap-
proach to bias reduction. We compare the resulting estimators with the ‘standard’
1This chapter is based on Carro and Traferri (2009).
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Maximum Likelihood estimators, and with the bias-corrected estimators proposed
by Bester and Hansen (2009). In Montecarlo simulations, we show that both
Maximum Likelihood and Bester and Hansen’s estimators under-perform relative
to the estimators obtained by following Carro’s approach. Moreover, we also find
that large biases remain in the case of Bester and Hansen’s estimator, even for
relatively large panel sizes.
We estimate the model using the British Household Survey in the period 1991-
2006. Based on our best estimates, the two fixed effects exhibit important variation
so it is relevant to account for both when estimating the effect of other variables.
Our estimates also show that state dependence is very important even though we
have controlled for unobserved heterogeneity and some forms of objective health
measures. The latter are the variables with higher marginal effects.
The contributions of this chapter are twofold. First, the chapter contributes to
the recent literature on bias correction in nonlinear panel data models by applying
and studying the finite sample properties of two of the existing proposals to the
ordered probit case. We find that the most direct and easily applicable correction
to our model is not the best one and still has important biases in our sample
sizes. Second, we contribute to the literature that studies the determinants of
Self-Assessed Health measures by applying the previous analysis on estimation
methods to the British Household Panel Survey.
Finally, in Chapter 3, I study gender differences in major choice and college
entrance probabilities in the University of Campinas, a Brazilian public university
dependent on the State of Sa˜o Paulo.
As with most Brazilian public universities, candidates for entry into University
of Campinas first select a major, and then compete for a place in that major by
taking a major-specific entrance exam. This singular characteristic of the Brazil-
ian case allows me to differentiate the effect of gender on major-specific entrance
probabilities and preferences.
I propose a model and econometric strategy which can account for two impor-
tant issues, selectivity bias and the fact that expected utility depends on the prob-
ability of entering the different majors. I estimate this model using a novel dataset
obtained from University of Campina’s Permanent Commission for Vestibular Ex-
ams (Comvest).
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I find evidence of gender differences in preferences and entrance probabilities.
For most majors, gender differences in major choice are mostly explained by differ-
ences in preferences. However, for the most demanding majors (those that require
higher grades from students), differences in major choice are explained in a large
proportion by differences in entrance probabilities. Finally, I find that gender has
important interactions with other variables. In particular, gender effects depend
on education, socioeconomic characteristics and family background.
This chapter has three contributions. First, the econometric model is able to
account for selection bias, in contrast to previous papers, which have assumed that
the errors of the probability of entry and choice equations were independent, i.e.
there was no selectivity bias by assumption (see for example, Montmarquette et
al. 2002). Second, the chapter introduces a novel database, which can be used
to disentangle the differential effects of probability of entry and preferences in
gender differences in major choice. Third, this chapter provides the first detailed
analysis of the determinants of major choice in Brazil. A few papers analyze the
determinants of performance in Entrance Test Exams (Guimaraes and Sampaio
2007, 2008, Calvacanti et al. 2009), but the choice of major has not been analyzed
in detail. Performing such analysis is important because of its possible relation
with gender inequality, which is an important issue for the Brazilian Federal Gov-
ernment. For example, the Federal Government has recently introduced over 400
projects directed at enhancing equal opportunities for men and women, which will
be performed by 22 government institutions between 2008 and 2011 (Pinheiro et
al. 2008).
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Resumen
Esta tesis se compone de tres trabajos de investigacio´n en las a´reas de la
Economı´a de la Salud, Trabajo y Educacio´n.
El cap´ıtulo 1 estudia las diferencias en la proporcio´n de empleados temporales
entre las empresas nacionales y extranjeras del sector manufacturero espan˜ol. El
objetivo del cap´ıtulo es determinar si existe una relacio´n entre la nacionalidad
de las empresas y el tipo de contratos de trabajo ofrecidos, au´n despue´s de con-
trolar por un amplio conjunto de caracter´ısticas observables y componentes no
observables que no var´ıan en el tiempo.
A tal efecto, estimo modelos Tobit censurados, y modelos de seleccio´n de Heck-
man (tambie´n conocidos como Tobit de tipo I y modelo Heckman de dos etapas,
respectivamente), utilizando datos de la Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales
(ESEE), que incluye un nu´mero representativo de empresas espan˜olas en el sector
manufacturero durante 1991-2005.
Las estimaciones muestran que la nacionalidad de la empresa tiene un efecto
significativo sobre la probabilidad de que las empresas contraten trabajadores tem-
porales y sobre la proporcio´n de trabajadores temporales, para las empresas que
optan por contratar a trabajadores temporales. El taman˜o y significancia de los
efectos dependen del taman˜o de la empresa. En el caso del modelo Heckman, por
ejemplo, una mayor proporcio´n de capital extranjero implica una menor probabil-
idad media de contratacio´n de trabajadores temporales para pequen˜as y medianas
empresas, pero no para empresas grandes. Del mismo modo, una mayor proporcio´n
de capital extranjero implica una disminucio´n de la proporcio´n media de traba-
jadores temporales (para las empresas que optan por contratar a trabajadores
temporales) para las empresas medianas y grandes, pero no para las pequen˜as
empresas.
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El cap´ıtulo 1 tiene dos contribuciones principales. En primer lugar, el cap´ıtulo
presenta un ana´lisis adicional de las diferencias entre empresas nacionales y ex-
tranjeras. En particular, se muestra que las empresas nacionales y extranjeras no
so´lo se diferencian en productividad y nivel de salarios, sino tambie´n en los tipos
de contrato laborales que ofrecen a sus trabajadores. En segundo lugar, el cap´ıtulo
ofrece un estudio detallado de los determinantes del empleo temporal en el sector
manufacturero espan˜ol, prestando especial atencio´n a la nacionalidad y taman˜o
de las empresas. Los resultados indican que una reforma laboral que trate de re-
ducir el uso de contratos laborales temporales deben ofrecer incentivos distintos a
empresas de diferente taman˜o.
El cap´ıtulo 2 estudia la estimacio´n de un modelo probit ordenado dina´mico con
efectos fijos, y su aplicacio´n al estudio de los determinantes del estado de salud
autoreportado (ESA).2
El ESA se ha utilizado como sustituto del verdadero estado de salud en nu-
merosos estudios socioecono´micos. Por otra parte, tambie´n se ha demostrado que
es un buen predictor de la mortalidad y de la demanda de atencio´n me´dica (ve´ase,
por ejemplo van Doorslaer, Koolman y Jones 2004).
Contoyannis, Jones y Rice (2004) estudiaron la dina´mica y los efectos de vari-
ables socioecono´micas sobre la ESA para la Encuesta de Panel de Hogares Brita´nica
(British Household Panel Survey). Concretamente, los autores estudiaron un mod-
elo probit ordenado dina´mico con efectos aleatorios (random effects). Entre otros
objetivos, Contoyannis, Jones y Rice buscaban determinar la contribucio´n relativa
de la dependencia del estado (state dependence) y la heterogeneidad no observada
en la persistencia observada en la ESA.
En este cap´ıtulo, aplicamos un ana´lisis de efectos fijos, en vez de efectos aleato-
rios, lo que nos permite dejar libre la distribucio´n conjunta de los dos efectos indi-
viduales y su correlacio´n con las variables explicativas, as´ı como evitar el problema
de las condiciones iniciales.
Adema´s de tener en cuenta a los factores no observados que afectan el estado
de salud (cambios de ı´ndice, index shifts), tambie´n tomamos en cuenta la posible
heterogeneidad en los criterios de reporte del estado de salud (cambios de punto
de corte, cut point shifts), que puede producirse si los individuos utilizan distintos
2Este cap´ıtulo esta´ basado en Carro y Traferri (2009).
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umbrales para evaluar su salud (es decir, dos personas pueden informar de un valor
diferente para la ESA aunque tengan el mismo nivel de salud verdadera).
A pesar de las ventajas de efectos fijos sobre los efectos aleatorios, ha habido
pocas aplicaciones en modelos no lineales en el a´rea de la economı´a de la salud
(tal como puede verse al leer el cap´ıtulo del Handbook of econometrics de Jones
2007). Esto se debe a la dificultad de lidiar con el problema de los para´metros
incidentales, el cual es especialmente grave en nuestro modelo, ya que contiene dos
efectos fijos (index y cut point shifts).
Para tener en cuenta el problema de los para´metros incidentales, aplicamos
el enfoque de reduccio´n de sesgo de Carro (2007), y comparamos los estimadores
resultantes con los estimadores “esta´ndar” de ma´xima verosimilitud, y con los
estimadores corregidos de Bester y Hansen (2009). Las simulaciones de Montecarlo
muestran que tanto los estimadores de ma´xima verosimilitud como los de Bester
y Hansen tienen un mayor sesgo que los obtenidos bajo el enfoque de Carro. Por
otra parte, tambie´n encontramos que los estimadores de Bester y Hansen tienen
un gran sesgo, incluso para paneles relativamente grandes.
Estimamos el modelo propuesto usando datos de la Encuesta de Panel de Hog-
ares Brita´nica en el per´ıodo 1991-2006. Nuestras mejores estimaciones muestran
que los dos efectos fijos presentan una variacio´n significativa para distintos indi-
viduos, por lo que es importante tener en cuenta ambos efectos al estimar el efecto
de otras variables. Nuestras estimaciones muestran tambie´n que la dependencia de
estado es muy importante, a pesar de que se haya controlado por la heterogeneidad
no observada y algunas medidas objetivas de salud. Estas u´ltimas variables son
las que poseen los mayores efectos marginales.
Este cap´ıtulo tiene dos contribuciones principales. En primer lugar, el cap´ıtulo
contribuye a la literatura reciente sobre la correccio´n de sesgo en los datos de panel
de modelos no lineales, mediante la aplicacio´n y el estudio de las propiedades de
muestra finita de dos de las propuestas existentes para el caso probit ordenado.
Encontramos que la correccio´n ma´s directa y de fa´cil aplicacio´n a nuestro modelo
(la de Bester y Hansen) no es la mejor, y todav´ıa tiene mantiene sesgos importantes
para taman˜os de panel como el que nosotros utilizamos. En segundo lugar, el
cap´ıtulo contribuye a la literatura que estudia los determinantes de las medidas
de salud autoreportada, mediante la aplicacio´n del ana´lisis anterior a la Encuesta
de Panel de Hogares Brita´nica.
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Por u´ltimo, en el cap´ıtulo 3 estudio las diferencias de ge´nero en la eleccio´n
de carrera y en la probabilidad de ingreso a la universidad en la Universidad de
Campinas, una universidad pu´blica brasilen˜a dependiente del Estado de Sa˜o Paulo.
Como con la mayor´ıa de las universidades pu´blicas de Brasil, los candidatos
para la entrada en la Universidad de Campinas eligen primero la carrera a la que
desean entrar, y luego compiten por un lugar en esa carrera tomando un examen
espec´ıfico para dicha carrera. Esta caracter´ıstica singular del caso de Brasil me
permite diferenciar el efecto del ge´nero sobre las probabilidades de entrada en cada
carrera, y sobre las preferencias.
En este cap´ıtulo, propongo un modelo econome´trico que tiene en cuenta dos
problemas importantes: el sesgo de seleccio´n, y el hecho de que la utilidad esperada
de una carrera depende de la probabilidad de entrada. Luego, estimo el modelo
utilizando una novedosa base de datos obtenida de la Comisio´n Permanente de los
Vestibulares (Comvest) de la Universidad de Campinas.
Las estimaciones proveen evidencia de que existen diferencias de ge´nero tanto
en las preferencias, como en las probabilidades de entrada a las distintas carreras.
Para la mayor´ıa de las carreras, la mayor parte de las diferencias de ge´nero en la
eleccio´n de las carreras es explicada por diferencias en preferencias. Sin embargo,
para las carreras ma´s exigentes (aquellas que requieren mayores calificaciones para
entrar), las diferencias en la eleccio´n de carrera tambie´n son explicadas en gran
medida por las diferencias en las probabilidades de entrada. Por u´ltimo, tambie´n
encuentro que el ge´nero tiene interacciones importantes con otras variables. En
particular, las diferencias de ge´nero dependen de las variables de educacio´n, las
caracter´ısticas socioecono´micas y los antecedentes familiares.
Este cap´ıtulo tiene tres contribuciones principales. En primer lugar, el cap´ıtulo
presenta un modelo econome´trico que tiene en cuenta el sesgo de seleccio´n, a difer-
encia de trabajos anteriores, que han asumido que los errores de las ecuaciones
que determinan la probabilidad de entrada y la eleccio´n de los estudiantes son
independientes, por lo que suponen que no hay sesgo de selectividad (ve´ase, por
ejemplo, Montmarquette et al. 2002). En segundo lugar, el cap´ıtulo introduce una
nueva base de datos, que permite separar los efectos diferenciales de la probabil-
idad de entrada y las preferencias en las diferencias de ge´nero en la eleccio´n de
carrera universitaria. En tercer lugar, este cap´ıtulo proporciona el primer ana´lisis
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detallado de las diferencias de ge´nero en la eleccio´n de carreras en Brasil. Di-
cho ana´lisis es importante por los posibles efectos de las diferencias en la eleccio´n
de carrera sobre las posteriores diferencias profesionales entre hombres y mujeres.
Esta l´ınea de investigacio´n es muy importante para el Gobierno Federal de Brasil,
que ha introducido ma´s de 400 proyectos dirigidos a mejorar la igualdad de oportu-
nidades entre hombres y mujeres, los que sera´n llevados a cabo por 22 instituciones
gubernamentales 2008 y 2011 (Pinheiro et al. 2008).
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CHAPTER 1
Temporary Employment and Firm Ownership Nationality:
Evidence from Spain
Abstract. This paper analyzes the differences in the proportion of temporary
employees of domestic and foreign firms in the Spanish manufacturing sector.
I estimate sample selection models using data from the Survey on Managerial
Strategies (ESEE) in 1991-2005. I find there is a clear relation between the
nationality of the owners of the firm and the type of labor contracts offered,
even after controlling for observable firm characteristics and unobservable fixed
effects. In particular, the share of temporary employees is significantly lower for
foreign firms and this effect decreases with firm size.
1. Introduction
The high share of temporary workers in total employment in Spain since the
mid-1980s raised concern among policy-makers because of the potential negative
effects of temporary employment on efficiency and equality. As has been noted
in the literature, the co-existence of permanent and temporary contracts creates
a segmented labor market, which may imply lower investment in human capital,
unequal distribution of unemployment duration, lower mobility and larger wage
dispersion (see, for example, Bentolila and Dolado 1994, Gu¨ell 2000, Garibaldi and
Mauro 2002, Blanchard and Landier 2002).1
A series of employment legislation reforms were performed in 1994, 1997 and
2001, with the objective of reducing the share of temporary workers. The reforms
lowered the hiring and dismissal costs of permanent workers and restricted the
use of fixed-term contracts. According to the Index of Strictness of Employment
1The high share of temporary workers was a consequence of the 1984 Employment Protection
Legislation Reform, which liberalized fixed-term contracts, in order to reduce the high unem-
ployment rate. As a result, the share of temporary workers increased from 15.6% in 1987 to
33.65% in 1994. However, the reform had little effect on the unemployment rate, which was on
average 19.41% between 1984 and 1994.
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Protection Legislation of the OECD (Table A.1 in Appendix A), the regulation
of permanent contracts in Spain was one of the most stringent regulations in the
OECD in 1990, and the regulation of temporary contracts was one of the weakest
regulations. After the reforms, the regulation of permanent contracts became more
flexible and the regulation of temporary contracts strengthened, becoming one of
the most stringent by 2003.
Nevertheless, these reforms had no impact on the share of temporary workers,
which kept above 30% from 1994 to 2007. In comparison with other OECD coun-
tries, Spain still has one of the largest shares of temporary employment, which
is 20 percentage points above the OECD and European means (see Table A.2 in
Appendix A.).
The reasons for the high proportion of temporary workers in Spain, despite
the efforts of the afore mentioned reforms, have not been studied in depth. An
exception is the paper by Dolado, Garc´ıa-Serrano, and Jimeno (2002). These
authors claim that policy reforms did not have the desired effect on the share of
temporary workers because of a simultaneous increase of temporary employment
in the public sector.
An analysis of the Spanish manufacturing sector may provide an additional
explanation to this puzzle. The Spanish manufacturing sector provides an inter-
esting case study because it has a similar proportion of temporary employees as
the aggregate economy and also shows a similar evolution in the period under
study (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A). Interestingly, microeconomic data from
the Survey of Managerial Strategies (Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales,
ESEE) shows that the proportion of temporary workers of domestic firms is 9 per-
centage points higher than the proportion of foreign-owned firms (where a firm is
considered foreign in a given year if its proportion of foreign capital is larger than
50%). This suggests that the nationality of firm owners may influence the choice
between temporary and permanent employment contracts.
There is a large literature analyzing the differences between domestic and for-
eign firms. The general conclusions of these studies are that foreign firms have
higher labor productivity, a higher proportion of skilled workers and that they
pay higher wages for workers of similar skills (Feliciano and Lipsey 1999, Conyon,
Girma, Thompson, and Wright 2002, Griffith and Simpson 2003, Go¨rg, Strobl,
and Walsh 2007). This literature is an important precedent for this paper for two
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reasons. First, it provides support for the idea that domestic and foreign firms may
also differ in their hiring policies regarding temporary and permanent employment.
Second, given that domestic and foreign firms have different characteristics, it is
important to control for these characteristics when examining whether there is an
effect of firm nationality on temporary employment.
The objective of this paper is to determine if, after controlling for a large
set of observable firm characteristics and unobservable firm-specific time-invariant
components, there is still a relationship between firm nationality and the type
of employment contracts that firms offer. Identifying the characteristics of firms
with a low proportion of permanent contracts is important, as it could help in the
design of a labor reform aiming to provide the right incentives for firms to increase
their use of permanent contracts.
For this purpose, I estimate standard censored Tobit and Heckman sample
selection models (also known as type I Tobit and Heckman two-step models, re-
spectively), using data from the Survey of Managerial Strategies (Encuesta so-
bre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE), which includes a representative number of
Spanish firms in the manufacturing sector during 1991-2005.
The estimations show that firm nationality has a significant effect over the
probability that firms hire temporary workers and over the proportion of temporary
workers for firms that choose to hire temporary workers. The size and significance
of the effect depends on firm size. In the case of the Heckman estimations, for
example, a higher proportion of foreign capital implies a lower average probability
of hiring temporary workers for small and medium firms, but not for large firms.
Likewise, a higher proportion of foreign capital implies a decrease in the average
proportion of temporary workers (for firms who choose to hire temporary workers)
for medium and large firms, but not for small firms.
In order to study the quantitative relevance of the effects, I calculate what the
average probability of hiring temporary employees and the average proportion of
temporary employees would be if firms changed their proportion of foreign capital
to 50%. This exercise allows me to determine for which groups of firms a change
in the proportion of foreign capital would have a significant effect on temporary
employment. For example, in the case of the Heckman estimations, if firms with a
proportion of foreign capital smaller than 50% were to change their proportion of
foreign capital to 50%, the probability of hiring temporary employees would fall
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in average 8.52 percentage points. However, the effect is not significant for firms
with more than 50% of foreign capital changing their proportion of foreign capital
to 50%. The analysis of Tobit estimations leads to similar conclusions.
I also find that the effect of foreign nationality on temporary employment is
decreasing in firm size. In the case of the Heckman estimations, a change in
the proportion of foreign capital of domestic firms to 50% implies a decrease in
the probability of hiring temporary employees of 10.76 percentage points for small
firms and of 5.28 percentage points for medium firms, and also implies a decrease in
the proportion of temporary employees of 2.4 to 3.9 percentage points for medium
firms and of 2.51 to 2.7 percentage points for large firms.
Fixed effects estimations show that there may be unobserved firm character-
istics, like the managerial style or ability, which also influence the proportion of
temporary employees. However, the estimated marginal effects of firm nationality
are still statistically and quantitatively significant, which shows that firm nation-
ality has an effect on the type of labor contracts offered, even after controlling for
unobservable firm characteristics.
Given that the proposed econometric analysis considers a large number of co-
variates related with the structure of the firm, its production technology and de-
mand, and the characteristics of its managers, as well as unobserved firm charac-
teristics, the measured effects of firm nationality will not be caused by a correlation
between firm nationality and other factors, and therefore, the coefficients of the
reduced form analysis reflect a causal effect of firm nationality on temporary em-
ployment. These results are also robust to several alternative specifications.
This paper provides two contributions to the literature. First, I further the
study of the differences between domestic and foreign firms. In particular, I show
that domestic and foreign firms do not differ only in wages and productivity, but
also on the types of labor contracts that they offer. Second, I provide a detailed
study of the determinants of temporary employment in the Spanish manufacturing
sector, focusing in particular on firm nationality and firm size. I find that foreign
nationality has a negative effect on the probability of hiring temporary employees
for small and medium firms, and on the proportion of temporary employees (for
firms that hire temporary employees) of medium and large firms. These findings
indicate that labor reform should provide different incentives to firms of different
size.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework.
Section 3 describes the sample used in the estimations. Section 4 discusses the
empirical model and estimation strategy. Section 5 presents the results. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical framework
Firms determine their demand of permanent and temporary workers by solving
a profit maximization problem. The demand of each firm will depend on the
productivity, wages and hiring and dismissal costs of each kind of worker, and on
the firm’s need to adapt to fluctuations in the business cycle. All these factors
may be firm specific, so they should be taken into account when attempting to
determine whether firm nationality has an effect on the proportion of temporary
workers. In what follows, I will explain how each of these factors affects the
proportion of temporary workers and comment on the expected sign of this effect.
With respect to productivity, several papers show that permanent workers
are in general more productive than temporary workers. For example, Sa´nchez
and Toharia (2000) show that firm productivity diminishes as the proportion of
temporary workers increases in the case of Spain. To control for this effect, I
introduce variables related to productivity, human capital, on-the-job training and
capital intensity, which are expected to have a negative effect on the proportion
of temporary employees.
Firms may also differ in the wages they pay for each kind of worker. Unfor-
tunately, the survey does not provide disaggregated information on wages, so I
take an indirect approach and relate the wage mark-up (the ratio of wages of per-
manent and temporary workers) to firm specific variables. Wage determination
models like efficiency wages, union bargaining and insider-outsider models show
that in addition to external market forces, firm specific variables can also affect
the wages of a given firm (see Katz 1986, Oswald 1985, Lindbeck and Snower 1988,
respectively, for detailed surveys).
According to Nickell, Vainiomaki, and Wadhwani (1994), for example, the wage
mark-up depends not only on internal factors, such as industry prices and produc-
tivity; external factors, such as the aggregate wage and unemployment rate; but
also on product market conditions, represented by the firm’s market share. The
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latter effect arises because monopoly power generates rents, some of which can be
expropriated by insiders (permanent workers) in the wage bargaining process.
As I have mentioned above, regressions will include variables to control for
productivity differences. I will also include variables to account for the firm’s
market power. These variables are expected to have a negative effect on the
proportion of temporary workers, through their effect on the wage mark-up (e.g.
an increase in market share implies an increase in the wage of permanent workers
relative to the wage of temporary workers, and thus an increase in the share of
temporary employees).
Finally, adjustment costs models analyze the way in which firms adjust their
employee staff to face economy-wide or industry-specific economic fluctuations
(Nickell 1978, Sargent 1978, Kennan 1979, Hamermesh and Pfann 1996). Ad-
justment costs differ between permanent and temporary workers, and between
increases and decreases in the number of employees. Temporary contracts have
lower firing costs, so the proportion of temporary workers should decrease during
recessions and increase in expansions.
Taking into account the literature analyzing the differences between firms of
different nationalities, domestic and foreign firms may also differ in the way they
react to changes in productivity, wages and economic fluctuations. For this reason,
in Section 5.1 I present an alternative specification with interactions between firm
nationality and the aforementioned controls.
Summarizing, regressions will include suitable controls to account for differ-
ences in productivity, wages and business cycle fluctuations. To the extent that
I properly control for observable and unobservable firm characteristics, the esti-
mated coefficients of firm nationality will measure the causal effect of nationality
on the proportion of temporary employees.
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3. Data description
3.1. The sample. The dataset comes from the Survey of Managerial Strate-
gies (Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales, ESEE)2. The sample is an unbal-
anced panel of 4,050 firms drawn from the Spanish manufacturing sector in the
period 1990-2005.
The survey is national in scope and the sample is representative of the universe
of manufacturing establishments of certain sizes. The sample has been selected
across both activity sectors and size intervals, where size is determined by the
number of workers. Two subpopulations have been distinguished, one formed by
firms with more than 200 workers, and another by firms with 10 to 200 workers.
For the first subpopulation the sample selection was exhaustive. For the second
subpopulation, the sample was selected by random sampling across 20 activities
and four employment size intervals.
Year 1990 is not considered because the measurement methodology of many
variables changed in 1991. The sample has been cleaned by dropping observations
of years in which the accounting period is incomplete, the export propensity is
larger than 100 or the firm does not report some of the variables used in the
estimations. Firms that were involved in a merger or acquisition are excluded
from the sample. I also exclude firms that stop reporting because they become
unreachable, disappear or stop cooperating. Finally, the selected sample includes
all firms with at least two consecutive observations. The final sample has 2,136
firms and 16,075 observations. See Table B.1 in Appendix B for more details.
3.2. Variable definitions. In this section, I describe the variables used in
the estimations.3 The dependent variable is the proportion of temporary employ-
ees in total employment (pte). Total employment is the sum of temporary workers,
full-time permanent workers and one half of part-time permanent workers. Tem-
porary and full-time permanent workers are measured by the simple average of
the quarterly number of employees when there has been significant variation, or
2This survey is funded by the Ministry of Industry of Spain and carried out by the Public
Enterprise Foundation (Fundacio´n Empresa Pu´blica). See Garc´ıa, Jaumandreu, and Rodr´ıguez
(2002) for more information.
3All variables used in the estimations are directly obtained from the survey, except in the case
of the logarithm of the production of goods and services in real terms, which was constructed
using the production of goods and services (provided by the survey) and the IPRI (Industry
Price Index), which is provided by the INE (National Institute of Statistics).
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by the number of employees at the end of the year when the firm reports that this
number has not changed much. Part-time permanent workers are measured by the
number of workers at the end of the year.
There are two alternatives for the specification of the main explanatory vari-
able: one is to use the proportion of foreign capital, and the other is to construct a
dummy variable of firm nationality, which would be equal to 1 when the proportion
of foreign capital is greater than 50% and equal to 0 otherwise. The main disad-
vantage of the dummy variable specification is that it does not provide enough
temporal variation to apply fixed effects.4 Therefore, I will use the continuous
specification for the estimations. Nevertheless, I will keep the distinction between
domestic and foreign firms for the section with descriptive statistics. For complete-
ness, I will also present results using the dummy variable specification in Section
5.1.
To control for the effects of productivity and human capital, I introduce the
average productivity of labor, the capital-to-labor ratio, the proportion of engineers
and bachelors in total employment, and variables describing worker selection and
worker formation. The average productivity of labor is given by the production
of goods and services per worker and the capital-to-labor ratio is the net real
capital in equipment goods divided by the total number of employees. Worker
selection and worker formation are two categorical variables which can take on
three values depending on whether the firm performs the activity itself, hires an
external contractor to perform it, or does not practice the activity at all5.
The wage mark-up will be mainly affected by productivity and the firm’s mar-
ket power. The variables used to describe productivity have already been dis-
cussed. The variables capturing the firm’s market power are the market share, the
market globalization index and the market atomization index. The market share is
a weighted average of the market shares of all markets in which the firm operates,
the market globalization index is the percentage of these markets that the firm
identifies as foreign or domestic-foreign, and the market atomization index is the
4See the discussion in Section 3.3 for further details.
5Both worker selection and worker formation are reported only once every four years, but there is
evidence that skill composition is relatively stable over time. Therefore, the combination of these
variables with others describing productivity and human capital provides a good description of
the skill composition of the firm.
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percentage of markets served by the firm in which no firm has a significant market
share and the firm itself does not have a market share larger than 10%.
The wage mark-up will also be affected by macroeconomic variables, such as
the unemployment rate and the average aggregate wage. Given that these variables
are the same for all firms at each period, their effect will be taken into account
by including year dummies. At the same time, industry specific variables, like
industry price, will be captured by industry dummies.
Several variables are included to control for the fluctuations in the demand
of the firm, which may not always be in sync with the general business cycle.
To capture the demand in the main market of the firm, I introduce two dummy
variables: demand increase and demand decrease. These variables take the value
1 if the main cause of change in the price of the firm is an increase or decrease
in demand, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Another control is market dynamism,
which is a categorical variable based on a weighted market dynamism index, and
takes into account all markets in which the firm participates. It indicates if the
average demand is in a slump (index smaller than 35), is stable (index between
35 and 65), or is in a boom (index larger than 65). Finally, the estimations also
include the logarithm of the production of goods and services deflated by the
industry price index.
To complete the characterization of the firm, I include an additional set of
variables including size, industry, location, age, age squared, legal type, type of
good, outsourcing, export propensity, number of markets, financial situation, fam-
ily business and public control. Moreover, given that time-industry effects may be
particularly relevant in the Spanish case, estimations will also include interactions
between time and industry dummies.
Firm size is determined by the number of employees, and three size intervals
are considered: 10 to 50, 51 to 200 and more than 200 workers. With respect to in-
dustry, there are 20 activities, which correspond to the 3-digit CNAE classification.
Location is determined by the region where the main industrial establishment is
located. There are 17 regions that correspond to the Autonomous Communities
of Spain.
Firms are classified according to their legal type, such as corporations and
limited liability companies. The type of good that the firm produces may be a final
good, an intermediate good or undefined. The variable representing outsourcing is
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the ratio of subcontracted purchases over sales. The export propensity is measured
by the percentage of exports over total sales and the financial situation of the firm
is described by the annual cost of debt to financial institutions in the long-run and
in the short-run.
To control for the possible effect of family business on the type of employment
contracts offered, I include the proportion of owners and family of owners in the
firm’s management and administration. Finally, given that public firms may have
other objectives besides profit maximization, I introduce a dummy variable of
public control, which takes the value 1 if the firm has a share of public capital
larger than 50% in any year in the examined period, and 0 otherwise. In an
alternative exercise, I exclude all these firms from the sample.
3.3. Sample statistics. Table B.2 shows the distribution of firms according
to ownership nationality, where a firm is considered domestic if its proportion of
foreign capital is less than 50%, and is considered foreign otherwise.
Most observations represent domestic ownership (87.74% in comparison with
12.26% representing foreign ownership). Most of the firms in the sample (94.29%)
never change nationality. Specifically, 1,801 firms have domestic nationality during
the whole period, and 213 firms have foreign nationality during the whole period.
Of the firms that changed nationality, 34.43% changed from domestic to foreign,
23.77% changed from foreign to domestic, and 41.80% changed nationality in more
than one direction.
Table B.2 also shows descriptive statistics for the proportion of temporary
employees (pte). The average proportion of temporary employees is 21.38% for
the whole sample, but the average proportion is nearly 9 percentage points higher
in the years in which firms are domestic (22.47%), in comparison with the years
in which they are foreign (13.59%).
It is interesting to compare the differences in the proportion of temporary
employees among firms that change nationality, given that with this exercise we
are partly controlling for unobserved permanent heterogeneity. If we look at firms
that change from foreign to domestic, for example, we can see that these firms have
9.16% of temporary workers in the years in which they were foreign, in comparison
with 11.18% in years in which they were domestic. This small difference in the
proportions of temporary workers is caused by the lack of within-firm variation
in the sample when using the dummy variable of firm nationality, which already
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suggests that fixed effect estimation is not going to work well with this specification,
as was noted in the previous section. In the case of firms that change nationality
from domestic to foreign, the difference in the proportions of temporary employees
of years in which they were domestic or foreign is larger. However, the small
number of observations of firms that change nationality in the sample still does not
allow us to identify permanent unobserved heterogeneity when using the dummy
variable specification for firm nationality.
A further analysis of the data shows there are important differences between
foreign and domestic firms. Table B.3 shows the distribution of firms according to
size. Domestic firms are in general smaller (70% have less than 50 workers) while
foreign firms are larger (60.30% have more than 200 workers). The proportion of
temporary workers is decreasing in size for domestic firms, but for foreign firms
the relationship between size and pte is non-monotonic (medium firms have lower
pte than small firms, but large firms have higher pte than medium firms). For each
size, the proportion of temporary employees is larger for domestic firms than for
foreign firms (differences are significant at 1%), but the difference diminishes as
size increases (around 9% for small and medium firms and 3.26% for large firms).
Tables B.4 to B.12 in Appendix B present a further account of the differences
between both types of firms. In general, the main activities of domestic and
foreign firms are different. Domestic firms are mostly dedicated to textiles, metal
products and food and tobacco, while foreign firms are mostly involved in electronic
and electrical equipment, motor vehicles, and chemical products. Foreign firms
are characterized by using more physical and human capital in their production
process and are more capital intensive. Also, these firms invest more in the hiring
and training of their workers, and prefer to subcontract these services. Foreign
firms are more oriented to the international market, because they have a larger
globalization index and their export propensity is 22.21 percentage points larger
than that of domestic firms. In addition, foreign firms operate in markets that
are more concentrated and their average market share is larger. There are also
differences in the legal form of the firms. Almost all foreign firms are corporations,
while domestic firms are more diversified in this aspect.
On the other hand, there are some characteristics in which the two types of
firms are similar. For example, both kinds of firms prefer to be located in Catalonia
or Madrid (38% of domestic firms and 55% of foreign firms), produce mainly
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intermediate goods (50.34% of domestic firms and 67.87% of foreign firms) and
prefer not to outsource the production of components or final goods. Finally, both
kinds of firms operate in markets they consider relatively stable.
To summarize, there is clear evidence that foreign and domestic firms have
different characteristics and behavior. It is therefore necessary to control for all
these characteristics when investigating whether firm nationality is an important
factor in determining the type of labor contract that firms offer.
4. Empirical model and estimation strategy
The objective of the empirical analysis is to determine if there is a relationship
between firm ownership nationality and the share of temporary employees, even
after controlling for observed and unobserved firm characteristics.
When choosing the econometric model, it is necessary to take into account that
22.9% of the observations correspond to firms with a zero proportion of temporary
contracts (corner solutions). One possibility is to apply a censored regression
model like the standard censored Tobit model (Tobin 1958), also known as type I
Tobit model.6
The standard censored Tobit model that allows for lower censoring assumes
that the observed dependent variable, yjt, satisfies
(1) yjt = max(0, y
∗
jt),
where j = 1, . . . , N is the firm index and t = 1, . . . , T is the period index. y∗jt is
the latent variable generated by the classical linear regression model
(2) y∗jt = x
′
jtβ + µjt,
where xjt is a vector of regressors, including 1 for the intercept, and β is the
corresponding vector of parameters. The errors µjt are independent and follow a
distribution N(0, σ2µ), conditional on xjt. Note that xjt is independent of µjt but
the relation between xjt and µjs, for s 6= t is unspecified.
6Strictly speaking, the dependent variable has potentially both lower and upper censoring (it
can only take on values in the unit interval). However, the upper censoring does not take place
in practice, so I will use a model which only allows for lower censoring. It is also important to
remark that, even though the range of the dependent variable is bounded, the estimated model is
still a valid linear approximation of the function determining pte as a function of the explanatory
variables.
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The main limitation of this model is that the same set of variables and co-
efficients determine both the probability that an observation is censored and the
value of the dependent variable. In our case, this means that all explanatory vari-
ables affect the probability of entry into the temporary employment market and
the proportion of temporary contracts offered in the same way.
This shortcoming can be overcome by using a more flexible estimation ap-
proach, such as the sample selection model of Heckman (1979), also known as
Heckman two-step model. In this model, a different set of variables and coefficients
determines the probability of a zero outcome and the value of the dependent vari-
able given that it is not zero. In particular, it could be possible that nationality
affects the proportion of temporary contracts offered (given that the proportion is
positive), but not the probability of entry into the market of temporary employees.7
Heckman’s sample selection model is characterized by the following two equa-
tions:
y2jt = 1[x
′
jt α + vjt ≥ 0],(3)
y∗1jt = x
′
1jt δ + ujt.(4)
The first equation is the selection or entry equation and the second one is the
outcome or level-of-use equation. y2jt is a binary entry indicator which takes the
value 1 if x′jt α+ vjt ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise. xjt is a k-vector of regressors and x1jt is
an m-vector of regressors with m ≤ k.
The entry equation determines the probability of entry into the market of
temporary contracts and the level-of-use equation determines the proportion of
temporary contracts offered, given that the firm has decided to enter into this
market.
The underlying assumptions of this model are: (i) (x1jt, xjt, y2jt) are always
observed, but y∗1jt is observed only when y2jt = 1, (ii) ujt, and vjt are independent of
xjt and x1jt, (iii) vjt ∼ N(0, 1), and (iv) E(ujt|vjt) = γ vjt. The model is estimated
through a standard two-step procedure, which gives consistent estimators under
the above assumptions.
7Even though the Tobit model places additional restrictions to the model equations, in compar-
ison with the Heckman model, it is interesting to compare the results of both estimations, in
order to see the effect of these additional restrictions on the estimation results. For this rea-
son, and also for completeness, I will estimate both Tobit and Heckman models for the different
specifications in the paper.
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In Section 5 I present the estimations of the Tobit and Heckman models. The
dependent variable of interest in both models is ptejt. The regressors included in
xjt are interactions of the proportion of foreign capital with each category of size
(these are the main explanatory variables), dummy variables of size, legal form,
type of good, market dynamism, demand increase and demand decrease, public
participation, worker selection, worker formation, industry, location, and year (plus
interactions between time and industry dummies); and continuous variables like
the capital-labor ratio, age, age squared, proportion of engineers and bachelors,
average productivity of labor, market share, market globalization index, market
atomization index, production of goods and services in logs, outsourcing, export
propensity, number of markets, cost of debt in the long-run, cost of debt in the
short-run, and family control.
In the case of Heckman’s sample selection model, it is well known that if the set
of explanatory variables is the same in the selection and outcome equations, the
coefficients are identified only due to the non-linearity of the inverse Mill’s ratio.
However, if x′jtα does not have much variation in the sample, the inverse Mill’s ratio
will be approximately linear. Therefore, in order to guarantee the identification of
the parameters, it is better to have non-trivial exclusion restrictions.
Consequently, the regressors included in the x1jt vector will be the same than
in xjt, with the exception of the dummies of worker selection, the outsourcing
indicator and family control. Moreover, in order to have additional exclusion
variables and with the aim of picking up the effect of the legal reforms carried
out in 1994, 1997, and 2001, I will include dummy variables for the labor reforms,
where each of these dummies is one for the year of the reform and the following
years until a new reform, and 0 otherwise. Since the objective of these reforms was
to discourage the use of fixed-term contracts, they will mainly affect the decision
of hiring temporary workers or not.
4.1. Fixed effects estimation. Until now I have considered that the propor-
tion of temporary contracts is affected by a large set of observable variables. How-
ever, it is also reasonable to think there is a firm-specific time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity component (ηj), which could be related with the managerial style or
ability of the firm. For example, firms with higher managerial skills will tend to
hire more permanent workers, just like firms with higher productivity. Therefore,
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if foreign firms have higher (lower) ability, the effect of foreign nationality on the
proportion of temporary workers will be overestimated (underestimated).
This endogeneity problem can be solved by applying fixed effects techniques,8
which means that no restrictive assumptions on the distribution of ηj are imposed.
In the Heckman model, assuming that the unobserved component is only in
the outcome equation, it is possible to obtain fixed-T consistent estimators by
applying a two-step estimation procedure, and estimating in the second step a
transformed model in deviations with respect to individual means. In the case
of the entry equation of the Heckman model (which is a Probit model) or the
Tobit model, on the other hand, it is not possible to obtain fixed-T consistency
without assuming a particular distribution for the unobserved effect9. Moreover, I
consider the selection equation of the Heckman model as a reduced form equation,
which is included in the estimations to take into account the selection process,
and thus obtain better estimates of the level of use equation. In other words, I am
not interested in determining the causal effect of the independent variables on the
probability of selection, but in correcting the estimates of the level equation. For
these reasons, I will only consider fixed effects in the level of use equation of the
Heckman model.
The empirical model to be estimated is:
y2jt = 1[x
′
jtα + vjt ≥ 0],(5)
y1jt = x
′
1jtδ + γλˆjt + ηj + ujt.(6)
As before, y2jt is the binary entry indicator and vjt and ujt are idiosyncratic dis-
turbances, independent of xjt and x1jt. ηj is a time-invariant individual-specific
fixed effect.
I estimate this model in two steps. The first step consists of a Probit esti-
mation of (5). The second step consists of OLS estimation of (6), including as a
regressor the estimated inverse Mills ratio, λˆjt ≡ λ(x′jtαˆ), obtained from the first
8It is also possible to apply a correlated random effects approach, but this is more restrictive
because it is necessary to assume some distributional form of the unobserved component to relate
it with the covariates.
9In general, is not possible to obtain fixed-T consistency in non-linear models, like Probit or
Tobit. There are some exceptions, like the conditional Maximum Likelihood for the static panel
Logit model (Andersen 1970), or Honore´ and Kyriazidou’s (2000) estimator for the dynamic
panel Logit model, but these models impose restrictive assumptions which hold only in certain
specific cases.
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step. To account for unobserved heterogeneity, the second equation is estimated
in deviations from individual means.
Finally, the variables included in xjt will be the same variables as in the case
without fixed effects, with the exception of the dummies of public control, loca-
tion and industry, given that they do not have enough within-firm variation in
the sample, and thus cannot be separately identified from permanent unobserved
heterogeneity.
5. Results
Table 1 shows the average marginal effects of the baseline specification for the
type I Tobit and Heckman sample selection models. In the Tobit case, I report
the average marginal effects on the expected value of the proportion of temporary
workers (pte), given that this value is greater than zero, E(pte |x, pte > 0). In the
Heckman case, I report the average marginal effects on the probability of entering
the market of temporary contracts, Pr(pte > 0 |x), and the expected value of pte
given that it is greater than zero, E(pte |x, pte > 0).
[ TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. ]
The dependent variables in all equations are expressed in percentage terms.
Therefore, the marginal effects measure the percentage change in the proportion
of temporary workers (Tobit and level-of-use equations) or the probability of entry
in the market for temporary workers (entry equations).
It is worth noticing that the first three entries in Table 1 are not the average
interaction effects between pfk and size, but the average marginal effects of the
proportion of foreign capital (pfk) calculated for groups of firms of different size.
The fourth entry is the average marginal effect of pfk considering all firms.
Given that the proportion of foreign capital is a continuous variable, the mar-
ginal effects shown in Table 1 show the effects of an infinitesimal change in the
proportion of foreign capital. These average marginal effects already show the
statistical significance of the effect of changes in the proportion of foreign capital
on temporary employment. However, it is also important to have an idea of the
magnitude of these effects.
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Table 2 shows the average effect of a change in the proportion of foreign capital
to 50%. For firms with less than 50% of foreign capital (domestic firms), this
exercise simulates what would happen if they changed their proportion of foreign
capital to the minimum possible amount to be considered foreign (according to our
definition of nationality). Likewise, for firms with more than 50% of foreign capital
(foreign firms), the exercise simulates what would happen if they changed their
proportion of foreign capital to the minimum possible amount to be considered
domestic.10
[ TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. ]
In the Tobit model the marginal effects of the proportion of foreign capital
are negative and significant at the 1% level for the three sizes. The average effect
for all firms is also significant. With respect to the average effect of changing the
proportion of foreign capital to 50%, it is significant for firms changing nationality
from domestic to foreign, but not for firms changing from foreign to domestic.
Specifically, if all domestic firms would change their proportion of foreign capital
to 50%, the proportion of temporary employees would fall in average 2.9 percentage
points. Moreover, the effect is larger for small firms and medium firms changing
from domestic to foreign.
In the level of use equation of the Heckman model without fixed effects, the
estimated effects of pfk are negative and significant at the 1% level for medium
and large firms, but are not significant for small firms, or when considering all
firms.
If we look at the effect of changing pfk to 50%, we can see that, as in the
Tobit case, the effect is only significant for firms changing their nationality from
domestic to foreign. Specifically, if medium sized domestic firms would change
their proportion of foreign capital to 50%, the proportion of temporary employees
would fall in average 3.9 percentage points, and if large domestic firms would
10Of course, it could well be the case that a national or domestic shareholder gains control of the
firm with less than 50% of the firm’s capital. However, in this exercise, the 50% threshold is only
used to test the quantitative importance of a discrete change in the proportion of foreign capital.
Considering a different threshold would not have a significant impact on the sign or statistical
significance of the effects, but would affect the magnitude of such effects.
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change pfk to 50%, the proportion of temporary employees would fall in average
2.7 percentage points.
With respect to the entry equation, the effect of pfk on the probability of entry
into the market of temporary workers is negative considering all firms, and also
for small and medium firms. A change of pfk to 50% has a greater impact for
firms going from domestic to foreign than for firms going from foreign to domestic.
Specifically, if all domestic change their pfk to 50%, the probability of hiring
temporary employees would fall in average 8.53 percentage points. The effect for
foreign firms gaining domestic nationality is significant only for small firms: if
all small foreign firms reduce pfk to 50%, the probability of hiring temporary
employees would increase 4.99 percentage points in average.
The difference in significance between the marginal effects of the entry and
level of use equations in the Heckman model indicate the importance of allowing
different processes to determine the probability of entry into the market for tem-
porary workers, and the share of temporary workers, when the firm decides to hire
temporary workers.
For example, in the Tobit model, a higher proportion of foreign capital for small
firms increases the probability of hiring temporary employees, but also increases
the share of temporary employees for firms that decide to hire temporary workers
(which is due to the fact that the same set of coefficients determines both quan-
tities). In the Heckman model, on the other hand, a higher proportion of foreign
capital for small firms affects the probability of hiring temporary employees, but
not the share of temporary workers given that the firm chooses to hire temporary
workers.
In the Heckman model without fixed effects, the coefficient of the inverse Mill’s
ratio is negative and significant, which means that variables that increase (de-
crease) the probability of entering the market of temporary employees have an
indirect negative (positive) effect on the level of temporary workers.
Fixed effects estimations reinforce the results of the estimations without fixed
effects. Marginal effects maintain sign and significance in the entry and outcome
equations, which means that firm nationality has an effect on the proportion of
temporary employees even after controlling for time invariant unobserved effects.
Comparing the results of the Heckman estimations with and without fixed
effects, we can see that the magnitudes of the effects of firm nationality are similar
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in both estimations, although they are slightly larger for the model without fixed
effects. For example, for medium sized domestic firms changing pfk to 50%, the
effect is 2.38 percentage points for the fixed effects estimation, and is 3.9 percentage
points for the model without fixed effects.
The coefficient of the inverse Mill’s ratio, which measures the extent of sample
selection, becomes non significant once we introduce fixed effects. This means that
the correlation we had found between the errors in the entry and level equations
in the first Heckman estimation may be due to unobserved characteristics. Once
we take into account these unobserved differences, the selection process looses
significance. This finding shows the importance of including fixed effects into the
analysis.
The above analysis allows us to conclude that, after controlling for a large set
of observable firm characteristics and also for unobservable heterogeneity across
firms, there is a significant effect of the proportion of foreign capital on the type
of employment contracts offered by firms.
With respect to the variables used as controls, in general the marginal ef-
fects have the expected sign. The marginal effects of the variables related with
productivity and human capital (proportion of engineers and bachelors, average
productivity of labor and capital-to-labor ratio) are negative and generally signif-
icant, which confirms our previous assertion that more productive firms tend to
have a smaller proportion of temporary workers.
A higher market share implies a decrease in the probability of hiring temporary
employees, and also on the proportion of temporary employees (except in the fixed
effects estimation). Therefore, the marginal effect of market share has the expected
sign. The market globalization index is significant only in the entry equation of
the Heckman estimations: firms that are more globalized have a lower probability
of hiring temporary employees. With respect to the market atomization index,
it does not have a clear effect on pte, since sign and significance depend on the
estimation.
The effects of the dummies of market dynamism are significant. Firms hire
more temporary workers in expansions, and hire less temporary workers in re-
cessions, as expected. The effect of recessions is larger in absolute value than
the effect of expansions in the level-of-use equations of the Heckman estimations,
which means that firms adjust their number of temporary workers more during
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recessions than during expansions. With respect to the demand in the main mar-
ket, a demand decrease has a negative effect on pte (except in the fixed effects
estimation), but it is interesting to notice that the effect is also negative for an
increase in demand.
Therefore, it is clear that in slumps the need for reducing costs drives firms
to dispense with temporary employees. However, during booms firms may have
incentives to hire either permanent or temporary workers. It is true that firms
prefer to hire temporary employees to avoid high dismissal costs in the future,
but if the firm believes that the expansion will last for a long time the lower
probability of firing workers will encourage the hiring of permanent workers. Thus,
the adjustment of labor demand depends on the phase of the cycle and on the firm’s
expectations of the duration of the boom or slump.
Another variable with a strong effect is the dummy of public capital. In the
case of the Heckman model without fixed effects, for example, having a share of
public capital larger than 50% in at least one year, implies an average decrease of
11.74 percentage points in the proportion of temporary employees.
Finally, it is interesting to analyze the effects of the labor reforms in the entry
equation. These marginal effects are calculated comparing the years after the
reform (until a new reform) with the years corresponding to the previous reform.
Results show that the reform corresponding to 1994 had a positive effect in the
share of temporary workers, which means that this reform failed to discourage the
use of fixed-term contracts. On the other hand, the reforms of 1997 (in comparison
with that of 1994) and 2001 (in comparison with 1997) had a negative effect on the
probability of entering the temporary contracts market, which is consistent with
the objective of those reforms.
In conclusion, the estimations of type I Tobit and Heckman sample selection
models show that nationality has a negative effect on the probability of hiring
temporary employees or the proportion of temporary employees, depending on
firm size. These findings support the hypothesis that there is a causal relationship
between firm ownership nationality and the share of temporary employees, after
accounting for observable and unobservable firm characteristics.
5.1. Robustness checks. I have estimated alternative specifications to test
the robustness of the results of the baseline specification. First, taking into account
that there are significant differences in the characteristics of foreign and domestic
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firms, I include a set of interactions between the proportion of foreign capital
and several control variables (all control variables except public control, and time,
industry and region dummies, for which there is not enough variation to accurately
estimate the coefficients corresponding to the interactions). The results of this
estimation (Specification II) are presented in Table 3.
[ TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE. ]
[ TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE. ]
Looking at Table 3 we can see that the results of Specification II are similar
to those of the baseline specification, although there are some differences. For
example, in the Heckman specification with fixed effects, the marginal effect of
pfk remains significant for medium firms, but becomes non significant for large
firms. This loss of significance may be due to the fact that many variables do not
have enough variation in the sample, which makes it difficult to accurately estimate
the coefficients of a large number of interactions in the fixed effects specification.
Nevertheless, Table 3 shows there is a significant effect of pfk on the proportion
of temporary workers, which is larger for medium firms in comparison with small
and large firms. Table 4 shows the effect of a change in pfk to 50%, and provides
additional support to the results of Table 3.
In order to see the effect of the interactions, Table 5 shows the effect of pfk
for different groups of firms. For example, the marginal effects of the level of
use equation of the Heckman model without fixed effects shows that the effect of
foreign nationality is smaller for firms that are more capital intensive, are older,
have higher labor productivity, and have a higher market globalization index. The
level of use equation of the Heckman model with fixed effects shows for most groups
the effect of nationality is non significant, which is due to the loss of significance
of this variable in the fixed effects specification, as discussed above.
[ TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE. ]
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Second, given that public firms may have other objectives besides profit max-
imization, all firms with a positive proportion of public capital in some year are
excluded from the sample (Specification III). These firms represent only a 2.4% of
the firms in the sample (51 firms and 440 observations are dropped). Table 6 shows
the marginal effects of pfk and Table 7 shows the average effects of a change in
pfk to 50%. Comparing these results with those of the baseline estimation, we can
see that when firms with public participation are not considered, the conclusions
of the analysis do not change significantly. In the Heckman case, for example, the
effects are slightly larger for the entry equation and slightly smaller for the level of
use equation, but they keep sign and significance (except in the case of the effect
of a change in pfk to 50% for large firms in the Heckman model without fixed
effects).
[ TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE. ]
[ TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE. ]
Third, firms’ adaptation to fluctuations in demand or technology may not
be instantaneous. Specification IV includes the lags of the dummies of demand
increase and decrease and the lag of the production of good and services, instead
of their contemporaneous values. Table 8 shows the marginal effects of pfk and
the lagged variables, and Table 9 shows the effects of a change of pkf to 50%. The
main difference with the baseline specification is that in the level equation of the
model with fixed effects, the marginal effects of foreign capital loose significance.
In particular, the effect is no longer significant for medium firms, and is significant
for large firms at a 10% level. Moreover, the effects of a change in pfk to 50%
in the level equation are no longer significant for medium and large firms. For
the other models, the results are similar to those of the baseline specification.
With respect to the marginal effects of the lagged variables, they are also less
significant than their contemporaneous counterparts in the baseline specification.
Demand increase is in general positive but non significant, and demand decease is
negative but smaller and in some cases non significant. The effect of changes in
the production of goods and services continues to be positive and significant, but
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it is smaller than the effect of the contemporaneous counterpart in the baseline
specification.
[ TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE. ]
[ TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE. ]
Finally, it is interesting to test the robustness of the results to the definition
of firm nationality. Specification V replaces the continuous specification of firm
nationality (proportion of foreign capital) by a dummy variable which is equal to
1 if the firm has a share of foreign capital greater than 50%, and is equal to 0
otherwise. Given that the dummy variable does not have much variation in the
sample, this specification is not amenable to the inclusion of fixed effects. Table 10
reports estimation results for this specification. We can see that this specification
leads to similar results as the baseline specification. In the entry equation of
the Heckman model, for example, foreign nationality has an effect for small and
medium firms, but not for large firms. In the level equation of the Heckman
model, foreign nationality has an effect for medium and large firms, but not for
small firms. Both results correspond to the findings of the benchmark model. As
for the magnitude of these effects, having a proportion of foreign capital higher
than 50% implies an average decrease of 5.47 percentage points in the share of
temporary employees for medium firms, and a decrease of 2.79 percentage points
in the share of temporary employees for large firms.
[ TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE. ]
Summarizing, the above analysis shows that the results of the baseline speci-
fication are robust to the introduction of interactions and lags of relevant control
variables, the exclusion of firms with public participation, and the use of alterna-
tive definitions of firm nationality.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, I present a study of the effects of firm nationality on the share
of temporary employees focusing on the Spanish manufacturing sector. For that
purpose, I estimated pooled type I Tobit and Heckman sample selection models,
and fixed effects Heckman sample selection models, regressing the proportion of
temporary employees on the proportion of foreign capital and a large set of ob-
servable firm-specific variables. The sample used in the estimations comes from
the Survey on Managerial Strategies (Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales,
ESEE) in the period 1991-2005.
The main finding of the paper is that, after controlling for observable and unob-
servable firm characteristics, there is a significant relationship between the propor-
tion of foreign capital and the employment contracts that firms offer. Therefore,
there is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the lower proportion of temporary
contracts observed in firms with a high proportion of foreign capital is not caused
by a composition effect (firm or industry composition), but that there is a causal
effect of firm nationality.
In order to study the quantitative relevance of the effects, I calculate what the
average probability of hiring temporary employees and the average proportion of
temporary employees would be if firms changed their proportion of foreign capital
to 50%. This exercise allows me to determine for which groups of firms a change
in the proportion of foreign capital would have a significant effect on temporary
employment. For example, in the case of the Heckman estimations, if firms with a
proportion of foreign capital smaller than 50% were to change their proportion of
foreign capital to 50%, the probability of hiring temporary employees would fall
in average 8.52 percentage points. However, the effect is not significant for firms
with more than 50% of foreign capital changing their proportion of foreign capital
to 50%. The analysis of Tobit estimations leads to similar conclusions.
I also find that the effect of foreign nationality on temporary employment is
decreasing in firm size. In the case of the Heckman estimations, a change in
the proportion of foreign capital of domestic firms to 50% implies a decrease in
the probability of hiring temporary employees of 10.76 percentage points for small
firms and of 5.28 percentage points for medium firms, and also implies a decrease in
the proportion of temporary employees of 2.4 to 3.9 percentage points for medium
firms and of 2.51 to 2.7 percentage points for large firms.
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The comparison of the Tobit and Heckman estimations show the importance of
allowing two different processes to determine the probability of having temporary
employees, and the proportion of temporary employees, given that the firm decides
to employ some of them.
Fixed effects estimations show that there may be unobserved firm character-
istics, like the managerial style or ability of the firm, which also influence the
proportion of temporary employees. However, the estimated marginal effects of
firm nationality are still statistically and quantitatively significant, which shows
that firm nationality has an effect on the type of labor contracts offered, even after
controlling for observable and unobservable firm characteristics.
The difference in the incentives to use permanent contracts between foreign and
domestic firms may be due to differences in the degree of risk aversion, the inter-
temporal discount rate or the time horizon taken into account to make decisions,
which may be affected by the nationality of the firm. It may also be the case that
foreign firms have directives from parent firms in the home country concerning
the hiring and training of workers, and these directives may deprecate the use of
temporary contracts.
Another reason may be that foreign firms have higher bargaining power, and
can therefore negotiate more favorable terms of permanent contracts with the
government or unions of the host country. Larger domestic firms may also benefit
from this additional bargaining power, and this may be the reason why the effect
of nationality is smaller for large firms.
The results raise interesting questions about why domestic firms prefer the
flexibility of temporary contracts and foreign firms the greater productivity or
experience of permanent contracts. Addressing this question would complement
the results of the present paper, and is an interesting direction for further research.
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Appendix A: Labor market indicators
Table A.1. Strictness of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)
Country Regular Contracts Fixed-Term Contracts
1990 1998 2003 1990 1998 2003
Australia 1 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3
Austria 2.6 2.9 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.8
Belgium 1.5 1.7 1.7 5.3 1.5 1.5
Canada 0.9 1.3 1.3 0 0 0
Denmark 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.3 2.3 2.3
Finland 2.7 2.3 2.2 3.3 3.3 3.3
France 2.3 2.3 2.5 3.5 4 4
Germany 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.5 1.8 1.8
Greece 2.5 2.3 2.4 4 4 4.5
Ireland 1.6 1.6 1.6 0 0 0.8
Italy 2.8 1.8 1.8 5.3 4 2.5
Japan 2.7 2.4 2.4 1 0.5 0.5
Korea 2.4 2.4 0.8 0.8
Netherlands 3.1 3.1 3.1 1.5 0.8 0.8
New Zealand 1.4 1.7 0.3 1.5
Norway 2.4 2.3 2.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
Poland 2.2 2.2 1 0
Portugal 4.8 4.3 4.2 2.3 2.3 1.8
Spain 3.9 2.6 2.6 1.5 2.5 3
Sweden 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.7 1.8 1.8
Switzerland 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3
Turkey 2.6 2.6 4.3 4.3
United Kingdom 0.8 0.9 1.1 0 0 0.3
United States 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0 0
Indices range from 0 (least stringent) to 6 (most stringent).
Data Source: OECD.Stat.
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Figure A.1. Proportion of temporary employees
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Appendix B: Description of the sample
Table B.1. Reasons for deletion of observations
Reason Obs. Firms
Accounting period is incomplete 45
Propensity to export is greater than 100 24
Missing variable 3,871
Firm is involved in a process of merger, acquisition or scission 5,271
Firm is unreachable, has disappeared or does not cooperate 34,134
Firm with less than two consecutive observations 1,330
Total 44,675
Initial Sample 60,750 4,050
Deleted observations 44,675 1,914
Final sample 16,075 2,136
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Table B.2. Firm Distribution in the Sample
Observations Firms Prop. of Temp. Employees
Num. % Num. % Mean St.dev. Min Max
Nationality
Domestic 14,105 87.74 - - 22.47 24.16 0 100.00
Foreign 1,970 12.26 - - 13.59 16.08 0 94.29
Total 16,075 100.00 2,136 100.00 21.38 23.50 0 100.00
Never change
Domestic 13,631 84.80 1,801 84.32 22.58 24.21 0 100.00
Foreign 1,412 8.78 213 9.97 12.82 14.88 0 94.29
Total 15,043 93.58 2,014 94.29 21.67 23.67 0 100.00
Change
Foreign to domestic
Domestic 112 0.70 - - 11.18 9.41 0 37.89
Foreign 149 0.93 - - 9.16 10.45 0 60.42
Total 261 1.62 29 1.36 10.04 10.04 0 60.42
Domestic to foreign
Domestic 128 0.80 - - 23.14 27.20 0 96.64
Foreign 173 1.08 - - 16.74 21.18 0 92.19
Total 301 1.87 42 1.97 19.46 24.09 0 96.64
Several changes
Total 470 2.92 51 2.39 19.27 21.02 0 95.86
Total firms that change 1,032 6.42 122 5.71 17.27 20.54 0 96.64
Data Source: ESSE
Table B.3. Firm Size
Size Domestic Foreign Differences
(number of workers) Obs. (%) Mean Pte Obs. (%) Mean Pte in Pte
1: [10, 50] 70.00 23.70 10.05 14.64 9.06***
[0.25] [1.73] [1.75]
2: [51, 200] 14.90 22.20 29.64 12.84 9.36***
[0.51] [0.69] [0.86]
3: > 200 15.10 17.05 60.30 13.79 3.26***
[0.40] [0.40] [0.57]
Total 14,105 1,970
Data Source: ESSE
Standard errors in brackets; *** significant at 1%.
30
T
a
b
l
e
B
.4
.
F
ir
m
A
ct
iv
it
y
A
ct
iv
it
y
D
om
es
ti
c
F
or
ei
gn
O
b
s.
(%
)
M
ea
n
P
te
O
b
s.
(%
)
M
ea
n
P
te
1:
M
ea
t
pr
o
ce
ss
in
g
3.
44
26
.5
5
1.
73
18
.2
5
2:
F
o
o
d
an
d
to
b
ac
co
10
.2
2
29
.0
8
7.
31
23
.3
5
3:
B
ev
er
ag
es
1.
96
15
.5
8
1.
62
22
.3
4
4:
T
ex
ti
le
s
an
d
cl
ot
h
in
g
12
.1
9
23
.4
3
5.
94
11
.1
6
5:
L
ea
th
er
an
d
fo
ot
w
ea
r
4.
47
35
.0
1
0.
1
0.
14
6:
W
o
o
d
pr
o
d
u
ct
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
3.
57
27
.8
5
1.
07
16
.3
5
7:
P
ap
er
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
2.
59
12
.8
5
4.
21
8.
06
8:
P
u
b
lis
h
in
g,
pr
in
ti
n
g
an
d
re
pr
o
d
u
ct
io
n
of
re
co
rd
ed
m
ed
ia
6.
46
13
.2
2
1.
52
10
.6
0
9:
C
h
em
ic
al
pr
o
d
u
ct
s
4.
74
11
.8
3
10
.8
6
7.
83
10
:
R
u
b
b
er
an
d
p
la
st
ic
pr
o
d
u
ct
s
4.
57
24
.4
2
8.
22
18
.7
7
11
:
N
on
-m
et
al
lic
m
in
er
al
pr
o
d
u
ct
s
7.
07
23
.9
7
4.
06
13
.0
5
12
:
F
er
ro
u
s
an
d
n
on
fe
rr
ou
s
m
et
al
s
2.
55
17
.8
1
2.
49
12
.5
2
13
:
M
et
al
pr
o
d
u
ct
s
10
.0
6
24
.1
0
9.
49
11
.4
9
14
:
In
d
u
st
ri
al
an
d
ag
ri
cu
lt
u
ra
l
m
ac
h
in
er
y
6.
62
15
.4
9
9.
14
9.
07
15
:
O
ffi
ce
m
ac
h
in
er
y
an
d
co
m
p
u
te
rs
1.
32
16
.2
4
2.
84
19
.1
7
16
:
E
le
ct
ri
ca
l
an
d
el
ec
tr
on
ic
m
ac
h
in
er
y
an
d
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
4.
18
21
.7
9
11
.9
3
15
.3
5
17
:
M
ot
or
ve
h
ic
le
s
3.
13
20
.2
5
12
.1
3
13
.1
7
18
:
O
th
er
tr
an
sp
or
t
eq
u
ip
m
en
t
1.
79
19
.6
4
2.
44
13
.0
2
19
:
F
u
rn
it
u
re
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
6.
44
26
.2
9
1.
22
20
.7
6
20
:
O
th
er
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
2.
64
22
.8
2
1.
68
10
.2
6
T
ot
al
14
,1
05
1,
97
0
D
at
a
S
o
u
rc
e:
E
S
S
E
31
Table B.5. Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables
Variable Nat. Mean St.dev. Min Max
Proportion of engineers and Domestic 3.00 5.57 0 71.4
bachelors (%) Foreign 6.64 7.57 0 49.9
Proportion of owners in firm’s Domestic 3.98 5.87 0 100
management and admin. (%) Foreign 0.09 0.63 0 12.5
Export propensity (%)
Domestic 12.45 22.24 0 100
Foreign 34.66 29.72 0 100
Market globalization index (%)
Domestic 14.79 33.58 0 100
Foreign 36.53 44.78 0 100
Capital-to-labor ratio
Domestic 36,985 54,762 5.73 984,279
Foreign 87,576 110,035 714.20 1,307,827
Production of goods and services Domestic 14.91 1.67 9.28 21.20
(in logs) Foreign 17.36 1.25 12.97 22.69
Average productivity of labor
Domestic 97,551 94,594 533 1,584,209
Foreign 189,433 209,396 20,335 2,452,482
Firm age
Domestic 21.44 19.77 0 224
Foreign 30.62 21.91 0 128
Market share (%)
Domestic 8.48 16.67 0 100
Foreign 19.95 21.64 0 100
Market atomization index (%)
Domestic 23.92 40.86 0 100
Foreign 10.41 28.20 0 100
Subcontracted purchases Domestic 8.96 17.86 0 100
over sales (%) Foreign 9.23 18.68 0 100
Annual cost of debt to financial Domestic 1.72 3.63 0 31
institutions in the long-run (%) Foreign 1.16 2.96 0 18
Annual cost of debt to financial Domestic 4.04 4.55 0 27
institutions in the short-run (%) Foreign 4.46 4.40 0 18
Number of markets
Domestic 1.95 1.19 1 5
Foreign 2.23 1.24 1 5
Proportion of public capital (%)
Domestic 0.99 8.83 0 100
Foreign 0.63 5.36 0 67
Data Source: ESSE
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Table B.6. Worker Selection Service
Service is: Domestic Foreign
Obs. (%) Mean Pte Obs. (%) Mean Pte
Performed by the firm 71.68 23.86 54.06 15.15
Subcontracted 12.02 18.11 42.28 11.96
Not used 16.31 19.58 3.65 9.41
Total 14,105 1,970
Data Source: ESSE
Table B.7. Worker Formation Service
Service is: Domestic Foreign
Obs. (%) Mean Pte Obs. (%) Mean Pte
Performed by the firm 56.98 24.86 34.16 14.74
Subcontracted 24.52 18.41 61.93 12.73
Not used 18.50 20.50 3.91 17.36
Total 14,105 1,970
Data Source: ESSE
Table B.8. Legal Form
Legal Form Domestic Foreign
Obs. (%) Mean Pte Obs. (%) Mean Pte
1: Corporations 53.71 18.04 92.34 13.71
2: Limited Liability Companies 38.30 28.33 6.80 12.48
3: Others 7.99 24.22 0.86 9.50
Total 14,105 1,970
Data Source: ESSE
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Table B.9. Firm Region
Region Domestic Foreign
Obs. (%) Mean Pte Obs. (%) Mean Pte
1: Andalucia 8.03 37.13 3.15 9.47
2: Aragon 3.65 24.53 7.77 15.86
3: Asturias 1.94 26.02 1.27 5.41
4: Balearic Islands 1.88 20.31 0.2 13.44
5: Canary Islands 1.58 18.18 1.12 7.14
6: Cantabria 1.13 11.62 2.84 13.38
7: Castilla-La Mancha 5.53 28.80 1.68 9.80
8: Castilla-Leon 4.49 20.83 6.29 11.27
9: Catalonia 20.29 16.91 31.57 12.81
10: Valencian Community 17.28 26.67 6.24 15.37
11: Extremadura 1.03 25.52 0.91 61.93
12: Galicia 5.29 29.56 2.49 18.59
13: Madrid 16.36 15.70 22.64 12.97
14: Murcia 2.74 34.21 0.61 56.42
15: Navarra 1.66 16.40 3.76 17.75
16: Basque Country 5.76 15.10 7.16 8.08
17: La Rioja 1.35 18.43 0.3 25.82
Total 14,105 1,970
Data Source: ESSE
Table B.10. Type of Good
Type Domestic Foreign
Obs. (%) Mean Pte Obs. (%) Mean Pte
1: Consumer good 23.17 22.94 11.12 12.20
2: Intermediate good 50.34 21.57 67.87 14.01
3: Undefined 26.49 23.79 21.02 13.00
Total 14,105 1,970
Data Source: ESSE
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Table B.11. Market Dynamism
Evolution Domestic Foreign
Obs. (%) Mean Pte Obs. (%) Mean Pte
Expansion 26.13 25.76 34.87 16.17
Stable 52.41 22.24 45.33 12.89
Slump 21.46 19.03 19.80 10.66
Total 14,105 1,970
Data Source: ESSE
Table B.12. Demand Changes
Change in Demand Domestic Foreign
Obs. (%) Mean Pte Obs. (%) Mean Pte
Demand increase 3.41 23.36 5.13 11.43
Demand decrease 4.75 17.97 6.00 11.05
No change 91.84 22.67 89.00 13.89
Total 14,105 1,970
Data Source: ESSE
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Table 1. Results of the Baseline Estimations
Explanatory Variables Tobit Model
Heckman Model
No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Entry Level-of-use Entry Level-of-use
Equation Equation Equation Equation
Foreign capital of small firms -0.0880*** -0.2339*** -0.0446 -0.2339*** -0.0152
[0.024] [0.089] [0.039] [0.089] [0.051]
Foreign capital of medium firms -0.0724*** -0.1050*** -0.0871*** -0.1050*** -0.0583**
[0.015] [0.035] [0.022] [0.035] [0.029]
Foreign capital of large firms -0.0278*** -0.0191 -0.0443*** -0.0191 -0.0372**
[0.007] [0.017] [0.011] [0.017] [0.016]
Proportion of foreign capital -0.0729*** -0.1680*** -0.0522* -0.1680*** -0.0282
[0.018] [0.063] [0.027] [0.063] [0.035]
Small firm 1.0235* -1.5586 -1.3108 -1.5586 -6.3960***
[0.608] [1.883] [1.062] [1.883] [1.464]
Medium firm 2.1636*** 2.1077 0.4442 2.1077 -3.9520***
[0.405] [1.461] [0.698] [1.461] [0.951]
Prop. of eng. and bachelors -0.0687*** 0.0087 -0.1601*** 0.0087 0.0722
[0.021] [0.061] [0.031] [0.061] [0.048]
Capital-to-labor ratio -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age -0.2608*** -0.3267*** -0.3789*** -0.3267*** -0.8515**
[0.011] [0.025] [0.016] [0.025] [0.356]
Market dynamism: expansion 1.8751*** 3.6933*** 1.9467*** 3.6933*** 1.1412***
[0.276] [0.749] [0.419] [0.749] [0.317]
Market dynamism: slump -1.8145*** -3.3074*** -2.4509*** -3.3074*** -2.4174***
[0.305] [0.868] [0.504] [0.868] [0.398]
Demand increase -0.5245 0.1824 -1.8094** 0.1824 -1.8489***
[0.562] [1.762] [0.912] [1.762] [0.631]
Demand decrease -1.0304** 1.2565 -3.1479*** 1.2565 -0.4468
[0.479] [1.446] [0.760] [1.446] [0.575]
Public control -6.4124*** -10.0569*** -11.7366*** -10.0569***
[0.607] [3.328] [1.280] [3.328]
Export propensity 0.0135** -0.0121 0.0272*** -0.0121 0.0050
[0.006] [0.016] [0.009] [0.016] [0.013]
Production of good and services 1.9909*** 8.2223*** -0.2457 8.2223*** 4.8896***
[0.192] [0.492] [0.303] [0.492] [0.652]
Average productivity of labor -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000*** -0.0000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Market share -0.0253*** -0.0566*** -0.0171* -0.0566*** 0.0248*
[0.007] [0.020] [0.010] [0.020] [0.014]
Market globalization index 0.0041 0.0354*** -0.0046 0.0354*** -0.0039
[0.003] [0.010] [0.005] [0.010] [0.005]
Market atomization index 0.0055* -0.0161** 0.0235*** -0.0161** -0.0067
[0.003] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.005]
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Table 1. Results of the Baseline Estimations (continuation)
Explanatory Variables Tobit Model
Heckman Model
No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Entry Level-of-use Entry Level-of-use
Equation Equation Equation Equation
Worker formation not used -1.0096** -3.0514** -0.2845 -3.0514** -0.8424
[0.443] [1.217] [0.685] [1.217] [0.672]
Worker formation by the firm 0.3509 -0.9964 1.1029*** -0.9964 0.2165
[0.285] [0.870] [0.415] [0.870] [0.429]
Worker selection not used -3.2199*** -8.7062*** -8.7062***
[0.488] [1.463] [1.463]
Worker selection by the firm -0.7095** -1.5471 -1.5471
[0.322] [1.031] [1.031]
Family business -0.2020*** -0.2990*** -0.2990***
[0.027] [0.059] [0.059]
Cost of debt in the long-run 0.1238*** 0.3407*** 0.1175** 0.3407*** 0.0932**
[0.033] [0.095] [0.052] [0.095] [0.041]
Cost of debt in the short-run 0.0038 0.0264 0.0094 0.0264 0.0334
[0.028] [0.075] [0.043] [0.075] [0.037]
Labor reform of 1994 1.7912* 1.7912*
[0.949] [0.949]
Labor reform of 1997 -3.1850*** -3.1850***
[0.944] [0.944]
Labor reform of 2001 -9.1093*** -9.1093***
[1.004] [1.004]
Lambda -6.3686** -0.6443
[2.615] [2.491]
Number of observations = 16,075. All regressions include industry, region and time dummies
and variables of legal type, type of good and number of markets. Tobit and entry equations
also include dummies for worker selection and outsourcing. Standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2. Average effect of a change of pfk to 50%
Explanatory Variables Tobit Model
Heckman Model
No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Entry Level-of-use Entry Level-of-use
Equation Equation Equation Equation
Domestic to foreign
All firms -2.8970*** -8.5241*** -1.6361 -8.5241*** -0.1310
[0.618] [2.424] [1.117] [2.424] [1.487]
Small firms -3.1097*** -10.7621*** -0.7769 -10.7621*** 1.0780
[0.764] [2.948] [1.486] [2.948] [2.019]
Medium firms -3.1521*** -5.2836*** -3.9008*** -5.2836*** -2.3778*
[0.545] [1.964] [0.909] [1.964] [1.229]
Large firms -1.6592*** -1.3455 -2.6998*** -1.3455 -2.5104**
[0.466] [1.343] [0.833] [1.343] [1.065]
Foreign to domestic
All firms 0.0962 1.0053 0.0007 1.0053 -1.1740
[0.425] [1.469] [0.765] [1.469] [0.915]
Small firms 0.4980 4.9910** -1.5663 4.9910** -3.2587**
[0.460] [2.342] [1.161] [2.342] [1.478]
Medium firms 0.6968 2.6214 0.7506 2.6214 -1.0798
[0.439] [1.892] [0.815] [1.892] [0.995]
Large firms -0.2659 -0.4534 -0.1559 -0.4534 -0.9995
[0.463] [1.298] [0.799] [1.298] [0.992]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3. Results of Specification II
Explanatory Variables Tobit Model
Heckman Model
No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Entry Level-of-use Entry Level-of-use
Equation Equation Equation Equation
Foreign capital of small firms -0.0599 -0.1815 -0.0963** -0.1815 -0.0631
[0.049] [0.130] [0.045] [0.130] [0.055]
Foreign capital of medium firms -0.0780*** -0.0931** -0.1014*** -0.0931** -0.0585*
[0.016] [0.037] [0.023] [0.037] [0.030]
Foreign capital of large firms -0.0409*** -0.0115 -0.0581*** -0.0115 -0.0186
[0.007] [0.017] [0.012] [0.017] [0.016]
Proportion of foreign capital -0.0590* -0.1316 -0.0881*** -0.1316 -0.0516
[0.033] [0.088] [0.031] [0.088] [0.037]
Small firm 0.9958 -0.7802 -1.4251 -0.7802 -5.9498***
[0.631] [1.822] [1.050] [1.822] [1.446]
Medium firm 2.0306*** 2.5124* 0.3737 2.5124* -3.7230***
[0.418] [1.465] [0.688] [1.465] [0.941]
Prop. of eng. and bachelors -0.0761*** -0.0033 -0.1580*** -0.0033 0.0706
[0.022] [0.062] [0.033] [0.062] [0.048]
Capital-to-labor ratio -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age -0.2728*** -0.3282*** -0.4081*** -0.3282*** -0.8872**
[0.011] [0.025] [0.016] [0.025] [0.354]
Market dynamism: expansion 1.6623*** 3.8574*** 1.8334*** 3.8574*** 1.1416***
[0.270] [0.791] [0.424] [0.791] [0.318]
Market dynamism: slump -1.8962*** -3.1302*** -2.2190*** -3.1302*** -2.3136***
[0.322] [0.811] [0.509] [0.811] [0.395]
Demand increase -0.5343 0.2395 -1.8287* 0.2395 -1.6762***
[0.604] [1.777] [0.960] [1.777] [0.650]
Demand decrease -0.9728* 1.1625 -3.2605*** 1.1625 -0.3092
[0.505] [1.487] [0.760] [1.487] [0.577]
Public control -7.2395*** -8.9891*** -9.0600*** -8.9891***
[0.764] [2.806] [1.158] [2.806]
Export propensity 0.0170*** -0.0044 0.0441*** -0.0044 0.0029
[0.006] [0.017] [0.010] [0.017] [0.013]
Production of good and services 2.1104*** 8.5320*** -0.1243 8.5320*** 5.2686***
[0.192] [0.496] [0.301] [0.496] [0.650]
Average productivity of labor -0.0000*** -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0001*** -0.0000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Market share -0.0239*** -0.0488** -0.0161 -0.0488** 0.0232*
[0.007] [0.020] [0.011] [0.020] [0.013]
Market globalization index 0.0008 0.0249** -0.0052 0.0249** -0.0052
[0.003] [0.011] [0.005] [0.011] [0.006]
Market atomization index 0.0071** -0.0182** 0.0258*** -0.0182** -0.0066
[0.003] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.005]
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Table 3. Results of Specification II (continuation)
Explanatory Variables Tobit Model
Heckman Model
No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Entry Level-of-use Entry Level-of-use
Equation Equation Equation Equation
Worker formation not used -0.5917 -1.7305 0.3622 -1.7305 -0.7627
[0.473] [1.262] [0.746] [1.262] [0.705]
Worker formation by the firm 0.3737 -1.0485 1.3947*** -1.0485 0.1675
[0.296] [0.894] [0.432] [0.894] [0.436]
Worker selection not used -3.2973*** -8.7972*** -8.7972***
[0.531] [1.469] [1.469]
Worker selection by the firm -0.5973* -2.0616* -2.0616*
[0.344] [1.148] [1.148]
Family business -0.0736 -0.2295 -0.2295
[0.096] [0.169] [0.169]
Cost of debt in the long-run 0.1227*** 0.3433*** 0.1041** 0.3433*** 0.0867**
[0.032] [0.096] [0.050] [0.096] [0.039]
Cost of debt in the short-run 0.0309 0.0307 0.0567 0.0307 0.0377
[0.028] [0.075] [0.043] [0.075] [0.036]
Labor reform of 1994 2.1014** 2.1014**
[1.068] [1.068]
Labor reform of 1997 -3.2123*** -3.2123***
[0.998] [0.998]
Labor reform of 2001 -8.6825*** -8.6825***
[1.008] [1.008]
Lambda -6.9912*** -0.1226
[2.116] [2.430]
Number of observations = 16,075. All regressions include industry, region and time dummies
and variables of legal type, type of good and number of markets. Tobit and entry equations
also include dummies for worker selection and outsourcing. Standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4. Average effect of a change of pfk to 50%. Specification II.
Explanatory Variables Tobit Model
Heckman Model
No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Entry Level-of-use Entry Level-of-use
Equation Equation Equation Equation
Domestic to foreign
All firms -1.8250 -6.9554 -3.7162*** -6.9554 -1.8511
[1.944] [4.597] [1.368] [4.597] [1.696]
Small firms -1.4244 -8.7812 -3.5503* -8.7812 -1.6894
[2.672] [6.226] [1.861] [6.226] [2.310]
Medium firms -3.3706*** -4.7293** -4.8574*** -4.7293** -2.7650**
[0.642] [2.047] [0.960] [2.047] [1.315]
Large firms -2.1550*** -0.6875 -3.2602*** -0.6875 -1.5930
[0.471] [1.331] [0.844] [1.331] [1.055]
Foreign to domestic
All firms 0.4760 1.4109 0.6034 1.4109 -1.6324*
[0.428] [1.485] [0.763] [1.485] [0.918]
Small firms 0.4581 5.1310** -1.5205 5.1310** -3.4812**
[0.472] [2.394] [1.117] [2.394] [1.516]
Medium firms 0.7334* 2.9535 0.9105 2.9535 -1.3340
[0.437] [1.910] [0.820] [1.910] [1.033]
Large firms 0.3530 0.0325 0.6917 0.0325 -1.5686
[0.465] [1.305] [0.803] [1.305] [0.983]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5. Specification II: Effect of pfk for different groups of firms.
Explanatory Variables Tobit Model
Heckman Model
No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Entry Level-of-use Entry Level-of-use
Equation Equation Equation Equation
Capital-to-labor ratio
First quartile -0.0727 -0.1647 -0.1270*** -0.1647 -0.0892
[0.054] [0.132] [0.045] [0.132] [0.054]
Second quartile -0.0654 -0.1457 -0.1019*** -0.1457 -0.0634
[0.041] [0.107] [0.038] [0.107] [0.045]
Third quartile -0.0585** -0.1241 -0.0790*** -0.1241 -0.0413
[0.027] [0.076] [0.027] [0.076] [0.033]
Fourth quartile -0.0393*** -0.0920** -0.0466*** -0.0920** -0.0144
[0.012] [0.040] [0.016] [0.040] [0.020]
Age
Less than 10 years old -0.0972** -0.1535 -0.1326*** -0.1535 -0.0750
[0.049] [0.100] [0.039] [0.100] [0.048]
Between 11 and 20 years old -0.0611 -0.1496 -0.1006*** -0.1496 -0.0572
[0.040] [0.109] [0.036] [0.109] [0.043]
Between 21 and 30 years old -0.0499** -0.1289 -0.0801*** -0.1289 -0.0464
[0.025] [0.082] [0.027] [0.082] [0.033]
More than 31 years old -0.0147 -0.0872 -0.0202 -0.0872 -0.0178
[0.013] [0.058] [0.020] [0.058] [0.025]
Market dynamism: expansion -0.0570* -0.1416 -0.0791*** -0.1416 -0.0394
[0.035] [0.094] [0.028] [0.094] [0.034]
Market dynamism: slump -0.0449 -0.1273 -0.0984*** -0.1273 -0.0582
[0.034] [0.108] [0.034] [0.108] [0.039]
Demand increase -0.0802** -0.0995 -0.1106*** -0.0995 -0.0638*
[0.032] [0.080] [0.033] [0.080] [0.034]
Demand decrease -0.0499 -0.0772 -0.0889*** -0.0772 -0.0771**
[0.030] [0.092] [0.032] [0.092] [0.036]
Average productivity of labor
First quartile -0.063 -0.1715 -0.1292*** -0.1715 -0.1015*
[0.051] [0.136] [0.044] [0.136] [0.054]
Second quartile -0.0680* -0.1462 -0.0999*** -0.1462 -0.0743*
[0.038] [0.100] [0.036] [0.100] [0.044]
Third quartile -0.0645** -0.1260* -0.0788*** -0.1260* -0.0457
[0.027] [0.069] [0.027] [0.069] [0.033]
Fourth quartile -0.0408** -0.0828* -0.0468** -0.0828* 0.0118
[0.018] [0.049] [0.019] [0.049] [0.023]
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Table 5. Specification II: Effect of pfk for different groups of firms
(continuation).
Explanatory Variables Tobit Model
Heckman Model
No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Entry Level-of-use Entry Level-of-use
Equation Equation Equation Equation
Market globalization index
Equal to zero -0.0645* -0.1565 -0.0968*** -0.1565 -0.0600
[0.038] [0.099] [0.035] [0.099] [0.042]
Between 0 and 100 -0.0440** -0.0606 -0.0617*** -0.0606 -0.0276
[0.019] [0.047] [0.020] [0.047] [0.025]
Equal to 100 -0.0356** -0.0278 -0.0563*** -0.0278 -0.0206
[0.017] [0.050] [0.019] [0.050] [0.023]
Market atomization index
Equal to zero -0.0572* -0.1094 -0.0856*** -0.1094 -0.0472
[0.030] [0.081] [0.029] [0.081] [0.035]
Between 0 and 100 -0.0549* -0.1259 -0.0764** -0.1259 -0.0466
[0.032] [0.081] [0.030] [0.081] [0.037]
Equal to 100 -0.0673 -0.2199* -0.1033** -0.2199* -0.0723
[0.046] [0.121] [0.044] [0.121] [0.051]
Worker formation not used -0.0796** -0.1880* -0.0486 -0.1880* -0.0538
[0.040] [0.097] [0.053] [0.097] [0.056]
Worker formation by the firm -0.0533*** -0.0834* -0.1080*** -0.0834* -0.0664
[0.015] [0.043] [0.036] [0.043] [0.043]
Worker selection not used -0.0663* -0.1479* -0.0763 -0.1479* -0.0618
[0.036] [0.089] [0.049] [0.089] [0.054]
Worker selection by the firm -0.0519*** -0.0722** -0.0981*** -0.0722** -0.0588
[0.013] [0.030] [0.033] [0.030] [0.040]
Family business
Equal to zero -0.0815*** -0.1186** -0.0754*** -0.1186** -0.0350
[0.015] [0.049] [0.021] [0.049] [0.028]
Greater than zero -0.034 -0.1463 -0.1033** -0.1463 -0.0715
[0.066] [0.158] [0.044] [0.158] [0.050]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 6. Results of Specification III
Explanatory Variables Tobit Model
Heckman Model
No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Entry Level-of-use Entry Level-of-use
Equation Equation Equation Equation
Foreign capital of small firms -0.0791*** -0.2559*** -0.0191 -0.2559*** 0.0041
[0.026] [0.093] [0.042] [0.093] [0.050]
Foreign capital of medium firms -0.0644*** -0.1115*** -0.0666*** -0.1115*** -0.0479*
[0.016] [0.037] [0.024] [0.037] [0.029]
Foreign capital of large firms -0.0255*** -0.0226 -0.0357*** -0.0226 -0.0300*
[0.007] [0.014] [0.011] [0.014] [0.016]
Foreign capital -0.0662*** -0.1869*** -0.0312 -0.1869*** -0.0128
[0.020] [0.067] [0.030] [0.067] [0.035]
Lambda -5.3719** -0.1013
[2.646] [2.497]
Number of observations = 15,635. All regressions include industry, region and time dummies, and other
covariates included in the baseline specification. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 7. Average effect of a change of pfk to 50%. Specification III.
Explanatory Variables Tobit Model
Heckman Model
No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Entry Level-of-use Entry Level-of-use
Equation Equation Equation Equation
Domestic to foreign
All firms -2.7258*** -9.2142*** -0.9681 -9.2142*** 0.5062
[0.664] [2.570] [1.228] [2.570] [1.478]
Small firms -2.9232*** -11.3493*** -0.1959 -11.3493*** 1.7410
[0.798] [3.067] [1.595] [3.067] [1.975]
Medium firms -2.8814*** -5.6933*** -3.1067*** -5.6933*** -1.9804
[0.595] [2.108] [0.977] [2.108] [1.246]
Large firms -1.5433*** -1.8072 -2.0582** -1.8072 -2.1451**
[0.521] [1.382] [0.880] [1.382] [1.092]
Foreign to domestic
All firms 0.2853 0.7289 0.6322 0.7289 -1.0124
[0.463] [1.577] [0.834] [1.577] [1.011]
Small firms 0.6597 4.6304* -1.0523 4.6304* -3.4013**
[0.494] [2.502] [1.238] [2.502] [1.541]
Medium firms 0.8290* 2.1183 1.2714 2.1183 -0.9439
[0.480] [2.050] [0.863] [2.050] [1.127]
Large firms -0.0384 -0.5841 0.5389 -0.5841 -0.7971
[0.500] [1.378] [0.879] [1.378] [1.071]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 8. Results of Specification IV
Explanatory Variables Tobit Model
Heckman Model
No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Entry Level-of-use Entry Level-of-use
Equation Equation Equation Equation
Foreign capital of small firms -0.0778*** -0.2248** -0.0315 -0.2248** 0.0297
[0.026] [0.105] [0.044] [0.105] [0.058]
Foreign capital of medium firms -0.0706*** -0.0962** -0.0919*** -0.0962** -0.0220
[0.016] [0.041] [0.024] [0.041] [0.033]
Foreign capital of large firms -0.0261*** -0.0106 -0.0462*** -0.0106 -0.0302*
[0.008] [0.018] [0.013] [0.018] [0.018]
Foreign capital -0.0663*** -0.1599** -0.0463 -0.1599** 0.0059
[0.020] [0.075] [0.030] [0.075] [0.039]
Dummy of demand increase (lag) 0.5784 2.6352 1.2842*** 2.6352 0.4396
[0.596] [1.833] [0.448] [1.833] [0.659]
Dummy of demand decrease (lag) -1.5961*** -1.0429 -2.6665*** -1.0429 -0.4382
[0.508] [1.696] [0.545] [1.696] [0.608]
Prod. of good and services (lag) 1.6399*** 7.2483*** -0.4081 7.2483*** 1.5751**
[0.202] [0.547] [0.340] [0.547] [0.633]
Lambda -3.080 -1.5197
[2.577] [2.418]
Number of observations = 12,900. All regressions include industry, region and time dummies, and other
covariates included in the baseline specification. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 9. Average effect of a change of pfk to 50%. Specification IV.
Explanatory Variables Tobit Model
Heckman Model
No Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Entry Level-of-use Entry Level-of-use
Equation Equation Equation Equation
Domestic to foreign
All firms -2.5964 -8.3540 -1.1051 -8.3540 1.4019
[0.677] [2.797] [1.275] [2.797] [1.712]
Small firms -2.7000*** -10.7097*** 0.1562 -10.7097*** 2.8744
[0.836] [3.411] [1.753] [3.411] [2.410]
Medium firms -3.0809*** -4.7725** -4.0306*** -4.7725** -0.7108
[0.600] [2.225] [0.972] [2.225] [1.353]
Large firms -1.5843*** -0.7874 -2.9184*** -0.7874 -2.0137
[0.526] [1.445] [0.910] [1.445] [1.231]
Foreign to domestic
All firms 0.0647*** 1.2625*** -0.3334 1.2625*** -1.1865
[0.471] [1.680] [0.849] [1.680] [1.003]
Small firms 0.3533 5.6481** -2.4801* 5.6481** -3.8331**
[0.512] [2.671] [1.375] [2.671] [1.879]
Medium firms 0.6828 2.9984 0.4470 2.9984 -1.7286
[0.482] [2.220] [0.870] [2.220] [1.063]
Large firms -0.3071 -0.3853 -0.4650 -0.3853 -0.6848
[0.516] [1.436] [0.890] [1.436] [1.068]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 10. Results of Specification V
Tobit Model
Heckman Model
Explanatory Variables Entry Level-of-use
Equation Equation
Foreign capital of small firms -4.0731*** -15.8442*** 0.2147
[1.071] [3.578] [1.906]
Foreign capital of medium firms -4.2181*** -7.8705*** -5.4656***
[0.530] [1.870] [1.040]
Foreign capital of large firms -1.6442*** -0.8203 -2.9544***
[0.370] [1.132] [0.784]
Proportion of foreign capital -3.5960*** -11.4113*** -1.3882
[0.688] [2.305] [1.233]
Small firm 1.1409* -1.8078 -1.1042
[0.607] [1.864] [0.982]
Medium firm 2.2635*** 1.8875 0.8032
[0.403] [1.442] [0.698]
Changes nationality 1.9956*** 1.1427 3.0817***
[0.450] [1.494] [0.749]
Prop. of eng. and bachelors -0.0738*** 0.0070 -0.1658***
[0.021] [0.061] [0.035]
Capital-to-labor ratio -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Age -0.2603*** -0.3405*** -0.3781***
[0.011] [0.026] [0.014]
Market dynamism: expansion 1.8736*** 3.6144*** 1.9471***
[0.276] [0.749] [0.417]
Market dynamism: slump -1.8028*** -3.2813*** -2.4520***
[0.305] [0.867] [0.489]
Demand increase -0.6248 0.2070 -1.9323**
[0.561] [1.762] [0.917]
Demand decrease -1.0399** 1.2777 -3.1809***
[0.480] [1.446] [0.825]
Public control -6.3696*** -9.7262*** -11.7342***
[0.610] [3.310] [1.540]
Export propensity 0.0122** -0.0174 0.0255***
[0.006] [0.016] [0.009]
Production of good and services 1.9506*** 7.9972*** -0.2280
[0.192] [0.494] [0.282]
Average productivity of labor -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Market share -0.0265*** -0.0588*** -0.0192*
[0.007] [0.020] [0.011]
Market globalization index 0.0039 0.0355*** -0.0049
[0.003] [0.010] [0.005]
Market atomization index 0.0054* -0.0168** 0.0230***
[0.003] [0.008] [0.005]
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Table 10. Results of Specification V (continuation)
Tobit Model
Heckman Model
Explanatory Variables Entry Level-of-use
Equation Equation
Worker formation not used -3.1520*** -8.8987***
[0.487] [1.460]
Worker formation by the firm -0.6554** -1.5714
[0.321] [1.025]
Worker selection not used -1.0055** -3.0267** -0.4344
[0.443] [1.215] [0.634]
Worker selection by the firm 0.3496 -1.1023 1.1190**
[0.285] [0.870] [0.447]
Family business -0.2025*** -0.3273***
[0.027] [0.060]
Cost of debt in the long-run 0.1241*** 0.3385*** 0.1172**
[0.033] [0.095] [0.049]
Cost of debt in the short-run 0.0061 0.0304 0.0125
[0.028] [0.075] [0.041]
Labor reform of 1994 1.7273*
[0.949]
Labor reform of 1997 -3.2866***
[0.944]
Labor reform of 2001 -9.0959***
[1.003]
Lambda -3.5821***
[1.136]
Number of observations = 16,075. All regressions include industry,
region and time dummies and variables of legal type, type of good
and number of markets. Tobit and entry equations also include
dummies for worker selection and outsourcing.
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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CHAPTER 2
Correcting the bias in the estimation of a dynamic ordered
probit with fixed effects of self-assessed health status1
Abstract. This paper considers the estimation of a dynamic ordered probit
with fixed effects, with an application to self-assessed health status. The well-
known estimation problem of this kind of models when T is not very large
is specially severe in our model because it contains two fixed effects: one in
the linear index equation and one in the cut points. These two fixed effects,
instead of only one as usually done, are implied by the potential existence of
heterogeneity in both unobserved health status and reporting behavior. The
contributions of this paper are twofold. Firstly this paper contributes to the
recent literature on bias correction in nonlinear panel data models by applying
and studying the finite sample properties of two of the existing proposals to
the ordered probit case. The most direct and easily applicable correction to
our model is not the best one and still has important biases in our sample
sizes. Secondly, we contribute to the literature that studies the determinants of
Self-Assessed Health measures by applying the previous analysis on estimation
methods to the British Household Panel Survey.
1. Introduction
The estimation of nonlinear panel data models with fixed effects is known to be
problematic with the panels usually available, since they do not have a very large
number of periods. This is even more severe when estimating dynamic models, like
the dynamic ordered probit model. This incidental parameters problem is reflected
in the inconsistency of standard estimators like the maximum likelihood estimator
(MLE) when the number of individuals N goes to infinity and T is fixed. Even
when T goes to infinity, if it does not grow faster than N, the asymptotic normal
distribution is not centered at zero due to the bias coming from the incidental
parameters. Moreover, this problem results in large finite sample biases of the
1This chapter is based on Carro and Traferri (2009).
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MLE when using panels where T is not very large. The dynamic ordered probit
model is not an exception to this, specially if it contains more than one individual
specific parameter, as in our case.
An important part of the research on microeconometrics in recent years has
been concerned with finding a solution to this problem, by developing bias-adjusted
methods to estimate those models. Given this fast growing literature, there are
several bias correction methods we could consider to estimate our model. These
methods can be grouped in three approaches.2 The first one is to construct an
analytical or numerical bias correction of a fixed effect estimator. Hahn and Newey
(2004), Hahn and Kuersteiner (2004) and Fernandez-Val (2009), for example, take
this approach to the problem. The second approach is to correct the bias in
moment equations. An example of this is Carro (2007), which uses an estimator of
this type to correct the bias in dynamic binary choice models. The third approach
is to correct the objective function. Arellano and Hahn (2006) and Bester and
Hansen (2009) take this approach, with the latter including an application to a
dynamic ordered probit model.
Asymptotically all of the above methods reduce the order of the bias of the MLE
from the standard O(T−1) to O(T−2). Therefore, from this perspective we could
use any of the methods developed for dynamic models. A second criteria to choose
among the several alternatives is to check the easiness of implementation to our
model. From this criteria the estimator that corrects the objective function using a
penalty term based on a product of the sample scores and Hessian can be directly
applied without modification to our specific model. Bester and Hansen (2009) refer
to it as the HS penalty. In contrast with the direct applicability of this estimator,
others are computationally more difficult and require some transformation to be
applied to our model, specially because our model contains two fixed effects instead
of one as usually is the case in binary choice models. This does not mean that other
methods cannot be applied nor that we do not know their theoretical properties.
They have been developed for a quite general class of nonlinear panel data models
with fixed effects.
A third and more important criteria is the finite sample performance of the
method when estimating our model with the sample size we have. The incidental
2See Arellano and Hahn (2007) for a good review of this literature, detailed references and a
general framework in which the various approaches can be included.
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parameters problem can be seen as a finite sample bias problem in panel data
context. The incidental parameters problem is not very important when T is large
relative to N. However, since our panel does not have a very large number of pe-
riods it is reasonable to wonder whether the asymptotic properties when T goes
to infinity are a good approximation to our finite sample. Given this, we should
evaluate the finite sample performance of the available methods we could use to
estimate our model. As usual, this comparison is done through Monte Carlo ex-
periments. Bester and Hansen (2009) do not compare the finite sample properties
of the method they use with others for the ordered probit case because many of
the other methods will require some derivation to get the specific correction for
this case. They, however, make such a comparison using a static and a dynamic
logit model. Also, Carro (2007) and Fernandez-Val (2009) make Monte Carlo
experiments for logit and probit models with different sample sizes. The Monte
Carlo experiments made in these three papers allow us to compare a wide range
of methods for the dynamic logit and probit models. From all these comparisons
we can conclude that the HS penalty approach is clearly not the best one. We
can also conclude that for sample sizes with T smaller than 13 the reminding bias
when using HS could still be significant, specially for the ordered probit Bester and
Hansen (2009) simulate. This result is also confirmed in our simulations. Given
this and that our empirical application has T = 13, some other of the proposed
methods should be considered, in addition to the HS penalty approach. Interest-
ing candidates are the corrections discussed by Fernandez-Val (2009) and Carro
(2007) since they are both equally superior to other methods in the relevant ex-
isting Monte Carlo experiments. In this paper we derive explicit formulas of the
modified MLE used in Carro (2007) for the model considered here, evaluate its
finite sample performance and compare it with the HS penalty estimator. This
exercise is a main contribution of this paper since, as Arellano and Hahn (2007)
point out in their conclusions, more research is needed to know “how well each
of the methods recently proposed work for other specific models and data set of
interest in applied econometrics.” Also, Greene and Hensher (2010) comment on
the lack of studies about the applicability to ordered choice models of the recent
proposals for bias reduction estimators in binary choice models.
Self-assessed health (SAH) has been used as a proxy for true overall individ-
ual health status in many socioeconomic studies. Moreover, it has been shown
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to be a good predictor of mortality and of subsequent demand of medical care
(see for example van Doorslaer, Koolman and Jones (2004)). Motivated by this
importance and the high observed persistence in health outcomes, Contoyannis,
Jones, and Rice (2004) study the dynamics and effects of socioeconomic variables
on SAH for the British Household Panel Survey. Among other aims, they try to
know the relative contribution of state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity
in explaining the observed persistence in SAH. Given that SAH is a categorical
variable they use a dynamic ordered probit model, and they take a random effects
approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the level equation.
In addition to accounting for unobserved factors that affect health status (index
shift), here we also have to take into account the possible heterogeneity in reporting
behavior (cut-point shift). The cut-point shifts occur if individuals use different
thresholds when assessing their health and reporting it in the SAH categorical
variable, so that they report a different value of SAH even though having the
same level of true health.3 To control for these two unobserved factors, which are
possibly correlated with other explanatory variables and between each other, we
include individual effects not only in the levels of the ordered probit but also in the
cut points. Given that in discrete choice models we can only identify differences
up to scale, in addition to the normalization in the errors we have to normalize
one of the cut-point shifters (or the index shifter). This means that we cannot
separately identify the two sources of heterogeneity. We can, nonetheless, correctly
control for these two sources of heterogeneity in the estimation of our model. In
contrast, a model that only allows for one individual effect (usually placed in the
index equation) and which imposes homogeneity in the other shifters will almost
always give incorrect estimates and inference if the two afore mentioned sources
of heterogeneity are present and correlated with other explanatory variables.
3Lindeboom and Van Doorslaer (2004) present a model where unobserved true health (a con-
tinuous variable) determines self-reported health (a categorical and ordered variable), through a
series of thresholds. True health, in turn, depends on observable individual characteristics and
an index shift. The authors allow cut-points and indexes to differ for different subgroups of the
population (they present four groups related with the language or cultural background of the
respondent: French only, English only, French and English, and Other), estimate the proposed
model using data from the Canadian National Population Health Survey, and reject the hypoth-
esis that the cut-points and index effects are the same for the four subgroups. Therefore, these
authors find evidence of the existence of these two different kinds of shifts.
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As it happens with one individual effect, we could take a ‘random effects’
approach. However, this approach has the drawback of imposing either indepen-
dence, or a specific and restrictive functional form for the relation between the
unobserved heterogeneity and other explanatory variables. It also has the draw-
back of having to deal with the so-called initial conditions problem. Taking a ‘fixed
effects’ approach we leave unrestricted the joint distribution of the two individ-
ual effects and their correlation with the explanatory variables. Moreover, there
is no initial conditions problem. Despite these advantages, there have been only
few applications in health economics of nonlinear panel models with fixed effects,
as can be seen by reading Jones’s (2007) handbook chapter. This is due to the
incidental parameters problem addressed by this paper and the related literature.
The estimation of our model and the comparison with random effects estimates
show that there is higher state dependence effects and that it matters to flexibly
account for more permanent unobserved heterogeneity.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We first present our model and its
estimation problems. We comment on the possible solutions from the nonlinear
bias correction literature for nonlinear panel data models with fixed effects. We
use simulations to evaluate the finite sample performance of two of the alternatives
and use this as final criteria for choosing our estimator. In Section 3, we apply
all that to the study self-assessed health status in the British Household Panel
Survey. There we first present the data and variables we include in our model.
The estimates and comments on them follow. Last section concludes.
2. The Model and Estimation Method
We consider a dynamic panel data ordered probit with fixed effects:4
(7) h∗it = αi + ρ11 (hi,t−1 = 1) + ρ−11 (hi,t−1 = −1) + x′itβ + εit,
for i = 1, . . . , N and t = 0, . . . , T , where h∗it is the latent variable (e.g. health
status), and the observed variable (hit) is determined according to the following
4In actuality, αi is equal to the fixed effect plus the coefficient of the missing category (hi,t−1 = 0).
In other words, fixed effects can be identified up to a constant.
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thresholds:
(8) hit =

−1 if h∗it < −ci
0 if −ci < h∗it ≤ 0
1 if h∗it > 0
For instance, in our empirical application, hit = −1 corresponds to poor health,
hit = 0 to fair health and hit = 1 to good health. αi and ci are the model’s fixed
effects, and εit ∼
iid
N(0, 1). Note that in addition to the usual scale normalization in
discrete choice models, here we are also normalizing one of the two cut points to
be zero. The, somehow more conventional, normalization of setting the intercept
in the linear index equal to zero is not available to us because with the fixed effects
approach the distribution of the intercept, including its mean, is unrestricted. An
alternative normalization is to put the two fixed effects in the two cut points and
leave the linear index equation without any intercept.
From this discussion on normalization it is clear that it is not possible to
separately identify individual effects affecting only h∗it from the individual effects
affecting the cut points. Having only the fixed effect in the linear index (αi) will
also allow for heterogeneity in the cut points, but in a very restrictive way. In
particular, by introducing only one individual effect (αi), we would be assuming
that the unobserved heterogeneity must have effects of opposite sign in Pr(hit = 1)
and Pr(hit = −1); and also we would be restricting how these two effects differ
in magnitude for all individuals. Having two fixed effects as in (8), we are not
imposing any restrictions on the cut-point shifts as well as on the index shift.
From (7), (8) and the assumption about εit, we have that
Pr(hit = −1|xit, hit−1, ci, αi) = 1− Φ (ci + µit)
Pr(hit = 0|xit, hit−1, ci, αi) = Φ (ci + µit)− Φ (µit)
Pr(hit = 1|xit, hit−1, ci, αi) = 1− Pr(hit = −1|.)− Pr(hit = 0|.) = Φ (µit)(9)
where
(10) µit = αi + ρ11 (hi,t−1 = 1) + ρ−11 (hi,t−1 = −1) + x′itβ
58
Conditioning on the first observation, the log-likelihood is:
l(ρ1, ρ−1, β, α, c) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
{1 {hit = −1} log [1− Φ (ci + µit)]+
1 {hit = 0} log [Φ (ci + µit)− Φ (µit)] + 1 {hit = 1} log [Φ (µit)]},(11)
2.1. Estimation problem and possible solutions. Using standard MLE
to estimate models like (8) is well known to be biased, since we do not have a
large number of periods. The MLE is inconsistent when T is not going to infinity
because the fixed effects are acting as incidental parameters. Furthermore, existing
Monte Carlo experiments with nonlinear models similar to this shows that the
MLE has large bias. In fact, simulations of a dynamic ordered probit in Bester
and Hansen (2009) and simulations in following sections show that the bias is non-
negligible even with T as large as 20. As mentioned in the introduction, several
bias-correction methods have been recently developed that could overcome this
problem. Arellano and Hahn (2007) summarize the different approaches.
The methods can be grouped in three approaches based on the object that is
corrected. The first one is to construct an analytical or numerical bias correction of
a fixed effect estimator. Fernandez-Val (2009), among others, takes this approach
to the problem and applies his analytical bias correction to dynamic binary choice
models. The second group are those that correct the bias in moment equations.
An example of this is Carro (2007) that uses an estimator of this type to correct
the bias in dynamic binary choice models. The third group are those that correct
the objective function. Arellano and Hahn (2006) and Bester and Hansen (2009)
take this approach, with the latter including an application to a dynamic ordered
probit model. Given that our model of interest is also a dynamic ordered probit,
and that other alternatives will require some sort of transformation or derivations
to be applied to our case, the HS-penalty estimator studied in Bester and Hansen
(2009) is the first option we should consider. In addition to that, this estimator
has the advantages of being simpler to compute than the Modified MLE in Carro
(2007) and than the Bias Correction in Fernandez-Val (2009) because the HS does
not require the calculation of expectations and the other two do. This advantage
is more relevant in our case, because it has two fixed effects.
Arellano and Hahn (2007) shows the relations between the different type of
approaches. Asymptotically all the methods and approaches are always reducing
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the order of the bias of the MLE from the standard O(T−1) to O(T−2) for the
general classes of models they were developed. However there may be differences
when they are applied to specific cases . The following very simple example, used in
Carro (2007), Arellano and Hahn (2007), and Bester and Hansen (2009), illustrates
this point. Consider the model where yit ∼
iid
N(ηi, σ
2
0). The ML estimator of σ
2
0
is σ̂2MLE =
1
NT
∑
i
∑
t (yit − η̂i)2. It is well known that σ̂2MLE is not a consistent
estimator of σ20 when N → ∞ with fixed T , since it converges to T−1T σ20. In this
case the whole problem is very easy to fix. 1
N(T−1)
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 (yit − η̂i)2 is the
fixed T consistent estimator of σ20. The MMLE from Carro (2007) produces this
very same estimator, correcting not only the O(T−1) term of the bias, but all the
asymptotic bias in this special example. The HS removes the O(T−1) term of the
bias, but it does not attain the fixed-T consistent estimator. The one-step bias
correction to the ML estimator from Fernandez-Val (2009) does not produce a
fixed-T consistent estimator either, but its iterated form does. So, differences may
appear between the different approaches when applied to specific models.
On the other hand, the incidental parameters problem can be seen as a finite
sample bias problem in panel data context. The problem is not very important
when T is large relative to N. However, since our panel does not have a large num-
ber of periods it is reasonable to wonder whether the good asymptotic properties
of the MLE when T goes to infinity (sufficiently fast) are a good approximation
to our finite sample. As a matter of fact, our problem is that the MLE has large
biases when T is not very large; and having large N exacerbates the problem
because the number of incidental parameters increases with N . It seems from
simulations that we would need panels with a much larger number of time periods
than those usually found in practice. The important implication of all this is that
we have to look at the finite sample performance of the estimators for our model
and sample sizes. In the methods considered here this is done through Monte
Carlo experiments. Unfortunately, Bester and Hansen (2009) do not compare the
finite sample properties of the method they use with others for the ordered probit
case because many of the other methods will require some derivation to get the
specific correction for this case. They, however, make such a comparison using a
binary choice (probit and logit) models. Also, Carro (2007) and Fernandez-Val
(2009) make Monte Carlo experiments for logit and probit models with different
sample sizes (both in T and N), allowing us to compare a wide range of methods
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for these models. From these comparisons we can conclude that the HS penalty
approach is clearly not the best one and for sample sizes with T smaller than 13
the reminding bias can still be significant. Given this result, we should consider
other of the proposed methods to estimate our ordered probit and evaluate its
finite sample properties. Interesting candidates are the corrections discussed by
Fernandez-Val (2009) and Carro (2007) since they are equally superior to other
alternatives in finite sample performance in the relevant existing comparisons. In
the next subsection we derive explicit formulas of the modified MLE used in Carro
(2007) for the model considered here and evaluate its finite sample performance.
2.2. MMLE for a dynamic ordered probit with two fixed effects. The
model to be estimated is defined in (7) and (8), and its log-likelihood is (11). Let
γ= (β, ρ1, ρ−1) and ηi = (αi, ci). Partial derivatives will be denoted by the letter
d, so the first order conditions will be dηi(γ, ηi) ≡ ∂li(γ,ηi)∂ηi and dγi(γ, ηi) ≡
∂li(γ,ηi)
∂γ
.
Bold letters represent vectors.
The MLE of ηi for given γ, ηi(γ), solves dηi(γ, ηi) = 0. Then, the MLE of γ is
obtained by maximizing the concentrated log-likelihood (
∑N
i=1 li(γ, ηi(γ))), i.e. by
solving the following first order condition:
(12)
1
T N
N∑
i=1
dγi(γ, ηi(γ)) = 0
where dγi(γ, ηi(γ)) =
∂li(γ,ηi)
∂γ
∣∣∣
ηi=ηi(γ)
.
To reduce the bias of the estimation, we follow Carro (2007) in modifying the
score of the concentrated log-likelihood adding a term that takes away the first
order term of the asymptotic bias in T . By doing this, we get that the MMLE of
the γ parameters of model (8) is the value that solves the following score equation:
dγMi(γ) = dγi(γ, ηi(γ))− 1
2
1
dααidcci − dαci2
[
dααi
(
dγcci + dαcci
∂α̂i
∂γ
+ dccci
∂cˆi
∂γ
)
+dcci
(
dγααi + dαααi
∂α̂i
∂γ
+ dααci
∂cˆi
∂γ
)
−2dαci
(
dγαci + dααci
∂α̂i
∂γ
+ dαcci
∂cˆi
∂γ
)]
− ∂
∂αi
(
E(dγci)E(dαci)− E(dcci)E(dγαi)
E(dααi)E(dcci)− [E(dαci)]2
)∣∣∣∣
ηi=ηi(γ)
− ∂
∂ci
(
E(dγαi)E(dαci)− E(dααi)E(dγci)
E(dααi)E(dcci)− [E(dαci)]2
)∣∣∣∣
ηi=ηi(γ)
= 0(13)
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where dγi(γ, ηi(γ)) is the standard first order condition from the concentrated log-
likelihood, as in (12). dγci =
∂2li
∂γ∂ci
, dααi =
∂2li
∂α2i
, dγαci =
∂3li
∂γ∂ci∂αi
, and so on. α̂i(γ)
and ĉi(γ) are obtained from the first order conditions of αi and ci, as it is done
in order to concentrate the log-likelihood. All expectations are conditional on the
same set of information as the likelihood. These expectations can be computed
by conditioning recursively, like we do to write the conditional likelihood. The
parametric model (equations (7), (8) and the assumption about εit) from which
we write the likelihood will also give the parametric form of the expectations we
need to calculate.
We show in Appendix A how this modification on the score of the concentrated
log-likelihood in (13) is a first order adjustment on the asymptotic bias of the ML
score, so the first order condition is more nearly unbiased and the order of the bias
of the estimator is reduced from O(T−1) to O(T−2).
2.3. Simulations. We simulate the model in equations (7), (8) with the fol-
lowing value of the parameters and Data Generating Process (DGP): β = 1,
ρ1 = 0.5, and ρ−1 = −0.5. The error follows a normal distribution: εit ∼ N(0, 1).
The fixed effects are constructed as follows:
αi =
1
2
4∑
t=1
xit + ui, where ui ∼ N(xi0, 1)(14)
ci = |zi|, where zi ∼ N(xi0, 1).(15)
so that they are correlated with the explanatory variables.5 xit follows a Gauss-
ian AR(1) with autoregressive parameter equal to 0.5. Initial conditions are
xi0 ∼ N(0, 1) and h∗i0 = αi + β0 xi0 + εi0. We perform 1000 replications, with
a population of N = 250 individuals. For each simulation we estimate the MLE,
the MMLE given by equation (13) and the HS estimator defined in Bester and
Hansen (2009). That is, the HS estimator is the value of the parameters that
maximize the following penalized objective function:
(16)
N∑
i=1
lki (β, ρ1, ρ−1, αi, ci)−
N∑
i=1
1
2
trace
(
Î−1αciV̂αci
)
− k
2
5Note that Bester and Hansen (2009) only consider in their simulations of an ordered probit the
case where the fixed effects are independent of the covariates. Correlation of the unobserved
heterogeneity with the covariates, as here, makes the problem more severe and the estimators
may have worse performance. However, we consider this situation to be more realistic.
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where lki is the log likelihood of i, Îαci is the sample information matrix for ei =
(αi, ci)
′, V̂αci is a HAC estimator of V ar
(
1√
T
∂li
∂ei
)
, and k = dim(ei).
Table 1. Monte Carlo Results. Dynamic Ordered Probit parameters
Parameter β ρ1 ρ−1
True value 1 0.5 −0.5
Estimator Mean Bias RMSE Mean Bias. RMSE Mean Bias RMSE
T = 4
MLE 0.816 0.828 −0.474 0.516 0.551 0.586
HS 0.796 0.809 −0.392 0.443 0.467 0.509
MMLE 0.172 0.182 −0.254 0.282 0.280 0.305
T = 8
MLE 0.335 0.341 −0.188 0.216 0.189 0.216
HS 0.247 0.254 −0.115 0.153 0.119 0.154
MMLE 0.073 0.086 −0.062 0.108 0.067 0.109
T = 10
MLE 0.257 0.263 −0.145 0.171 0.154 0.179
HS 0.170 0.178 −0.083 0.119 0.093 0.127
MMLE 0.052 0.067 −0.036 0.086 0.050 0.093
T = 12
MLE 0.210 0.215 −0.127 0.152 0.127 0.151
HS 0.127 0.134 −0.072 0.106 0.074 0.106
MMLE 0.040 0.054 −0.030 0.079 0.036 0.081
T = 16
MLE 0.154 0.159 −0.093 0.118 0.096 0.119
HS 0.081 0.088 −0.048 0.083 0.054 0.085
MMLE 0.026 0.041 −0.017 0.068 0.022 0.069
T = 20
MLE 0.122 0.127 −0.072 0.095 0.078 0.101
HS 0.058 0.065 −0.034 0.067 0.042 0.074
MMLE 0.019 0.034 −0.009 0.058 0.016 0.062
Note: See a detailed description of the model simulated and other characteristics
of the DGP in subsection 2.3.
Results from this experiment for different T are reported in Table 1, which
shows the mean bias and the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE). We find that for
all T , the MMLE performs much better than the other two estimators. Comparing
it with the HS, the differences are of greater magnitude for T = 4 and T = 8,
where the HS is closer to the MLE than to the MMLE. When using the MMLE
the bias is small than 10% of the true values with T = 10 for all but for one
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of the ρ parameters. With T = 12 the bias when using the MMLE is already
negligible whereas the HS contain biases and RMSE larger than the MMLE with
T = 10. Even with T = 16 the HS exhibit mean biases greater than the MMLE
with T = 10. It is not until T = 20 that the HS has small biases and RMSE.
So HS needs a larger number of periods (at least larger than 16) to have small
finite sample biases. Given this and the fact that the sample sizes we have in the
empirical application of this paper are smaller than T = 14, we will use MMLE.
Table 2. Monte Carlo Results. Dynamic Ordered Probit parame-
ters with different degrees of state dependence
Parameter β ρ1 ρ−1
Estimator Mean Bias RMSE Mean Bias. RMSE Mean Bias RMSE
True value 1 −1 1
MLE 0.204 0.212 −0.264 0.284 0.244 0.265
HS 0.105 0.116 −0.094 0.136 0.087 0.130
MMLE 0.012 0.044 −0.008 0.089 0.003 0.086
True value 1 −0.5 0.5
MLE 0.212 0.218 −0.214 0.235 0.206 0.227
HS 0.116 0.126 −0.079 0.119 0.078 0.119
MMLE 0.026 0.048 −0.018 0.083 0.018 0.083
True value 1 0 0
MLE 0.227 0.233 −0.180 0.201 0.180 0.201
HS 0.136 0.144 −0.079 0.116 0.084 0.119
MMLE 0.037 0.055 −0.028 0.082 0.032 0.084
True value 1 0.5 −0.5
MLE 0.257 0.263 −0.145 0.171 0.154 0.179
HS 0.170 0.178 −0.083 0.119 0.093 0.127
MMLE 0.052 0.067 −0.036 0.086 0.050 0.093
True value 1 1 −1
MLE 0.297 0.303 −0.105 0.144 0.111 0.148
HS 0.215 0.222 −0.086 0.126 0.091 0.129
MMLE 0.065 0.078 −0.057 0.100 0.069 0.107
Note: 1000 Monte Carlo simulations of the Ordered Probit model in equations
(7) and (8), following the same DGP as in Table 1 (which is described at the
begining of section 2.3), but changing the value of the state dependence
parameters from negative to positive values, including the case with no state
dependence.
To see if these results are maintained under different state dependence sce-
narios, we present in Table 2 simulations for different values of ρ1 and ρ−1, with
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T = 10. The DGP is the same as that of Table 1, but the values of the state
dependence parameters change from negative to positive, including the case with
no state dependence. We find that the MMLE performs better than the other
methods for all cases, in terms of bias and RMSE. In principle, having a more
negative state dependence may improve all the estimators since it induces higher
variance in yit. This is the case for the estimation of β, where the three estimation
methods improve, but it is not the case for the estimation of ρ1 and ρ−1, where
the MMLE improves but the MLE and HS get worse.
Table 3. Monte Carlo Results. Inference over Dynamic Order Pro-
bit parameters: Conference intervals coverage and estimation of the
estandard error.
Parameter β ρ1 ρ−1
True value 1 0.5 −0.5
% Coverage % Coverage % Coverage
Estimator C.I. 95% SE/SD C.I. 95% SE/SD C.I. 95% SE/SD
T = 8
MLE 0% 0.85 47% 0.87 48% 0.90
HS 0% 0.86 74% 0.91 73% 0.94
MMLE 64% 1.02 87% 0.93 85% 0.96
T = 10
MLE 0% 0.81 54% 0.91 53% 0.91
HS 3.5% 0.83 82% 0.96 78% 0.95
MMLE 74% 0.94 90% 0.96 89% 0.96
T = 12
MLE 0% 0.89 58% 0.91 62% 0.93
HS 8.8% 0.92 85% 0.96 83% 0.98
MMLE 81% 1.00 92% 0.95 92% 0.97
T = 16
MLE 0% 0.92 69% 0.91 68% 0.94
HS 29% 0.95 88% 0.96 88% 0.99
MMLE 88% 1.00 93% 0.94 93% 0.96
T = 20
MLE 2% 0.90 77% 0.96 73% 0.94
HS 48% 0.93 91% 1 88% 0.98
MMLE 90% 0.97 95% 0.98 93% 0.95
Note: We have used the inverse of the hessian as estimator of variance.
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Finally, we consider the quality of inference based on these estimators. Table
3 present the coverage of 95% confidence intervals and the estimated asymptotic
standard errors divided by the Standard Deviation. The latter is very close to 1 in
all cases for the MMLE and in most cases for the other estimators, which indicates
that de variance is being estimated well and the important problem is the bias.
With respect to inference, the coverage of the confidence intervals is extremely
poor for the MLE, specially for β. Even with T = 20, the coverage for β is smaller
than 3%. The HS estimator improves inference with respect to the MLE, but it is
still too far from the theoretical coverage of 95%, being also here the coverage for
β specially bad even with T = 20. As it happens with the bias and RMSE criteria,
the MMLE is clearly the best estimator of these three for doing inference, for all
periods and parameters.
3. Empirical application: self-assessed health status in the British
Household Panel
Self-assessed health (SAH) measures have been used as a proxy for true overall
individual health status in many socioeconomic studies. Also, it has been shown
to be a good predictor of mortality and of subsequent demand for medical care.
This motivates the study of dynamics and potential explanatory factors of SAH.
Moreover, SAH measures exhibit high persistence and it is interesting to know the
relative contributions of state dependence and heterogeneity to it. In this section
we estimate a dynamic ordered probit of SAH with two fixed effects, using MMLE
whose properties has been studied in previous section.
Our model, in contrast with previous studies like Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice
(2004), includes two fixed effects: one in the linear index equation and another one
in the cut points. The motivation for doing this is to account for heterogeneity in
reporting behavior (cut-points shifts) among individuals, in addition to account-
ing for unobserved factors that affect health status (index shift). The cut-point
shifts occur if individuals use different thresholds when assessing their health and
reporting it in the SAH categorical variable, so that they report a different value
of SAH even though having the same level of true health. To control for these two,
possibly correlated with other explanatory variables and between each other, un-
observed factors, we include individual effects not only in the levels of the ordered
probit but also in the cut points. Even though we cannot separately identified
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these two sources of unobserved heterogeneity because we have to normalize one
of the shifters, we are robustly controlling for both of them. In contrast, a model
with unobserved heterogeneity in only one shifter and imposing homogeneity in all
the other shifters will almost always give incorrect estimates if the two mentioned
sources of heterogeneity are relevant.
The model we estimate is in equations (7) and (8), where hit = −1 corresponds
to the situation where poor health is reported, hit = 0 to fair health, and hit =
1 to good health. αi and ci are the model’s fixed effects, and εit ∼
iid
N(0, 1).
The explanatory variables included in the model are described in the following
subsection.
3.1. Data and variables. For our empirical analysis, we use the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This is a longitudinal survey of private house-
holds in Great Britain, and was designed as an annual survey of each adult (16+)
member of a representative sample of more that 5,000 households, with a to-
tal of approximately 10,000 individual interviews. The same individuals are re-
interviewed in successive waves and, if they split off from their original households
are also re-interviewed along with all adult members of their new households. Sim-
ilarly, new members joining sample households become eligible for interview and
children are interviewed as they reach the age of 16. Currently, sixteen waves of
data for the years 1991 - 2006 are available. We take into account individuals who
gave a full interview at each wave. An unbalanced panel of individuals who were
interviewed in at least 8 subsequent waves is used. Our sample consists of 76,128
observations from 6,375 individuals.
SAH is defined for waves 1-8 and 10-16 as the response to the question “Com-
pared to people of your own age, would you say your health over the last 12
months on the whole has been: excellent, good, fair, poor, very poor?” At wave 9
the SAH question and categories were reworded. This makes the comparison with
other waves difficult and wave 9 is not used in our empirical analysis.
The original five SAH categories were collapsed to a three-category variable,
creating a new SAH variable, that will be our dependent variable, with the fol-
lowing codes: poor (hit = −1) for individuals who reported either “very poor” or
“poor” health; fair (hit = 0) for individuals who reported “fair” health; and Good
(hit = 1) for individuals who reported “good” or “excellent” health.
The explanatory x variables in (7) can be grouped in three categories:
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(1) Socioeconomic variables: three dummy variables representing marital sta-
tus (Married, Widowed, Divorced/Separated), with Single as the reference
category; five dummy variables representing employment (Self employed,
In paid employment, Unemployed, Retired, Long term sick or disabled),
with Other (Looking after family or home, On maternity leave, On a gov-
ernment training scheme, Full-time student/at school, Something else) as
the reference category; size of the household (the number of people living
in the same household); and number of kids in the household. The in-
come variable is the logarithm of equivalised real income, adjusted using
the Retail Price Index and equivalised by the McClement’s scale to adjust
for household size and composition, and consists on the sum of non-labour
income and labour income in the reference year.
(2) Health variables: Among the explanatory variables of overall self-assessed
heath status, we include information on objective health problems. The
BHPS contains several questions about health problems and health care
demand, but many of them can be induced by a self valuation that might
differ from true health as much as SAH, and in an unobserved way. For
example the number of visits to the doctor can be determined by a per-
ception of a health problem rather than a true health problem. To avoid
this endogeneity bias, we have selected only those questions that we re-
gard as measuring more objective health situations and, therefore, are
not affected by personal health assessments. We introduce the following
variables:
- Health problems: This is a dummy variable, which takes the value
1 if the individual reports he/she has at least one of the following perma-
nent health problems or disabilities: arthritis or rheumatism, difficulty in
hearing, allergies, asthma, bronchitis, blood pressure, diabetes, migraine
or frequent headaches, cancer and stroke, among others.
- Health limits daily activities: This is a dummy variable, which takes
the value 1 if the individual answers ‘yes’ to the following question: does
your health in any way limit your daily activities, compared to most
people of your age? Examples of daily activities included are: doing
the housework, climbing stairs, dressing yourself, walking for at least 10
minutes, etc.
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- Health limits ability to work: Similar to previous question.
- Number of days in a Hospital as an in-patient in the reference year.
(3) Other controls: We include year dummies (excluding the necessary num-
ber to avoid prefect colinearity), age and age square. Note that the ques-
tion about SAH that we use to construct our dependent variable asks for
a comparison with the health of people with the same age as the respon-
dent. However, there is a trend for SAH to become worse over time in the
raw sample data that may indicate that the age effect over health is not
being totally discounted by the respondents. This can be seen in table 5.6
This is the reason for including age as explanatory variable.
Table 4. Number of individuals that reports each category of SAH
by number of times it is reported.
Number Excellent or good Fair Poor or very poor
of times Freq. % Freq. (N) % Freq. (N) %
0 273 4.28 2076 32.56 4380 68.71
1 170 2.67 1114 17.47 898 14.09
2 182 2.85 867 13.60 367 5.76
3 193 3.03 641 10.05 213 3.34
4 233 3.65 481 7.55 137 2.15
5 273 4.28 376 5.90 99 1.55
6 379 5.95 279 4.38 79 1.24
7 456 7.15 204 3.20 46 0.72
8 665 10.43 145 2.27 47 0.74
9 563 8.83 83 1.30 33 0.52
10 533 8.36 61 0.96 32 0.50
11 495 7.76 19 0.30 16 0.25
12 544 8.53 20 0.31 8 0.13
13 672 10.54 5 0.08 9 0.14
14 744 11.67 4 0.06 11 0.17
Total 6375 100.00 6375 100.00 6375 100.00
Variables that are time-constant and specific for individuals, like the level of
education and gender are not included in the set of explanatory variables since they
can not be separately identified from the permanent unobserved heterogeneity.
Therefore, the fixed effects account for these variables as well as for unobserved
characterictics, and we cannot separate their effects. Sometimes this is seen as
6See Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004) for further discussion on this.
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Table 5. Proportion (in %) of each category of SAH by several characteristics
Characteristics and their SAH categories
Sample Proportions Excellent or good Fair Poor or very poor
All 73.19 19.39 7.42
By age group
40.17 < 40 78.31 16.50 5.19
43.92 40-64 72.92 18.91 8.17
15.91 65+ 61.02 28.02 10.96
By sex
46.84 Male 75.35 18.32 6.34
53.16 Female 71.29 20.34 8.37
By marital status
63.46 Married 74.00 18.86 7.14
8.92 Divorced 69.63 19.29 11.08
6.32 Widowed 58.84 28.92 12.25
21.3 Single 76.52 18.20 5.28
Health problems
58.46 Yes 60.57 27.26 12.16
41.54 No 90.95 8.32 0.74
Health limits daily activities
13.36 Yes 22.49 39.13 38.38
86.64 No 81.01 16.35 2.64
Health limits work
16.43 Yes 29.85 38.29 31.86
83.57 No 81.71 15.68 2.61
Table 6. Sample transition probabilities from SAH in t-1 to SAH in t
SAH in t
Excellent or good Fair Poor or very poor Total
SAH Excellent 85.91 11.84 2.25 100
in Fair 43.22 45.18 11.59 100
t− 1 Poor or very poor 17.66 31.60 50.74 100
Proportion 72.80 19.67 7.53 100
a drawback of the fixed effects approach. However, the random effects approach
only separately identifies the effect of these variables because of the unrealistic
assumption that the unobserved characteristics are independent from them (for
example that unobserved healthy life style is independent of education). Even with
a correlated random effects approach, if correlation is allowed in a Mundlak (1978)
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and Chamberlain (1984) style and initial conditions are controlled for following the
proposal in Wooldridge (2005), it is not possible to separately identify the effect of
these time constant variables from the effect of the unobserved factors correlated
with them. For instance, Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004) follows Wooldridge
(2005) proposal and they comment about this impossibility of separating the effect
of variables like education from the effect of the unobservables correlated with
them.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 contain some descriptive numbers of the self-assessed heath
reported in our sample. The most frequent category is excellent or good with
more than 70% of the answers corresponding to this category. Also, there is
high persistence in SAH reported, as can be seen in table 6, which shows the
transition probabilities. In this table, the largest numbers are in the diagonal for
all three values of SAHt−1. Table 5 presents the variation on SAH across different
characteristics and health variables. People that smoke tend to select worse self-
assessed health categories than those that do not smoke. Married or single people
respond the excellent or good health category more frequently than widows or
divorced. The three objective health measures in table 5 alter the SAH responses in
the expected direction and in greater magnitude than the socioeconomic variables
also presented in the table.
Although there are clear connections, this empirical application does not substi-
tute Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004) since the latter contains a more detailed
data description, makes further discussion of the estimated model and address
other issues, like sample attrition, that are not considered in this paper.7 However
our paper complements Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004) in several ways:
(i): We use more periods from the BHPS than them. They only use the first
eight waves because the ninth contains a different question and catego-
rization about SAH. While we drop the 9th wave too, we incorporate the
waves after the 9th in our estimation. Since the model specified includes
7An unbalanced panel (with random attrition) in a dynamic panel model does not pose any
complication to a fixed effect estimator (as opposed to a random effects estimator), as long as
it does not imply many individuals with a very small number of periods; and in our sample all
observations have at least 8 periods. The real problem here is that the assumption of attrition
at random seems unrealistic. Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004) made a test an find evidence
of non-random attrition, but they also find that the bias this may be causing on the estimates
seems to be negligible. Given that result and that this problem would take us too far from the
main theme of this paper, we do not consider it here.
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only one lag of hit, we have all the variables we need for the 11th to 16th
waves. For the 10th wave we have all the variables but hit−1 as it happens
with the first wave. We treat the 10th wave like an initial observation
and we condition it out in our likelihood leaving the probability of that
observation totally unrestricted. Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004) can
not do this because of their way of solving the initial conditions problem
and the use of random effects.
(ii): In our model we have two individual specific effects: one in the linear
index and one in the cut points. Lindeboom and Van Doorslaer (2004)
tests the existence of cut-point shifts and find clear evidence of differ-
ent reporting behavior (cut-point shifting) for gender and age. Given
that Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004) are imposing homogeneous cut
points, they estimate different models by gender to allow for that differing
reporting behavior, but they do not allow unrestricted different behavior
by age. Although we can not separately identify both sources of unob-
served heterogeneity, our approach is robust to heterogenous cut points
freely correlated with any of the determinants of SAH.
(iii): Use of fixed effects instead of random effects approach. The main ad-
vantages of this are that no arbitrary restriction is imposed in the correla-
tion between the permanent unobserved heterogeneity and the observable
variables, and that there is no initial conditions problem.
(iv): As an additional complement, our study includes some objective health
measures, so we can see how much it is explained by the socioeconomic
variables and by state dependence even after these measures are included.
3.2. Estimates. Table 7 presents the coefficient estimates for the dynamic
ordered probit model based on three different estimators, that also includes dif-
ferent specification of the heterogeneity. The first estimated model (column I) is
a pooled model without individual specific effects. The second (column II) is a
correlated random effects specification with an individual effect in the linear index
equation (the αi parameter in (7)), but with homogeneous cut points. In this
correlated random effects specification:
(17) αi = γ0 + γ
′
1hi1 + γ
′
2xi + ui
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Table 7. Estimates
I II III
Variables Correlated
Pooled Random Effects MMLE
Health in t-1: Good 0.8366*** (0.0129) 0.3402*** (0.0231) 0.3696*** (0.0226)
Health in t-1: Poor -0.5833*** (0.0206) -0.3057*** (0.0334) -0.2784*** (0.0296)
Age 0.0064*** (0.0023) 0.0004 (0.0208) -0.0215(0.0282)
Age square 0.0000 (0.0000) -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0003*** (0.0001)
Married -0.0378** (0.0185) 0.0956 (0.0748) 0.0350(0.0672)
Separated/Divorced -0.0954*** (0.0245) 0.1113 (0.1015) 0.0340(0.0817)
Widowed -0.0683** (0.0292) 0.1902 (0.1330) 0.0474(0.1110)
Self employed 0.0858*** (0.0279) 0.0194 (0.0664) 0.0216(0.0660)
In paid employment 0.0344* (0.0198) 0.0586 (0.0418) 0.1069** (0.0425)
Unemployed -0.0191 (0.0372) 0.0850 (0.0617) 0.0946(0.0680)
Retired 0.0101 (0.0294) -0.0287 (0.0701) 0.1104* (0.0651)
Long term sick or disabled -0.2478*** (0.0354) -0.2552*** (0.0823) -0.2562*** (0.0707)
Household size -0.0422*** (0.0091) 0.0302 (0.0221) -0.0127(0.0206)
Number kids 0.0434*** (0.0099) 0.0272 (0.0275) 0.0387* (0.0213)
Household Income 0.0571*** (0.0088) -0.0116 (0.0194) 0.0112(0.0177)
Health problems -0.6171*** (0.0138) -0.6229*** (0.0279) -0.7759*** (0.0334)
Health limits daily activities -0.6421*** (0.0193) -0.6147*** (0.0334) -0.6865*** (0.0299)
Health limits work -0.4297*** (0.0183) -0.4243*** (0.0326) -0.4854*** (0.0306)
Hospital days -0.0306*** (0.0013) -0.0371*** (0.0021) -0.0350*** (0.0008)
Male -0.0009 (0.0118) 0.0265 (0.0263)
Non-white -0.1028*** (0.0322) -0.0496 (0.0708)
Higher/1st degree 0.2312*** (0.0214) 0.2628*** (0.0470)
HND/A level 0.1637*** (0.0168) 0.1983*** (0.0359)
CSE/O level 0.1470*** (0.0153) 0.1890*** (0.0327)
Cut point 1 -1.1358*** (0.0857) -0.9473*** (0.2176)
Cut point 2 0.1875*** (0.0855) 0.5676*** (0.2173)
σ2u 0.3960
Mean ci 1.2775
Variance ci 0.3942
Mean αi 2.7760
Variance αi 1.4170
N. obs. 69753 40140 16196
Log Lk. -36943.35 -20304.28 -12198.37
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Estimates of year dummies in all
models and within means of variables in random effects are not reported.
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%.
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where xi is the average over the sample period of the exogenous variables, and
ui ∼ N(0, σ2u) independently of everything else. This is the kind of specification
estimated in Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004) that accounts for the correlated
heterogeneity and the initial condition following Wooldridge (2005). The last spec-
ification (column III) is the specification described in previous subsections, that
is the model in (7) and (8) treating αi and ci as fixed effects. It is estimated by
MMLE.
To compare magnitudes of the effects across variables and estimates we will look
at the relative effects (i.e. ratio of coefficients), and at the average and median
marginal effects reported in tables 8 and 9 for the variables with a coefficient
significantly different from zero.8
The pooled model exacerbates the state dependence effect due to the lack of
permanent unobserved heterogeneity. Though not reported, we also estimated by
MLE model in (7) and (8). As seen in the simulations it is severely biased, and
that bias implies estimating much lower state depedance effects and higher effect
of the other explanatory variables.
More interesting than that, is the comparison between the correlated random
effects model and the fixed effects model (7) and (8) estimated by MMLE, columns
II and III respectively of Tables 7, 8, and 9. The effect of all explanatory variables
(with a significant effect) increases in absolute value in the MMLE case with respect
to the random effects model. That includes also the state dependence effect (effect
of hit−1). Comparing coefficients in Table 7 we can also see that the effect of
hit−1 increases proportionally less than the effect of the other relevant explanatory
variables. In the Random effects specification the ratio of the coefficient of ‘health
problems’ over the coefficient of 1 (hi,t−1 = good) is around 1.8, whereas in the
MMLE that ratio is 2.1. In any case, this increase in the effect of state dependence,
8These marginal effects are also called partial effects. The marginal effects are averaged (or
calculated their median) across the first eight waves of the panel as well as across the values of
the covariates for each individual. This means that we first calculate the marginal effect for each
individual in the sample at the observed values of the regressors and then we calculate the average
(or the median) of them, instead of the marginal effect at the average value of the covariates.
We do this in order to obtain summary measures of the marginal effects representative of the
situation of the population (see Chamberlain, (1984))
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Table 8. Average Marginal Effects on Probability of reporting
good and poor health for significant variables.
(a) Good
I II III
Correlated Random
Pooled St.Err. Effects St.Err. MMLE St.Err.
Health in t-1: Good 0.2400 0.0042 0.0762 0.0086 0.1122 0.0074
Health in t-1: Poor -0.2012 0.0070 -0.0776 0.0101 -0.0832 0.0223
Age 0.0019 0.0001 -0.0043 0.0038 -0.0135 0.0080
Long term sick or disa. -0.0608 0.0090 -0.0569 0.0196 -0.0729 0.0223
Health problems -0.1434 0.0032 -0.1329 0.0146 -0.2277 0.0480
Health limits daily act. -0.1760 0.0062 -0.1482 0.0136 -0.2045 0.0340
Health limits work -0.1107 0.0053 -0.0977 0.0112 -0.1439 0.0141
Hospital days -0.0068 0.0003 -0.0077 0.0008 -0.0099 0.0003
(b) Poor
I II III
Random
Pooled St.Err. Effects St.Err. MMLE St.Err.
Health in t-1: Good -0.0726 0.0017 -0.0198 0.0035 -0.0675 0.0877
Health in t-1: Poor 0.1091 0.0047 0.0241 0.0049 0.0650 0.0657
Age -0.0007 0.0001 0.0014 0.0011 0.0088 0.0161
Long term sick or disa. 0.0225 0.0034 0.0168 0.0064 0.0547 0.0570
Health problems 0.0429 0.0010 0.0313 0.0054 0.1216 0.1667
Health limits daily act. 0.0649 0.0025 0.0431 0.0077 0.1501 0.1630
Health limits work 0.0389 0.0019 0.0273 0.0050 0.0994 0.1136
Hospital days 0.0024 0.0001 0.0022 0.0003 0.0065 0.0075
is remarkable because in the model in column III we are allowing for more, and
more flexible permanent unobserved heterogeneity than in column II.9
Moreover, those differences in the estimated effects of the explanatory variables
between the correlated random effects model and the fixed effects model estimated
by MMLE are statistically significant. As it is known, if the restrictions imposed
by the correlated random effects model are correct its estimates are far more pre-
cise (i.e. efficient) than the estimates of the fixed effects model (even after the
modification of the MLE), thought both are consistent. Given this, we have made
9Remember here that permanent unobserved heterogeneity, state dependence and persistence in
observable variables are alternative explanations of the observed high persistence in hit.
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Table 9. Median Marginal Effects on Probability of reporting good
and poor health for significant variables.
(a) Good
I II III
Corr. Random
Pooled Effects MMLE
Health in t-1: Good 0.2439 0.0771 0.1175
Health in t-1: Poor -0.2140 -0.0802 -0.0898
Age 0.0019 -0.0037 -0.0130
Long term sick or disabled -0.0615 -0.0580 -0.0781
Health problems -0.1387 -0.1267 -0.2402
Health limits daily activities -0.1806 -0.1525 -0.2193
Health limits work -0.1130 -0.1001 -0.1540
Hospital days -0.0069 -0.0077 -0.0105
(b) Poor
I II III
Random
Pooled Effects MMLE
Health in t-1: Good -0.0534 -0.0091 -0.0631
Health in t-1: Poor 0.1021 0.0143 0.0647
Age -0.0003 0.0004 0.0080
Long term sick or disabled 0.0125 0.0075 0.0540
Health problems 0.0201 0.0108 0.1078
Health limits daily activities 0.0434 0.0232 0.1509
Health limits work 0.0234 0.0133 0.0976
Hospital days 0.0012 0.0008 0.0062
a Hausman type test to see if those important differences are only due to the more
imprecise estimates in columns III. We have made the test over the Average Mar-
ginal effects in table 8 instead of the parameters in table 7 for two reasons. Firstly,
Marginal Effects (including their average), and not the parameters in equations
(7) and (8), are usually the actual parameters of interest in nonlinear models. Sec-
ondly, the average marginal effects do not suffer the different scales problem that
makes magnitudes in columns II and III of Table 7 not directly comparable and
not directly interpretable. The average marginal effects of both models are well
defined within the same scale, as any other marginal effect over choice probabili-
ties, and their magnitude has the same clear interpretation. If we were primarily
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interested in a single average marginal effect, like the effect of hi,t−1 = good over
the probability of hi,t = good, we can use a t-statistic that ignores the others.
Doing this for all the average marginal effects there are four variables for which
we reject, at 5%, the null hypothesis that both estimates are the same. Doing
a joint test we also reject the null hypotesis that the correlated random effects
estimates and the fixed effects MMLE estimates are the same, rejecting, therefore,
the restriction imposed in the correlated random effects model.10
Figure 1. Distribution (histogram) of the fixed effects from MML estimates.
The previous two paragraphs are a clear indication that ignoring the added
dimension of heterogeneity and the flexibility in the distribution of the fixed effects
matters when estimating the model and the marginal effects of variables. It is
not only a matter of the amount of heterogeneity but also a matter of the other
restrictions being imposed in the model in column II.
Besides the formal test of random effects vs. fixed effects done, we look at the
unobserved heterogeneity both in the linear index equation and in the cut point
shift. Figure 1 displays the estimated distribution (histogram) of both fixed effects
in the population. Both exhibit important variation. The average for αi is 2.78
and 1.28 for ci. The standard deviations of those distributions are 1.19 and 0.63
10In the Hausman test we have used the Var-Cov of the Fixed Effects estimates only, instead of
subtracting from it the Var-Cov of the Random Effects. We do this in order to avoid the difference
not being a positive definite matrix due to the use of different estimates of the variance of the
errors. This represents a lower bound for this test and a rejection here will also be a rejection
when using the well defined difference in the var-cov matrices.
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respectively. αi in the random effects specification is the compound equation (17)
that includes a linear relation to some observables and an additive unobserved
term that is assumed to follow a normal distribution. Given the estimates of the
parameters of equation (17), the estimated average for αi in the random effects
model is 2.06, and its standard deviation is 0.64. With respect to the heterogeneity
on the cut points, in (8) the second cut point has been normalized to be zero.
Interestingly its estimate in the random effects model is not significantly different
from zero. The average of −ci, the first cut point, is very close to the estimate
of the first cut point in the random effects specification. However, as can be seen
in the right panel of figure 1 there is important variation in ci among individuals
that is ignored by the random effects model estimated.
Table 10. Proportion of individuals with marginal effects (on the
probability of reporting good and poor) that are significantly differ-
ent from zero at 10%.
Variable
Proportion
Good Poor
Health in t-1: Good 50.38 11.06
Health in t-1: Poor 49.83 20.32
Age 30.20 4.31
Long term sick or disabled 43.49 17.33
Health problems 47.04 9.95
Health limits daily activities 49.13 19.69
Health limits work 48.50 17.61
Hospital days 47.11 15.52
Focusing on the MML estimates, the two indicators of hit−1 and the variables
that capture objective health problems have a significant effect over SAH, with the
expected signs. The apparently surprising result that ‘Long term sick or disable’
has much smaller effect than ‘Health problems’, ‘Health limits daily activities’, or
‘Health limits work’, is explained by the positive correlation between being ’long
term sick or disable’ and the other three. This means that limiting daily activities
or work affects more negatively SAH than only suffering a long term sickness that
does not limit us, although both situations are correlated.11 It also means that
for many people the effect of a disability or long term sickness is going to be the
11Sample correlation between ‘Long term sick or disable’ and ‘Health limits daily activities’ or
‘Health limits work’ is around 0.35.
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composite effect of the ‘Long term sick or disable’ variable plus the effect of the
limit in daily activities and work that it causes. As in Contoyannis, Jones, and
Rice (2004) we also find evidence of strong positive state dependence, even after
including more heterogeneity and the objective health measures. Apart from age
and smoking, no socioeconomic variable has a significant effect. This is in contrast
with the apparent correlation in the sample between these variables and SAH
described in table 5.
In addition to looking at the average and median marginal effects reported
in tables 8 and 9, we look at how many individuals have a significant marginal
effect in the sample given their particular situation and unobserved characteristics.
Table 10 presents the proportion of individuals with a significant (at 10%) marginal
effects over the probability of reporting good and bad health, for the same variables
as in table 8. Notice that although the average marginal effects are significant,
there is a great deal of heterogeneity so that for half of the population the marginal
effects over the probability of reporting good health is not significantly different
from zero for many of these variables.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the estimation of a dynamic ordered probit
with fixed effects of a self-assessed health status, which includes two fixed effect:
one in the linear index equation and one in the cut points. These two fixed effects,
instead of only one as usually done, are implied by the potential existence of
two sources of heterogeneity: unobserved health status and reporting behavior.
Heterogeneous reporting behavior means that individuals use different thresholds
when assessing their health and reporting it, so that they report a different value
of SAH even if the have the same true health. Even though we cannot separately
identify these two sources of heterogeneity we are robustly controlling for them
by using two fixed effects. Based on our best estimates, the two fixed effects
exhibit important variation and it is relevant to account for both when estimating
the effect of other variables. Our estimates also show that state dependence is
very important even though we have controlled for unobserved heterogeneity and
some forms of objective health measures. The latter are the variables with higher
marginal effects.
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The recent literature in bias-adjusted methods of estimation of nonlinear panel
data models with fixed effects has produced several potentially equivalent estima-
tors. Here we find that the most directly and easily applicable correction to our
model, which is the HS estimator proposed in Bester and Hansen (2009), has still
important biases in our sample size. This lead us to consider the Modified MLE
proposed in Carro (2007). We derive the expression of the MMLE in our case,
and perform Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate its finite sample properties and
compare it with the HS. The MMLE has a negligible bias in our sample size. These
Monte Carlo experiments contribute to the mentioned literature on bias-adjusted
methods of estimation by showing how well two of the proposed methods work for
a specific model and sample size. Also, this will be useful information for other
applications when having to choose among the several correction methods.
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Appendix A: Reduction of the order of the bias
In this appendix we show that the modified score presented above correct the
first order asymptotic bias of the original score. This is done by deriving the leading
term of the bias of the MLE’s score, and then by showing that the modification is
substracting that term from the score. This follows Carro (2007), adapting it to
our model with two fixed effects.
The notation used is the same as before: we denote partial derivatives by the
letter d; bold letters are used to denote vectors; the derivatives evaluated at the
true values of the parameters are represented by including a 0 in the sub-index
(e.g. dηi0 = dηi(γ0, ηi0)).
4.1. Deriving the leading term of the bias of the score in the MLE.
We start by deriving the first term of the bias in the score of the original unmodified
concentrated log-likelihood. Expanding this score around ηi0, and evaluating it at
γ0 we get:
dγi(γ0, ηi(γ0)) = dγi0 + dγai0(aˆi(γ0)− ai0)(18)
+ dγci0(cˆi(γ0)− ci0)
+
1
2
dγaai0(aˆi(γ0)− ai0)2 + 1
2
dγcci0(cˆi(γ0)− ci0)2
+ dγaci0(aˆi(γ0)− ai0)(cˆi(γ0)− ci0) +Op(T−1/2) + . . .
Now we need expressions for (aˆi(γ0)− ai0) and (cˆi(γ0)− ci0), for which we do
asymptotic expansions, following Rilstone, Srivastava and Ullah (1996):
(aˆi(γ0)− ai0) = ba−1/2 + ba−1 +Op(T−3/2)(19)
(cˆi(γ0)− ci0) = bc−1/2 + bc−1 +Op(T−3/2)(20)
where
ba−1/2 =
1
T
dci0E
(
1
T
daci0
)− 1
T
dai0E
(
1
T
dcci0
)
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)− E ( 1
T
daci0
)2(21)
bc−1/2 =
1
T
dai0E
(
1
T
daci0
)− 1
T
dci0E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)− E ( 1
T
daci0
)2(22)
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It is also useful to obtain:
(aˆi(γ0)− ai0)2 = (ba−1/2)2 +Op(T−3/2)(23)
(cˆi(γ0)− ci0)2 = (bc−1/2)2 +Op(T−3/2)(24)
(aˆi(γ0)− ai0) (cˆi(γ0)− ci0) = ba−1/2 bc−1/2 +Op(T−3/2)(25)
With respect to the squares of ba−1/2 and b
c
−1/2, we get:
(ba−1/2)
2 =
(
1
T
dai0
)2
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)2
+
(
1
T
dci0
)2
E
(
1
T
daci0
)2 − 2 1
T
dai0
1
T
dci0E
(
1
T
daci0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)(
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)− E ( 1
T
daci0
)2)2
(bc−1/2)
2 =
(
1
T
dci0
)2
E
(
1
T
daai0
)2
+
(
1
T
dai0
)2
E
(
1
T
daci0
)2 − 2 1
T
dai0
1
T
dci0E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
daci0
)(
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)− E ( 1
T
daci0
)2)2
Substituting by expectations, and using the information matrix identity (E(daci) =
−E(daidci)), we get:
(ba−1/2)
2 = − 1
T
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)− E ( 1
T
daci0
)2 +Op(T−3/2)(26)
(bc−1/2)
2 = − 1
T
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)− E ( 1
T
daci0
)2 +Op(T−3/2)(27)
Following the same procedure for the cross-product, we get:
(28) ba−1/2 b
c
−1/2 =
1
T
E
(
1
T
daci0
)
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)− E ( 1
T
daci0
)2 +Op(T−3/2)
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With respect to ba−1 and b
c
−1, we follow the same procedure (replace by expec-
tations and use the information matrix identity) to get:
ba−1 =
1
2T
1(
E
(
1
T daai0
)
E
(
1
T dcci0
)− E ( 1T daci0)2)2
(29)
{
2E
(
1
T
daci0
)2(
E
(
1
T
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)
+ E
(
1
T
dai0dcci0
)
+ E
(
1
T
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))
+ E
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1
T
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E
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1
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1
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1
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)
E
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E
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Introducing all these expressions in (18), and taking expectations, we get:
E(dγi(γ0, ηˆi(γ0))) =
(32)
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1
T
dci0daci0
)
+ 2E
(
1
T
dai0dcci0
)]}
+
1
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)− E ( 1
T
daci0
)2[
E
(
1
T
dγaci0
)
E
(
1
T
daci0
)
− 1
2
E
(
1
T
dγaai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)
− 1
2
E
(
1
T
dγcci0
)
E
(
1
T
daai0
)]
+O(T−1)
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The remainder of this expression is O(T−1) because Op(T−1/2) terms have zero
mean. This means that the score of the original concentrated likelihood has a bias
of order O(1), whose expression is in the previous formulae.
4.2. Modified Score. The modified score in (13) can be decomposed in three
terms, dγMi(γ) = A+B + C, such that:
A = dγi(γ, ηi(γ))(33)
B = −1
2
1
daaidcci − daci2
(34) [
daai
(
dγcci + dacci
∂aˆi
∂γ
+ dccci
∂cˆi
∂γ
)
+ dcci
(
dγaai + daaai
∂aˆi
∂γ
+ daaci
∂cˆi
∂γ
)
−2daci
(
dγaci + daaci
∂aˆi
∂γ
+ dacci
∂cˆi
∂γ
)]
C = − ∂
∂ai
(
E(dγci)E(daci)− E(dcci)E(dγai)
E(daai)E(dcci)− [E(daci)]2
)∣∣∣∣
ηi=ηi(γ)
(35)
− ∂
∂ci
(
E(dγai)E(daci)− E(daai)E(dγci)
E(daai)E(dcci)− [E(daci)]2
)∣∣∣∣
ηi=ηi(γ)
A is the score of the original un-modified concentrated log-likelihood. So, we
now analyze B and C.
Part B. We first want to derive expression for ∂aˆi/∂γ and ∂cˆi/∂γ. Differentiating
the score of the concentrated log-likelihood, dηi(γ, ηi(γ)), with respect to γ we get
a system of two equations with two unknowns. Solving for ∂aˆi/∂γ and ∂cˆi/∂γ we
get:
∂aˆi(γ)
∂γ
=
dγcidaci − dccidγai
daaidcci − d2aci
(36)
∂cˆi(γ)
∂γ
=
dγaidaci − daaidγci
daaidcci − d2aci
(37)
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evaluating at γ0 and replacing by expectations:
∂aˆi(γ0)
∂γ
=
E
(
1
T
dγci0
)
E
(
1
T
daci0
)− E ( 1
T
dcci0
)
E
(
1
T
dγai0
)
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)− E ( 1
T
daci0
)2 +Op(T− 12 )(38)
∂cˆi(γ0)
∂γ
=
E
(
1
T
dγai0
)
E
(
1
T
daci0
)− E ( 1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dγci0
)
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)− E ( 1
T
daci0
)2 +Op(T− 12 )(39)
Introducing in (34) and rearranging terms:
B = −E
(
1
T
dγci0
)
E
(
1
T
daci0
)− E ( 1
T
dcci0
)
E
(
1
T
dγai0
)
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)− E ( 1
T
daci0
)2(40)
daaidacci + dccidaaai − 2dacidaaci
2(daaidcci − d2aci)
− daaidacci + dccidaaai − 2dacidaaci
2(daaidcci − d2aci)
Op(T
−1/2)
− E
(
1
T
dγai0
)
E
(
1
T
daci0
)− E ( 1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dγci0
)
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)− E ( 1
T
daci0
)2
dccidaaci + daaidccci − 2dacidacci
2(daaidcci − d2aci)
− dccidaaci + daaidccci − 2dacidacci
2(daaidcci − d2aci)
Op(T
−1/2)
− daaidγcci + dccidγaai − 2dacidγaci
2(daaidcci − d2aci)
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Evaluating at γ0, using the fact that ηi(γ) = ηi0 + Op(T
−1/2), adding 1/T 2 in
numerators and denominators and replacing by expectations:
B = −1
2
1(
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)− E ( 1
T
daci0
)2)2
(41)
{[
E
(
1
T
dγci0
)
E
(
1
T
daci0
)
− E
(
1
T
dcci0
)
E
(
1
T
dγai0
)]
[
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dacci0
)
+ E
(
1
T
dcci0
)
E
(
1
T
daaai0
)
− 2E
(
1
T
daci0
)
E
(
1
T
daaci0
)]
+
[
E
(
1
T
dγai0
)
E
(
1
T
daci0
)
− E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dγci0
)]
[
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)
E
(
1
T
daaci0
)
+ E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dccci0
)
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(
1
T
daci0
)
E
(
1
T
dacci0
)]}
− 1
2
1
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dcci0
)− E ( 1
T
daci0
)2[
E
(
1
T
daai0
)
E
(
1
T
dγcci0
)
+ E
(
1
T
dcci0
)
E
(
1
T
dγaai0
)
− 2E
(
1
T
daci0
)
E
(
1
T
dγaci0
)]
+Op(T
−1/2)
(42)
Finally, taking the expected value of this expression will not change anything,
except that the remainder would be O(T−1) instead of Op(T−1/2).
Part C. To analyze C, we need the following result:
(43)
∂
∂ai
E (dγci) = E (dγaci) + E (dγcidai)
This works with other derivatives of expectations as well.
We are interested in the following derivative, which we will call Ca:
Ca = − ∂
∂ai
(
E(dγci)E(daci)− E(dcci)E(dγai)
E(daai)E(dcci)− [E(daci)]2
)
= −
∂
∂ai
(E(dγci)E(daci)− E(dcci)E(dγai))
E(daai)E(dcci)− [E(daci)]2
+
(E(dγci)E(daci)− E(dcci)E(dγai)) ∂∂ai (E(daai)E(dcci)− [E(daci)]2)
(E(daai)E(dcci)− [E(daci)]2)2
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Working with the derivative and using the above rule, we get:
Ca = − 1
E(daai)E(dcci)− [E(daci)]2
{E(dγci) [E(daaci) + E(dacidai)] + E(daci) [E(dγaci) + E(dγcidai)]
−E(dcci) [E(dγaai) + E(dγaidai)]− E(dγai) [E(dacci) + E(dccidai)]}
+
E(dγci)E(daci)− E(dcci)E(dγai)
(E(daai)E(dcci)− [E(daci)]2)2
{E(daai) [E(dacci) + E(dccidai)] + E(dcci) [E(daaai) + E(daaidai)]
−2E(daci) [E(daaci) + E(dacidai)]}
Likewise, for Cc we have:
Cc = − 1
E(daai)E(dcci)− [E(daci)]2
{E(dγai) [E(dacci) + E(dacidci)] + E(daci) [E(dγaci) + E(dγaidci)]
−E(daai) [E(dγcci) + E(dγcidci)]− E(dγci) [E(daaci) + E(daaidci)]}
+
E(dγai)E(daci)− E(daai)E(dγci)
(E(daai)E(dcci)− [E(daci)]2)2
{E(dcci) [E(daaci) + E(daaidci)] + E(daai) [E(dccci) + E(dccidci)]
−2E(daci) [E(dacci) + E(dacidci)]}
We then evaluate at γ0 and take the expected value of these expressions.
Putting everything together. If we, finally, add all the terms of B and C from
before, which is equal to dγMi(γ) − dγi(γ, ηi(γ)) = B + C, we get exactly minus
(32). Therefore, the modified score equal the standard score minus the first order
term of the bias, because we are substracting it with the modification B +C. The
reminder of this expansion for dγMi(γ) is O(T
−1), as opposed to O(1) that is the
order of magnitude of the bias of dγi(γ, ηi(γ)). This shows that MMLE reduced
the order of the bias of the MLE.
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CHAPTER 3
Gender differences in Major Choice and College Entrance
Probabilities in Brazil
Abstract. I study gender differences in major choice and college entrance
probabilities in University of Campinas, a Brazilian public university depen-
dent on the State of Sa˜o Paulo. As with most Brazilian public universities,
students select a major, and then compete for a place in that major by taking a
major-specific entrance exam. This singular characteristic of the Brazilian case
allows me to differentiate the effect of gender on major-specific entrance prob-
abilities and preferences. I propose a model and econometric strategy which
can account for two important issues, selectivity bias and the fact that expected
utility depends on the probability of entering the different majors. I find evi-
dence of gender differences in preferences and entrance probabilities. For most
majors, gender differences in major choice are mostly explained by differences in
preferences. However, for the most demanding majors (those that require higher
grades from students), differences in major choice are explained in a large pro-
portion by differences in entrance probabilities. Finally, I find that gender has
important interactions with other variables. In particular, gender effects depend
on education, socioeconomic characteristics and family background.
1. Introduction
There are significant differences in the average major choices of men and
women. This issue has been analyzed extensively for the American case (see,
for example Freeman 1971, Turner and Bowen 1999, Zafar 2009), but the same
pattern is present in Brazilian universities. In the case of the University of Camp-
inas, for example, the proportion of men choosing engineering majors between 2006
and 2008 was 67 percentage points higher than the proportion of women choosing
that major, and the proportion of women choosing Medicine was 28 percentage
points higher than the proportion of men choosing that major (see Table 3 for
more details).
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The choice of college major depends not only on utility considerations (includ-
ing expected earnings), but also on the relative advantages of each student. Ceteris
paribus, students with a relative advantage in math will tend to do better in ma-
jors which make intensive use of mathematics, and therefore we expect them to
choose engineering majors more often than students who have a relative advantage
in verbal skills, for example.
Accordingly, men and women may choose different majors partly because they
have different preferences or different relative advantages1. Moreover, gender dif-
ferences may be affected by education, socioeconomic characteristics and family
background. For example, gender differences in major choice may be smaller or
larger for students who attended public schools, in comparison with students who
attended private schools.
Therefore, it is important to know what is the relative importance of gender
differences and other individual characteristics in explaining major choice and
academic performance. Does gender have an effect on the probability of entering
college once we take into account other individual characteristics? Do men and
women choose different majors because they have different preferences or different
relative advantages, or because they have received a different education and come
from different socioeconomic backgrounds?
In past works, it has been difficult to find an answer to the previous questions
because in most countries students are allowed to enter college (or not) before
choosing major. Therefore, it is in general not possible to discern whether the
major choice was motivated by the student preferring that choice more than others,
or because the student believes she will do better in that major.
A good survey of previous works is Turner and Bowen (1999). Their discussion
on the possible causes of gender differences makes clear that it is generally very
difficult to determine the differential impact of each factor. They use data on SAT
1Several hypothesis have been proposed in the literature as to why these gender differences may
arise. The fertility hypothesis says that women know that their work life will be interrupted when
they have children, so the economic value of particular careers may be lower. The socialization
hypothesis states that men and women are taught to be different since their infancy, and this has
an effect on what they perceive their role in society should be. Finally, gender discrimination
may also play a role, not only by generating a difference in expected earnings for particular
careers, but also by pre-empting the entry of women (men) to careers traditionally dominated
by men (women). See Turner and Bowen 1999 for a more detailed discussion. However, it is
important to remark that, independently of the reasons why gender differences in preferences or
academic performance, it is important to know whether these differences do, in fact, exist.
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(Scholastic Aptitude Test) scores for American college students, and show that
an important part of the gender gap is explained by differences in SAT scores.
Other papers, like Altonji (1993) and Arcidiacono (2004), present dynamic models
to study the choice of college and major. However, they are mainly concerned
with the effects of differences in predicted earnings, and do not take into account
differences in the probability of entering or finishing the different majors.
An important precedent for this paper is Montmarquette et al. (2002), who
use an econometric approach which is closer to the one used in this paper. They
present a model in which students take into account the probability of graduating
when choosing major. They estimate this probability through a linear probability
model, and then introduce the estimated probability in a multinomial logit of
choice of major. However, they do not allow for correlation between the errors
of the probability equation and the expected utility of each major, which implies
that their analysis is prone to sample selection bias. As I will show, an alternative
econometric strategy can account for correlation between both equations.
In this sense, the Brazilian case is particularly interesting. In most Brazilian
public universities, the student chooses a major before taking a major-specific
exam, which determines whether the student is allowed to enroll in the major or
not. Therefore, when choosing among the different majors, the student takes into
account not only the utility corresponding to each major, but also the associated
probabilities of entry. This implies that we can perform a separate study of the
factors affecting the probability of entry and the choice of major.
The determinants of major choice have been scarcely explored in the Brazilian
case. A few papers analyze the determinants of performance in Entrance Test
Exams (Guimara˜es and Sampaio 2007, 2008, Calvacanti et al. 2009), but the choice
of major has not been analyzed in detail. Such analysis of gender differences in
choice of major is important because of its possible relation with gender inequality.
This is an important topic of research for the Brazilian Federal Government, which
is currently designing public policies to reduce gender inequality. For example,
the Federal Government has recently introduced over 400 projects directed at
enhancing equal opportunities for men and women, which will be performed by 22
government institutions between 2008 and 2011 (Pinheiro et al. 2008).
In this paper, I estimate a model of major choice and college entry using data
from entrance tests of the University of Campinas between 2006 and 2008. The
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basic model (Model I) consists of two estimations. First, I estimate a binary logit
to study the determinants of the probability of entering the different majors. Then,
I estimate a multinomial logit model of major choice. An important determinant
of expected utility is the probability of entering the major. I calculate these
probabilities from the estimations of the first step.
In the basic model, I assume the errors of the entry and expected utility equa-
tions are uncorrelated, so there is no selectivity bias by assumption. In other
words, the fact that a student chooses a particular major does not mean that
this student has a higher probability of entering that major, in comparison with a
similar student who chose another major. In an extension (Model II), I allow for
correlations between the errors of both equations, so that students with a larger
entry shock for a particular major tend to have a larger preference shock for the
same major. Model I is estimated through Maximum Likelihood in two steps.
Model II is estimated through Maximum Simulated Likelihood in one unique step.
When estimating the second model, I find that the correlation between the
errors of the two equations is positive and significant. Therefore, students who get
a larger preference shock for some major tend to have a larger entry shock for that
major too. Given that the coefficient is significant, the model without correlations
will produce biased estimators. Therefore, it is important to consider correlated
errors in the econometric design.
I find evidence of gender differences in the probability of entering the different
majors. Controlling for other individual characteristics, men have on average a
higher probability of entering some majors, and women have a higher probability of
entering other majors. Interestingly, the effect of gender depends on past academic
performance, given that for most majors, the interaction between gender and the
ENEM grade is significant.2
I also find a significant effect of gender on major choice. The largest differences
between men and women arise in the most demanding majors (i.e. those with
highest minimum required grades). Nevertheless, there are significant differences
between the choices of men and women in other majors as well. Overall, men have
a higher probability of choosing mathematically-oriented majors (Technologies,
2ENEM (Exame Nacional do Ensino Me´dio, High School National Exam) is a non-mandatory
Brazilian national exam, which examines students’ knowledge of concepts taught in secondary
school.
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Exact Sciences, and Engineering and Architecture), and women have a higher
probability of choosing majors in Natural and Earth Sciences, Arts, Humanities,
and Health and Biological Sciences. In addition, I find that the effect of gender on
major choice depends on student characteristics. In particular, the size of gender
differences depends on work status, type of secondary school and income, among
other variables.
In order to determine if gender differences in major choice are caused by dif-
ferences in preferences or probability of entry, I simulate women choices with male
probabilities of entry, and men choices with female probabilities of entry. I find
that preferences account for most of the difference in choices in majors with low or
medium minimum required grades. In the most demanding majors, on the other
hand, a large part of the difference in major choice is explained by differences in
the probability of entry.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I present the models
to be estimated and the estimation strategy. In Section 3, I describe the process
of major selection and the characteristics of the entrance exam for University of
Campinas. In Section 4, I present an introduction to the data and show descriptive
statistics of the sample and variables used in the estimations. In Section 5, I
show and discuss the results of the estimations. Finally, Section 6 presents the
conclusions of the paper.
2. Model and estimation strategy
In this section, I present a model to study the decisions of N individuals (i =
1, 2, . . . N), choosing among J majors (j = 1, 2, . . . J). Let Mij ∈ {0, 1} be a binary
indicator, which is equal to 1 if individual i chooses major j and 0 otherwise, and
Eij ∈ {0, 1} be another binary indicator, which is 1 if individual i enters major j
and 0 otherwise. Clearly, Mij will be equal to 1 for exactly one major j, and we
observe Eij only for the major the individual has actually chosen.
Individuals choose a major in order to maximize their expected indirect util-
ity, which depends on the utility of entering the major and the probability of
entering the major, which in turn depend on individual characteristics. Specif-
ically, let Uij = αj xi be the utility of individual i of entering major j, and let
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pij = Pr(Eij = 1|xi) be the probability of entering major j, where xi is a kx-
vector of individual characteristics (including a 1 for the intercept), and the αj are
kx-vectors of parameters.
The expected indirect utility of individual i from choosing major j is:
(44) u∗ij = pij Uij + εij,
where εij is an individual-major taste shock, which is unobserved by the econome-
trician, but known to the individual when choosing among the different majors.
Introducing the expression for utility and rearranging equation (44) we get:
(45) u∗ij = pij αj xi + εij.
According to equation 44, the utility assigned to a given major depends on the
probability of entering that major. This probability depends on the characteristics
of the individual, and is determined by a binary model with latent equation:
(46) y∗ij = γj zi + ηij,
where zi is a kz-vector of individual characteristics, possibly overlapping with xi,
γj is a vector of major-specific parameters, and ηij is an error term which is un-
observed (or partially observed) by the individual when choosing major, and un-
observed by the econometrician before and after the individual chooses major. zi
includes a 1 for the intercept.
As usual, we cannot observe the latent variables u∗ij and y
∗
ij. The rules deter-
mining the observed variables are:
Mij = 1
[
u∗ij > max
k=1,...J, k 6=j
u∗ik
]
,
Eij = 1
[
y∗ij > 0
]
,
where 1[ . ] is an indicator function.
There are two difficulties in estimating the above model. First, we only observe
Eij when Mij = 1. Therefore, there will be a selection process if the errors in
equations (44) and (46) are correlated. Second, the first latent equation depends
on the parameters of the second latent equation, through the probability of entering
the major.
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2.1. Basic model. To complete the description of the model, we need some
assumption about the error terms. I will start by assuming independence of the
error terms (Model I), and then relax this assumption by introducing correlations
between the error terms (Model II). The benchmark model is characterized by the
following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Model I). εij are i.i.d. according to a double exponential
distribution, and have zero mean and variance equal to pi2/6. ηij are i.i.d. with a
cumulative density function F , and have zero mean and unit variance. εij and ηik
are independent for any j and k.
The first part of Assumption 1 corresponds to what is known as the multino-
mial logit Model (MNL, McFadden 1974).3 Alternatively, I could have assumed a
multivariate normal distribution for εij, which would have yielded a multinomial
probit Model (MNP). The advantage of the MNL is that it provides closed form
solutions for the probabilities, and is therefore more tractable (the MNP usually
requires numerical integration for solving multiple integrals, which becomes un-
feasible when the number of alternatives is large). As is well known, the main
disadvantage of the MNL is the IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives)
property.4
I will use the MNL for two reasons. First, it allows for comparison with pre-
vious studies of major choice. Turner and Bowen (1999), Montmarquette et al.
(2002) and Arcidiacono (2004), for example, use the MNL as their discrete choice
model. Second, in the following section, I will generalize the model to allow cor-
relations between the errors of equations (44) and (46), which will eliminate the
IIA property. Using the MNL for this baseline estimation allows me to compare
its results with the alternative specification.
3Some authors also refer to this model as the Conditional logit Model, but it is more appro-
priate to use the term multinomial logit for the case in which the model is derived from utility
maximization.
4The IIA property requires that the relative odds ratio between two alternatives does not change
when a new alternative is added to the set of alternatives or when the characteristics of a third
alternative change. In the case of the MNL, the ratio of probabilities of two events is
Pij
Pik
=
exp(pij αj xi)
exp(pik αk xi)
.
It is easy to see that this ratio does not depend on the utility parameters of the other choices,
which implies that the MNL has the IIA property. See Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and
Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1992) for more details.
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With respect to the distribution of ηij, I could use a normal (probit) or lo-
gistic (logit) distribution. The choice between the binary logit and probit models
is largely one of convenience and convention, since the substantive results are
generally indistinguishable. For the purpose of this paper, I will use the logistic
distribution, because of its tractability.
Model I is the easiest model that can be estimated. The errors are independent,
which means there is no selection problem. In other words,
Pr(Eij = 1|xi,Mij = 1) = Pr(Eij = 1|xi),
and the same is true for the expectations. It is important to understand the
meaning of this assumption: the fact that an individual chooses a given major
does not give any information as to whether he has a higher probability of entering
that major than other similar students who are not choosing that major.
Under Assumption 1, the probability of entering major j is
pij = Pr(Eij = 1|xi)
= Pr(γj zi + ηij > 0)
=
1
1 + exp(−γj zi) ,(47)
and the probability of choosing major j is
Pij = Pr(Mij = 1|xi)
=
exp(pij αj xi)∑J
j=1 exp(pij αj xi)
.(48)
The estimation approach is very simple. Given that the parameters of the
probability of entering a major are needed to determine the probability of choosing
that major, I first run a binary logit of Eij on zi, for each major j using only the
observations of individuals who choose that specific major. Then, we use these
estimations to run a multinomial logit of Mij on pij xi, using all observations.
It is important to remark that the proposed two-step procedure will give un-
biased estimators only if Assumption 1 is correct. If the errors of the choice and
entry equations are correlated, then there will be a selection process which the
two-step procedure will not take into account, producing biased estimators. No-
tice, however, that this has been the approach taken by previous papers examining
gender differences in major choice. In the next section, I present an alternative
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approach which will yield unbiased estimators for a specific correlation structure.
Designing an econometric model and estimation strategy to account for more gen-
eral correlation structures is an interesting topic for further research, but is beyond
the scope of the present paper.
In terms of identification, the parameters of the model are already identified
because of the non-linear functional form of probability, and because entrance
probabilities enter utility in a multiplicative form. However, as I describe in Section
4 I will include exclusion variables in the choice and entry equations, which will also
help in the identification of the parameters. In particular, some variables, like the
one describing whether the student has taken a private preparation course for the
entrance test, affect only the probability of entering a major. Other variables, like
the variables describing the reasons why the student chose the particular major,
affect only preferences.
2.2. Model with correlations. In this section we study what happens if εij
and ηij are correlated. Specifically, let εij = νij + σ µij and ηij = eij + σ µij, where
µij is the common factor affecting the taste and entry shocks. If σ is significant,
then students with a higher entry shock for some major tend to have a higher taste
shock for that major too.
It is important to determine what the individual and the econometrician know
before choosing a major. νij and µij are known by the individual before choosing
a major, but are unobserved by the econometrician. eij is not known by the
individual (at least before taking the exam), nor by the econometrician (before
and after the exam).5
Assumption 2 (Model II). νij are i.i.d. according to a double exponential
distribution, with zero mean and variance pi2/6. eij are i.i.d. with cumulative
density function F , and have zero mean and unit variance. µij are i.i.d. according
to a cumulative density function G with mean 0, probability density function g,
and unit variance. µij, νik and eih are independent for any j, k, and h.
The econometric approach is inspired in the mixed logit, which allows the
parameters to differ among individuals.6 McFadden and Train (2000) show that
5An alternative way to introduce correlation would have been to assume that the εij ’s and ηij ’s
have a joint normal distribution, and to allow the covariance matrix to be non-diagonal.
6Read chapter 6 of Train (2003) for a good description of the mixed logit.
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the mixed logit can approximate any discrete choice process, by appropriately
choosing the distribution G, and that the mixed logit eliminates the well known
problem of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) of the Conditional
and multinomial logit models.7 Usually, a normal distribution is used when the
parameters can take positive or negative values, and a lognormal distribution is
used when the parameters must have a specific sign. For the purposes of this
paper, µij will follow a normal distribution.
Estimation of Model II is not as straightforward as the previous case. The prob-
lem is that the correlation between the errors implies that Pr(Eij = 1|xi,Mij =
1) 6= Pr(Eij = 1|xi), so the estimation of the second equation using only the ob-
servations of individuals who chose a particular major gives biased estimates. For
this reason, the two-step procedure cannot be used and we have to estimate the
whole system in one step.
The first step is to construct the likelihood function. Let µi be a J-vector
containing the common factors for all majors, and suppose µi is observed by the
econometrician. This means that µi becomes a variable in the estimation, just as
one of the xi or zi. Let Pij(µi) = Pr(Mij = 1|xi, µi) and pij(µij) = Pr(Eij =
1|xi, µij).8 Under our assumptions, we have that:
(49) Pr(Eij = 1|xi, µij) = Pr(Eij = 1|xi,Mij = 1, µij).
According to equation 49, if the model is correctly specified (i.e. if the errors
of the choice and entry equations are correlated according to Assumption 2) and
we were able to observe µi, then there would not be a selection problem when
estimating the probabilities of entry. In other words, if Assumption 2 is correct,
once we control for µi, the fact that a student chooses a major does not mean that
she has a different probability of entering that major than a student with identical
xi, zi and µi who did not chose that major.
7Under Assumption 2, the ratio of probabilities of two events is
Pij
Pik =
∫∞
−∞
exp(pij αj xi)∑J
j=1 exp(pij αj xi)
g(µi) dµi∫∞
−∞
exp(pik αk xi)∑J
j=1 exp(pij αj xi)
g(µi) dµi
,
where µi is a J-vector containing the µij for j = 1, . . . J . Clearly, this ratio depends on the
utility parameters of the other choices, which implies that the IIA property does not hold under
Assumption 2.
8Notice that Pij depends on the common factors for all majors (µi), while pij depends only on
the shock for major j (µij).
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There are 2J possible events for which we have to find a probability: the
probability of choosing major j and entering, and the probability of choosing
major j and not entering, for each j. Given µi, the probability of choosing major
j and the probability of entering major j are
Pij(µi) =
exp(pij αˆj xi + σ µij)∑J
j=1 exp(pij αˆj xi + σ µij)
pij(µij) = F (γj zi + ai + σ µij).
Then, the probability of choosing major j and entering is Pij(µij) pij(µij), and the
probability of choosing major j and not entering is Pij(µij) (1− pij(µij)).
Of course, we do not observe µi. Nevertheless, we know its distribution, so we
can integrate out the µi, i.e. calculate the expected value of the above probabilities:
LEij =
∫ ∞
−∞
Pij(µi) pij(µij) g(µi) dµi(50)
LNij =
∫ ∞
−∞
Pij(µi) (1− pij(µij)) g(µi) dµi.(51)
With LEij and LNij we obtain the following log-likelihood function:
L =
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
Mij (Eij log(LEij) + (1− Eij) log(LNij))
There is no closed-form solution for the above integrals, and numerical inte-
gration is unfeasible when the number of majors is large.9 Therefore, I will ap-
proximate the above probability through simulations and maximize the simulated
log-likelihood function.
The estimation process is as follows. For a given value of the parameters,
a realization of µi is drawn from G for each individual. Using these draws, I
calculate Pij and pij. The process is repeated for R draws and yields the following
9In this paper, for example, I will group the majors in 9 major concentrations, which would
require solving 9 integrals for each of the above probabilities.
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approximate probabilities:
L˘Eij =
1
R
R∑
r=1
P˘ rij p˘
r
ij
L˘N ij =
1
R
R∑
r=1
P˘ rij (1− p˘rij),
where P˘ rij and p˘
r
ij are the simulated probabilities of choosing and entering major j
corresponding to draw r.
Using these simulated probabilities we obtain the following simulated log-
likelihood function:
L˘ =
N∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
Mij
(
Eij log(L˘Eij) + (1− Eij) log(L˘N ij)
)
.
The Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) estimator simply maximizes the
above simulated log-likelihood, and is obtained through an iterative maximization
algorithm as the usual ML estimator. The only difference is that in each step,
we use a particular draw of the random term µij to simulate the probabilities in
order to construct the objective function. With respect to the choice of R, the
estimators will be asymptotically consistent if R grows at a rate greater or equal
than
√
N . Therefore, in applications R is usually chosen to be slightly larger than√
N .
2.3. Alternative models. In this section, I discuss alternative models which
could have been used to analyze major choice.
First, as I mentioned earlier, an alternative to the multinomial logit (MNL)
is the multinomial probit (MNP). As is well known, the MNP does not have the
problem of the IIA property. On the other hand, the MNL has the advantage of
delivering closed form solutions for probabilities, which reduces the computational
burden of the estimations. This property is very important for the present paper
because the number of alternatives and observations is very large. Moreover, the
model with correlations (Model II) eliminates the IIA property of the standard
MNL, so the main argument to use the MNP instead of the MNL loses strength.
Second, another econometric approach which could have been used is the one
proposed by Mallar (1977). Mallar studied a model with a set of interrelated di-
chotomous (binary) relationships, where the probability that one event happens
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affects the probability that other events occur. The approach is to transform the
model, so that each probability is a non-linear function of a linear index. Then,
assuming that each linear index depends on the other linear indexes (rather than
on the other probabilities), it is possible to obtain a reduced form for the linear
indexes, and estimate an independent equation for each probability, in which the
dichotomous variable depends only on the exogenous variables (i.e. the model is
transformed so that each probability does no longer depend on the other proba-
bilities). Mallar shows that the structural parameters can be obtained from the
parameters of the reduced form.
We could interpret a polychotomous (multinomial) model as a model in which
the n choices are interrelated dichotomous events. Then, we could apply Mallar’s
approach to our problem, by adding the respective probabilities of entry. How-
ever, the above referenced transformation is a strong assumption for a multinomial
model. Mallar’s approach is specially suitable for the case where truly binary vari-
ables depend on one another, but is less satisfying for the analysis of polychotomous
choices, for which the MNL and MNP have been specially designed.
In addition to the previous reasons, an important advantage of the MNL for
the analysis of major choice is that this is the model which has been used the most
in the literature, so it facilitates comparison with other papers. For these reasons,
I will use the econometric model proposed in the previous sections to perform the
analysis.
3. The university entrance process
Before describing the data, it is important to understand the entrance process
for Brazilian universities (vestibular). In this section, I describe the process for
University of Campinas, but the process is similar for most public universities. I
will only present a brief description of the process of choosing a major and entering
the university, considering the most relevant features for the present paper. The
actual entrance process is much more complex.10 Basically, university candidates
must choose their preferred majors, and only the best students within each major
are called to fill the seats. Majors with more candidates per offered seat are more
competitive and thus imply a lower probability of entry.
10For more details, read University of Campinas’ general resolutions (resoluc¸o˜es gerales) number
31 of August 10, 2005; number 41 of August 21, 2006; and number 30 of August 8, 2007.
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Candidates must follow the following process:
(1) Each candidate chooses 3 majors in order of preference.
(2) Candidates take the first-stage exam. The exam is the same for all stu-
dents and has 2 parts: multiple choice questions and essay. The multiple
choice questions may belong to Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology,
History or Geography. The essay evaluates knowledge of the Portuguese
language, and is graded only for students who answered correctly at least
50% of the multiple choice questions. All students are ordered within their
major of first-choice. Only the top students within each major can par-
ticipate in the second-stage of the exam.11 It is important to remark that
in this first-stage of the exam students compete only with other students
choosing the same major for the possibility of taking the second-stage
exam.
(3) Candidates take the second-stage exam. The exam is the same for all stu-
dents, and has 8 parts: Literature and Portuguese Language, Biological
Sciences, Geography, History, Mathematics, Chemistry, Physics, and Eng-
lish language.12 The different parts of the exam are given different weights
for each major (e.g. engineering majors put more weight on mathematics,
literature puts more weight on Portuguese language).
(4) Students with the highest scores are called to fill a seat. If the student is
not called for her first choice, she may be called for her second or third
choice, if her score is high enough. As students may decide not to enroll
in a major when they are called, there may be several calls until all seats
at the different majors are filled.
(5) Candidates decide whether to enroll or not. Even when a candidate is
called to fill a seat, she may decide not to enroll in the university. There
are many reasons why this may happen:
(a) The candidate may be one of the so called “treineiros,” students who
have not finished high school, and are only training for the exam in
a subsequent year.
11The number of students going to the second stage is determined following a series of complex
rules. The basic intention is to have a maximum of eight candidates per seat in the second-stage
exam.
12Some majors require an additional aptitude test.
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(b) The candidate is called to fill a seat at another university, and chooses
that university over this one.
(c) The candidate decides not to enroll for other reasons (e.g. a change
in her socioeconomic situation).
In stage (4), students may be offered a place at their second or third choices
in an early call, but regardless of whether they accept or reject this offer, they
may still be offered a superior choice in later calls. However, students who reject
an offer to fill a seat in one of their chosen majors in any given call, will not be
offered lower choices in subsequent calls. For example, if in the first call a student
is offered a seat at her second choice major, she may reject it and still be offered
a seat at her first choice in later calls, but she will no longer be offered a seat at
her third choice.
With respect to the enrollment decision, in the available database it is possible
to identify treineiros, but it is not possible to identify students deciding not to
enroll for other reasons. Treineiros will be excluded from the analysis, because
they may have different motives for choosing a major than non-treineiros.13
As explained above, students submit an ordered list of 3 majors with their
university applications. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on the study
of the determinants of the first choice. There are several reasons for this decision.
First, the available database does not have information on students’ second and
third choices. Second, the proportion of students enrolling in their second or
third choice is much smaller than the proportion of students enrolling in their first
choice.14 Table 1 shows the number of candidates, offers to fill seats (calls), and
enrollments, depending on the order of the major in the list of preferred majors.
The table shows that 90.95% of enrolled students enroll in the major which they
13Treineiros want to take the exam in order to gain experience in the vestibular process. Given
that the exam is basically the same for all majors (all that changes from major to major is
the weight given to each part of the exam), treineiros care less about which major they choose
as their first choice. Therefore, many treineiros choose easier majors in order to have a higher
probability of getting to the second stage of the exam. In the database, for example, it is possible
to see that treineiros choose Technology majors (the least demanding group of majors) in a much
higher proportion than non-treineiros.
14Even though the database has no information on the majors that students select as second or
third alternatives, we know in which majors students are offered a seat, and also in which majors
students decide to enroll (if any). Therefore, we can determine if the student receives an offer or
enrolls in a major which was her first choice or not. Notice however, that we cannot determine
the second or third choice of students who are not offered any seat.
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selected as their first choice, and only 9.05% of enrolled students enroll in a major
which was not their first choice. Moreover, the share of calls for second and third
choices is 14.05%, which means that students reject second and third choices in a
higher proportion than first choices. Third, the reasons for choosing the second
and third alternatives may be very different from the reasons for choosing the first
alternative. For example, the second choice may be a ‘safe bet,’ that is, a major
for which the probability of entry is much higher than the first choice, and which
the student selects in order to maximize the probability of entering in some major.
Finally, students may be applying to other universities in addition to University
of Campinas. Then, it could be the case that these students select a major at
University of Campinas as a ‘safe bet,’ and choose a different major in the other
university. The information on applications to other universities is not available
in the database. However, it is unlikely that students will choose a major at
University of Campinas as a safe bet, given that University of Campinas is one
of the most prestigious universities in Brazil, and it is generally considered to be
very difficult to enter this university. For example, over 60% of the students in the
sample stated that they chose this university for its reputation, or because this
university is the best for the major they want to study.
[ TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. ]
4. Data and descriptive statistics
The dataset is composed of major choices, entrance test outcomes and individ-
ual characteristics of applicants to the University of Campinas between 2006 and
2008. The database has 134,563 observations (not including treineiros), each cor-
responding to one candidate. After eliminating observations with missing values,
we are left with 120,058 observations.
Table 2 shows the number of candidates for a seat at the University, the number
of students called to fill a seat in their first choice major, and the number of
students enrolled in their first choice major; separated by gender, where M stands
for male and F for female.15 Interestingly, we can see that the difference in the
probability of being offered a seat between men and women is between 2 and 4
15All tables in the paper are based on the sample used in the estimations, i.e. they do not include
treineiros and students with missing information for some variable used in the estimations. Tables
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percentage points, depending on the year. Considering the whole sample, male
students’ average probability of being called to fill a seat is 12.34%, while female
student’s probability is 9.57%.
[ TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. ]
Majors have been grouped in 9 areas. Groups have been constructed taking
into account similarity of the fields of study and degree of difficulty. The degree
of difficulty is determined by the test score of the last person called to fill a seat:
more difficult majors will require higher grades from students to be called to fill a
seat. The major composition of the different groups is the following:
Technologies: Construction Technology, Environmental Sanitation Tech-
nology, Telecommunications Technology, Information Technology.
Exact Sciences: Statistics, Mathematics (teaching certificate), Computer
Science, Physics (teaching certificate), Physics-
Mathematics-Applied Mathematics, Computation.
Engineering and Architecture: Electrical Engineering, Civil Engineer-
ing, Chemical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineer-
ing, Computer Engineering, Control and Automation Engineering, Archi-
tecture and Urban Planning.
Natural and Earth Sciences: Geography, Geology-Geography, Chemical
Technology, Chemistry, Food Engineering, Agricultural Engineering.
Arts: Music Conducting, Music Composition, Music (teaching certificate),
Music Instruments, Popular Music, Dance, Visual Arts, Scenic Arts.
Social Sciences: Social Sciences, Literature, History, Economics, Social
Communication (Media Studies).
Humanities: Pedagogy (teaching certificate), Chemistry-Physics (teaching
certificate), Linguistics, Language Studies, Language Studies (teaching
certificate), Philosophy.
Health and Biological Sciences: Pharmacy, Medicine, Biological Sciences.
Other Health and Biological Sciences: Nursing, Physical Education, Phonol-
ogy, Dentistry, Biological Sciences (teaching certificate).
including treineiros or students with missing information may be obtained from the author upon
request.
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University of Campinas organizes majors in 4 areas, according to similarity of
fields of study: (i) Exact, Technological and Earth Sciences; (ii) Humanities; (iii)
Arts; and (iv) Biological and Health Sciences. The approach taken to construct
major concentrations was to divide these areas in groups according to the grade
of the last person called to fill a seat. Humanities, and Biological and Health
Sciences were divided in two groups each. Arts was kept as one group because
there was not much heterogeneity between majors in terms of minimum grades.
Exact, Technological and Earth Sciences was divided in 4 groups because this was
the area with the largest number of majors, and with more heterogeneity in fields of
study and minimum grades. Architecture was placed in the same category as most
Engineering majors because it belongs to the same faculty as Civil Engineering,
and has a similar minimum grade. Food Engineering and Agricultural Engineering
were placed separately from the other Engineering majors because they have much
lower minimum grades. Instead, these majors were placed in Natural and Earth
Sciences, which is composed of majors with similar degree of difficulty and field of
study.
The major offering of University of Campinas remained unchanged from 2006
to 2008. University of Campinas gives two kinds of academic degrees. A Bachelor’s
degree corresponds to a BSc or BA degree in American Universities. A Teaching
Certificate is an inferior degree, which usually requires a lower grade to enter and
is intended for graduates who want to teach at the secondary level of education
(high school). I have indicated which majors correspond to Teaching Certificates
in the list of majors. All other majors correspond to Bachelor’s degrees.
One difference between this paper and previous works is that I will have to
include more groups in the analysis.16 This difference arises because previous
works are not concerned with the difference in the degree of difficulty, but only
with the similarity of the fields of study. For example, if we only considered major
similarity, Medicine and Nursing would be grouped together. However, Medicine
requires a much higher grade for students to be called to fill a seat. Therefore,
there may be students who choose Nursing over Medicine because they are more
likely to enter this major.
16For example, Montmarquette et al. (2002) and Arcidiacono (2004) consider only 4 major
groups.
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Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the different major groups. The first row
shows the average minimum grade required to be called to fill a seat in a major of
that group. A higher minimum grade indicates that it is in general more difficult to
enter a major of that group. We can see that Health and Biological Sciences, and
Engineering and Architecture are the two most difficult groups. Technologies and
Exact Sciences, on the other hand, are the least difficult groups. The second row
(candidates) shows the number and percentage of students who selected a major
within that group as their first choice. The third row (called) shows the number
and percentage of candidates who are called to fill a seat in their first choice major.
Finally, the fourth row (enrolled) shows the number and percentage of students
that decide to enroll in their first choice major when offered the chance.
[ TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE. ]
Table 3 shows there are differences in the proportion of men and women choos-
ing the different majors, but also in the proportion of men and women who are
called to enter a major. For example, women represent 22.37% of candidates for a
seat in Engineering and Architecture, but represent only 18.94% of students called
to fill a seat. This difference in shares means that men are offered seats in a higher
proportion than women.
The dependent variables used in the estimations are the choice of major (first
equation), and the outcome of the entry process (second equation). As explained
in the previous section, the entry variable measures whether the candidate was
effectively called to fill a seat in her first choice major. Table 4 shows the list
of independent variables, and indicates the group of variables that will appear in
each equation. Most variables will appear in both equations, but some of them
will appear only in the equation determining the choice of major or in the equation
determining the probability of entry. The table also shows which categories will
be the reference categories in the estimations.
[ TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE. ]
The main explanatory variable is gender. The estimations also include inter-
actions between gender and several variables. Other individual characteristics are
represented by race, age and work status.
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Education variables are also very important. There is currently an intense
debate in Brazil on whether students coming out of public schools have a lower
chance of entering public universities because of the low quality of primary and
secondary public education. Also, students of technical schools are considered to
be better in mathematics and related subjects, which may affect their probability
of choosing and entering the different majors. Finally, the estimations also include
a variable which indicates if the student is already enrolled in another major in
University of Campinas or another university.
The most important socioeconomic variable is income. When students are
surveyed, they are only asked in which income segment their family income lies.
Therefore, we do not have actual income, but a categorical variable indicating
the income of the family relative to the minimum wage. Allegedly, higher income
should imply a higher probability of entering any major, but it is more difficult to
conjecture what should be the effect on major choice. Also, poorer students are
exempt from paying the registration fee, so this can also be used as an indicative of
family wealth. Other important variables are the ones describing the occupation
and education of father and mother.
It is always desirable to have exclusion variables to help with identification.
Some variables only affect the probability of entry. For example, students with a
high ENEM grade may add points to the vestibular score.17 Also, if the student
took a pre-vestibular course, she is likely to perform better in the vestibular exam.
Finally, the entry equation also includes an interaction between ENEM and gender,
to test whether higher ENEM grades have a differential impact on men and women.
All these variables will influence the probability of entering the major the student
chooses, but will not affect preferences.
Likewise, variables describing the reasons why the student chose the major
and the University of Campinas will affect the equation determining major choice,
but will not affect the probability of entering a given major. The choice equation
also includes interactions between gender and work, secondary school variables,
17ENEM is a voluntary exam which students can take after finishing secondary school. Students
who have taken the ENEM exam increase their final vestibular exam score, only if the ENEM
grade is higher than the unadjusted vestibular score. If the student did not take the ENEM test,
or if the ENEM grade is below the unadjusted vestibular score, then the vestibular score is not
changed. Therefore, taking the ENEM exam may be beneficial (if the student gets a high score),
but is never harmful for students.
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other major, registration fee and the variables showing the reasons for choosing
the major and the university.18
Table 5 shows summary statistics for the independent variables. Columns 1
and 2 show the average value of each variable for men and women, and column 3
shows the sample average. For categorical variables, the average is the proportion
of individuals for whom the variable is equal to 1. Interestingly, we see important
differences between men and women with respect to their individual characteristics,
socioeconomic variables and education variables. This shows why it is important
to control for all these characteristics in the regressions, when trying to elucidate
the effect of gender on preferences and probabilities of entry.
[ TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE. ]
5. Results of the estimations
In this section, I discuss the estimation results for the models presented in
Section 2. I start with the benchmark model (Model I), and then proceed to
analyze the model with correlations (Model II).
5.1. Benchmark model. As explained in Section 2, the benchmark model
is estimated in two stages. First, I estimate the parameters of the entry equation,
and with the resulting parameters, I calculate the probabilities of entering the
different majors for each individual. Second, I estimate a multinomial logit model
for the choice of major, using entrance probabilities estimated in the first stage.
Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients for the entry equation (equation 46).
Table 7 shows the corresponding average marginal effects (in percentage terms),
which are calculated as the average of the marginal effects of all individuals. For
Gender and ENEM, the average marginal effect includes the effect of the interac-
tion, so the sign of the marginal effects may differ from the sign of the coefficients.
18I have also estimated a model with more interactions, and found interactions to be generally
non significant in the entry equation (besides the interaction between gender and ENEM). In
contrast, many interactions were significant in the choice equation. The unrestricted model had
too many coefficients (each interaction increases the number of coefficients to be estimated by
9), which reduced the global significance of the model. For the purposes of this paper, therefore,
I will only include in the estimations the interactions which were significant in the unrestricted
model.
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For all other variables, the sign of the coefficients will always coincide with the
sign of the marginal effects.
[ TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE. ]
[ TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE. ]
With respect to the effect of gender on the probabilities of entry, a positive
(negative) sign would indicate that males (females) have a greater probability of
entering a given major group. The coefficient of gender is positive and significant
for 6 groups, and it is non significant for 3 groups. Given that the estimations
include an interaction between Gender and ENEM, this result only means that
men have a higher probability for entering 6 major groups considering students
with ENEM equal to 0. To perform a complete analysis of the effects of Gender on
entrance probabilities, we have to study the sign and significance of the coefficients
of ENEM and the interactions between ENEM and Gender.
The coefficient of ENEM is positive and significant for all groups. The coef-
ficient for the interaction is negative and significant for 7 major groups, but is
always smaller in absolute value than the ENEM coefficient. Therefore, a higher
ENEM grade implies a higher average probability of entering all majors for both
men and women, but for 7 groups of majors, a higher ENEM grade has a greater
impact on women’s probability of entry.
The first row of Table 7 shows the average marginal effects of Gender consid-
ering all students. We can see that the marginal effect is negative for 6 major
groups, and is non significant for 3 groups. For example, holding other personal
characteristics constant, women have on average a 7.80 percentage points higher
probability of entering a major in Other Health and Biological Sciences, and a 4.78
percentage points higher probability of entering a Technologies major.
However, given that the interaction between ENEM and Gender is significant,
the average marginal effect of gender on entrance probabilities depends on the
ENEM grade. Table 8 shows the marginal effect of gender on entrance probabilities
for groups of students with different ENEM. Given that for most majors ENEM
coefficients for females are larger than for males, for a large enough ENEM this
will affect the sign of the average marginal effect of gender conditional on ENEM.
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In the case of Engineering and Architecture, for example, the average marginal
effect is positive for low ENEM grades, is non significant for intermediate ENEM
grades, and is negative for high ENEM grades. In the case of Health and Biological
Sciences, on the other hand, the effect is non significant for most ENEM groups,
and is negative and significant only for the group of students with highest ENEM
grade.
[ TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE. ]
Going back to Table 7, White is significant only for 2 major groups, Arts and
Health and Biological Sciences, and in both cases, the coefficient and marginal
effect is positive. The fact that White is non significant for many groups may in
part be due to the PAAIS affirmative action program, which gives additional points
to black and aboriginal students, and may be thus counteracting any advantage
White students may have. Work is significant and negative for 4 major groups
(working implies a lower probability of entering university), and significant and
positive for 1 major group.
The coefficients of the age variables are significant and negative for 7 major
groups, and are positive for only one group, Health and Biological Sciences. For
most major groups, the marginal effects decrease in absolute value as age increases.
This result is surprising, because it means that for most majors, getting older has
a positive effect on the probability of entry, which may be due to two effects. First,
many students try to enter the university several years before succeeding. These
students may have a higher chance of entering as time goes by because they become
more experienced. Second, there may be a selection process, through which older
students who are still trying to enter the university are the most constant and hard-
working students. In the case of Health and Biological Sciences, on the other hand,
the coefficients of the age categories are positive and marginal effects decrease with
age, which means that younger students have an advantage on average to enter
this major group.
The coefficient of Primary School Private is significant and positive for 5 major
groups. The largest marginal effects are those corresponding to Humanities (4.90
percentage points) and Exact Sciences (4.72 percentage points). The coefficient
of Secondary School Private is significant and negative for 4 major groups, and
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significant and positive for 1 major group. The coefficient of Secondary School
Mixed (students who attended both public and private schools) is significant and
negative for 4 major groups. For Engineering and Architecture; Natural and Earth
Sciences; and Social Sciences, coming from a private secondary school implies a
decrease of 4 to 5 percentage points in the probability of entry. This surprising
finding may in part be due to the PAAIS affirmative action program. Students
who only attended public schools for their secondary education receive extra points
in the vestibular exam, which may more than compensate the positive effects
that attending private secondary schools could have on the probability of entering
university.
The effect of attending a technical school is positive for 5 major groups, and
the largest effect is on Humanities (7.8 percentage points). Surprisingly, the effect
on Engineering and Architecture is negative. Nevertheless, it is important to
remark that the sign and significance of the effects changes in the estimations
corresponding to Model II. For example, in Model II, the effect on Engineering
and Architecture will become non significant.
Students who are already enrolled in another major, at University of Campinas
or another university, have in general a higher probability of accessing another
major. For example, being enrolled in another major increases the probability of
entering Humanities in 16.40 percentage points, and increases the probability of
entering Exact Sciences in 15.26 percentage points. This result shows that having
some experience in higher education has a positive impact on the possibilities of
entering another major.
Being exempt of the registration fee indicates that the student comes from
a poorer socioeconomic background. For almost all major groups, Registration
Fee has a negative effect on entrance probabilities. Therefore students coming
from a poorer economic background have in general a lower probability of entering
university. The exception is Health and Biological Sciences, for which being exempt
of the registration fee has no impact on entrance probabilities.
Finally, preparing for the vestibular exam in a private academy increases the
probability of entering 7 majors. Interestingly, the preparation course has a greater
effect on majors with a lower minimum grade, like Technologies, Exact Sciences,
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and Other Health and Biological Sciences. For example, preparing for the vestibu-
lar exam increases the probability of entering a major in Other Health and Biolog-
ical Sciences in 4.28 percentage points, and increases the probability of entering
Technologies in 3.95 percentage points.
Next, I discuss the estimation results for the parameters of the choice equations
(equation 44). Table 9 shows the estimated coefficients and Table 10 shows the
corresponding average marginal effects. Marginal effects are calculated as the
average of the individual marginal effects, and are shown in percentage terms. As
with any polychotomous choice model, the sign of the coefficients may not coincide
with the sign of the marginal effects because we have to consider the effect of a
variable on the utility of one alternative, in comparison with the effect on the
utility of the other alternatives. Moreover, the variables which are included in
both equations have a double effect on the probability of choosing a major: on
one hand, they affect the utility of entering the different majors, but at the same
time they affect the probability of entering the different majors, which also affects
expected utility. For these reasons, it is more useful to perform the analysis in
terms of marginal effects.
[ TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE. ]
[ TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE. ]
After controlling for other individual characteristics, and taking into account
the effect of the interactions, males have on average a greater probability of choos-
ing mathematically-oriented majors, like Technologies, Exact Sciences, and Engi-
neering and Architecture. Men also have a greater probability of choosing Social
Sciences. Women, on the other hand, have a greater probability of choosing Health
and Biological Sciences; Other Health and Biological Sciences; Natural and Earth
Sciences; and Arts. These findings are consistent with those of the previous liter-
ature, and show that the Brazilian case exhibits similar patterns to those found in
other countries.
With respect to the magnitude of the effects, the largest effects of gender are on
Engineering and Architecture, and Health and Biological Sciences. In particular,
men have a 13.86 percentage points higher probability of choosing Engineering
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and Architecture, and women have a 10.38 percentage points higher probability of
choosing Health and Biological Sciences.
The marginal effects of White and Work are generally significant. The largest
effect of White is on the probability of choosing a major in Engineering and Archi-
tecture: white students have a 1.42 percentage points lower probability of choosing
a major in this group. With respect to Work, students who work have a 11.39
percentage points lower probability of choosing Health and Biological Sciences,
and a 16.13 percentage points higher probability of choosing Engineering and Ar-
chitecture.
Students who went to a technical secondary school have a 21.12 percentage
points higher probability of choosing Engineering and Architecture, and have a
lower probability of choosing all other major groups. Being enrolled in another
major is also generally significant. Students who are enrolled in another major, in
the same or another university, have a 14.59 percentage points higher probability
of choosing Engineering and Architecture, and a 5.41 percentage points lower
probability of choosing Health and Biological Sciences.
Students who are exempt from paying the registration fee are more likely to
choose Engineering and Architecture, Humanities, and Other Health and Biologi-
cal Sciences, and are less likely to choose Technologies, Natural and Earth Sciences,
Arts, Social Sciences and Health and Biological Sciences.
The coefficients of the variables indicating the reasons for choosing the major
and the university are also significant. It is interesting to comment the results for
some major groups. For example, choosing a major for job market reasons implies
a decrease of 3.32 percentage points in the probability of choosing an Arts major
and a decrease of 4.02 percentage points in the probability of choosing Health and
Biological Sciences. Likewise, choosing a major for its social contribution implies
an increase of 13.84 percentage points in the probability of choosing Health and
Biological Sciences, and a decrease of 12.07 percentage points in the probability of
choosing Engineering and Architecture.
5.2. Model with correlations. As explained in Section 2.2, Maximum Sim-
ulated Likelihood Estimators (MSLE) will be consistent if R grows at a rate larger
or equal to
√
N , where N is the number of individuals. As a consequence, the
number of computations increases at a rate of N3/2, which makes it difficult to use
a large sample. Therefore, for the model with correlations I will use the sample
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corresponding to the year 2008.19 This sample has 39,494 observations. I will use
R = 200 draws for each individual, which is larger than
√
N .20
Table 11 shows the coefficients of the entry equations for Model II, and Table
12 shows the corresponding average simulated marginal effects. Reported marginal
effects are the average of the marginal effects calculated for each individual and
each draw, and are shown in percentage terms.
[ TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE. ]
[ TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE. ]
The coefficient of Gender is positive for 4 major groups, negative for 4 major
groups, and non significant for 1 major group. The coefficient of the interaction
between gender and ENEM is positive for 3 major groups, negative for 4 groups
and non significant for 2 groups. As in Model I, whenever the coefficient of the
interaction is negative, it is smaller in absolute value than the coefficient of ENEM,
which means that a higher ENEM grade implies a higher average probability of
entry for both men and women. Unlike Model I, however, the coefficient of the
interaction is positive for some major groups, which means that for some majors,
a higher ENEM grade has a larger impact on men in comparison with women.
As in the previous model, the presence of an interaction between Gender and
ENEM implies that the average marginal effect of gender will vary depending
on the ENEM grade of the group of students considered. Table 13 shows the
marginal effect of gender for groups of students with different ENEM. Consider
19In order to determine the effects of using a smaller sample, in Appendix A, I include the
estimation results for Model I using the sample corresponding to year 2008. Comparing the
estimations of Model I with the full sample and the reduced sample, we can see that the differences
in the effects of gender on choices are minimal. In the entry equation, there is a loss of significance
of the gender effect for two major groups, but the sign and significance of the other groups remains
unchanged.
20It may be argued that part of the differences in the results of Model I and II is caused by
the difference in the estimation procedures. Specifically, Model II is estimated by MSL which
involves simulating the expected value of the probabilities in equations 50 and 51. However, if
the correlation between the estimations turns out to be non significant, then the expected value
of these probabilities will be equal to the probabilities given by equations 47 and 48. Given the
large number of draws used in the simulations, the simulated expected probabilities will be a
good approximation of the true expected values. Therefore, the differences in the estimations
will not be caused by the difference between ML and MSL.
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first the two major groups with highest average minimum grades. For Engineering
and Architecture, the average effect considering all students is positive, and is also
positive for most ENEM groups. However, the average marginal effect becomes
negative for the top ENEM category, which is due to the fact that the coefficient of
the interaction between ENEM and Gender is negative for this group. Health and
Biological Sciences shows a very different pattern. The average effect considering
all students is negative, and is also negative for most ENEM groups (all groups
but the top group, where it becomes non significant).
[ TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE. ]
If we now consider the major group with the lowest average minimum grade
(Technologies) we can see that the marginal effect is negative for low ENEM grades
and is non significant for higher ENEM grades. On the other hand, for Exact
Sciences the average effect considering all students is non significant, and the effect
is negative for students with ENEM equal to zero, and positive for the top ENEM
groups. Similar analyses can be performed for other major groups, which lead to
the conclusion that the relation between the average marginal effect of gender and
the ENEM grade depends on the particular major group under analysis.
Going back to Table 12, White is significant for 4 major groups. The largest
effect is on the probability of entering Exact Sciences (2.27 percentage points),
Other Health and Biological Sciences (2.20 percentage points), and Arts (2.18
percentage points). Interestingly, Work is significant only for two major groups,
Engineering and Architecture, and Health and Biological Sciences, and is negative
in both cases. Therefore, students who work have a lower chance of entering the
most demanding majors.
With respect to the coefficients of the age variables, there are 4 major groups
which exhibit a similar pattern. For Natural and Earth Sciences, Social Sciences,
Humanities, and Other Health and Biological Sciences, the marginal effects are
negative and decreasing in absolute value as age increases. This means that older
students have an advantage to enter a major in these groups. The possible reasons
behind this result have already been discussed in the previous section.
Primary education variables lose significance in comparison with Model I. Pri-
mary School Private only has a positive effect for Humanities, and Primary School
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Mixed has a positive effect on Engineering and Architecture; and Health and Bi-
ological Sciences.
Secondary School Private has a negative effect on the probability of entering the
two most difficult majors (Engineering and Architecture; and Health and Biological
Sciences). For these majors, the positive effect that private secondary schools may
have is completely overcome by the extra points students get with the PAAIS
program. Finally, the effect of Secondary School Mixed is negative for 2 major
groups, Social Sciences and Health and Biological Sciences.
The effect of Secondary School Technical is positive and significant for Natural
and Earth Sciences, and is negative for Arts and Health and Biological Sciences.
This result is surprising because it means that attending a technical secondary
school does not imply a higher probability of entry into technical and math-oriented
majors.
The effect of being enrolled in another major is positive for all major groups
except Arts, which means that having some experience in University increases the
chances of entering a second career for most majors. Interestingly, the effect is
larger for easier majors, and is smaller for the two most difficult majors (Engineer-
ing and Architecture, and Health and Biological Sciences).
The effect of Registration Fee is negative for all major groups except Arts. This
result means that poorer students have on average a lower probability of entering
most majors. As in Model I, Preparation Course is positive for 7 major groups.
Finally, ENEM maintains sign and significance, which means that having a higher
ENEM grade increases the probability of entering all majors.
Next, I analyze the estimation results for the parameters of the choice equa-
tions. Table 14 shows the estimated coefficients and Table 15 shows the corre-
sponding simulated average marginal effects. In addition to the variables shown
in the previous section, Table 14 shows the estimated coefficient and standard
deviation of σ. The marginal effects are the average of the simulated effects cor-
responding to 200 draws for each individual, and show the average effects on the
probability of choosing a major group in percentage terms.
[ TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE. ]
[ TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE. ]
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Before analyzing the sign and significance of the effects, it is important to
comment on the coefficient σ, which is significant. This means that the errors of
the choice and entry equations are correlated: students who get a larger preference
shock for some major tend to have a higher entry shock for that major as well.
Econometric models that do not take this correlation into account will produce
biased estimators, and therefore it is important to consider correlated errors in the
econometric design.
In comparison with Model I, the sign of the average marginal effects of Gender
on choice probabilities remains unchanged for all groups except for Social Sciences,
for which the marginal effect is now non significant. The magnitudes of the effects
are also similar to the previous case, except in the cases of Engineering and Health
and Biological Sciences, for which they increase in absolute value. According to
Model II, men have on average a 24.14 percentage points higher probability of
choosing Engineering, controlling for other individual characteristics. Likewise,
women have on average a 16.95 percentage points higher probability of choosing
Health and Biological Sciences.
White has an effect on 4 major groups, and the largest effect is on Engineer-
ing and Architecture. Working decreases the probability of choosing Health and
Biological Sciences in 12.05 percentage points, and increases the probability of
choosing all other majors except Natural and Earth Sciences and Other Health
and Biological Sciences, for which the effect is non significant.
Attending a technical secondary school implies a higher probability of choosing
math-related majors (Technologies, Exact Sciences, and Engineering and Architec-
ture), and Natural and Earth Sciences, and implies a lower probability of choosing
Arts, Social Sciences, Health and Biological Sciences and Other Health and Bi-
ological Sciences. The largest effects are on Engineering and Architecture (7.78
percentage points), and Health and Biological Sciences (-7.77 percentage points).
According to Model II, then, attending a technical secondary school does not affect
the probability of entering mathematically oriented majors, but it does affect the
probability of choosing these majors.
Being enrolled in another major also affects major choice. The two largest
effects are on Health and Biological Sciences, and Social Sciences. Being enrolled in
another major decreases the probability of choosing Health and Biological Sciences
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in 7.81 percentage points, and increases the probability of choosing Social Sciences
in 4.26 percentage points.
As in the previous model, students who are exempt from paying the registra-
tion fee are less likely to choose Engineering and Architecture, and Health and
Biological Sciences, and more likely to choose Exact Sciences and Humanities.
Therefore, the conclusions of the analysis of Model I still hold: poorer students
tend to avoid choosing harder majors. In particular, being exempt from the reg-
istration fee implies a decrease of 15.54 percentage points in the probability of
choosing Health and Biological Sciences, and a decrease of 10.98 percentage points
in the probability of choosing Engineering and Architecture, which are the two
most demanding major groups, according to Table 3.
Finally, the analysis of the reasons for choosing major and university lead to
similar conclusions as before. Choosing a major for job market reasons implies a
decrease of 3.54 percentage points in the probability of choosing Arts, a decrease
of 7.39 percentage points in the probability of choosing Health and Biological Sci-
ences, and an increase of 4.11 percentage points in the probability of choosing
Engineering and Architecture. Likewise, choosing a major for its social contribu-
tion implies an increase of 21.26 percentage points in the probability of choosing
Health and Biological Sciences, and a decrease of 18.24 percentage points in the
probability of choosing an Engineering major.
5.3. Gender differences in entrance probabilities and preferences.
According to the model presented in Section 2, students choose majors by com-
paring expected utilities (pij uij). As a consequence, gender affects major choice
in two ways: (i) through its effect on entrance probabilities (pij), and (ii) through
its effect on preferences (uij).
The marginal effects presented in the previous section were constructed taking
into account both effects. In this section, I try to separate the two effects, to
see what part of the difference in gender choices are generated by differences in
the probability of entering the different majors, and what part is generated by
differences in preferences.
Specifically, I perform two simulations. First, I simulate women’s choices using
male entrance probabilities (i.e. setting Gender equal to 1 in the entry equation,
and equal to 0 in the choice equation), and compare them with men’s choices
(setting Gender equal to 1 in both equations). Then, I simulate men’s choices using
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female entrance probabilities, and compare them with women’s choices. Table 16
presents the results of the simulations for Model II, as well as choice probabilities
calculated with own-gender entrance probabilities.
[ TABLE 16 ABOUT HERE. ]
As expected, changing the entrance probabilities used to calculate expected
utility has an effect on the probabilities of choosing the different majors. For exam-
ple, using female entrance probabilities, women’s average probability of choosing
Engineering and Architecture is 12.72%, but when we simulate women’s choices
using male entrance probabilities, this probability increases to 21.11%. Likewise,
using male entrance probabilities, men’s average probability of choosing Health
and Biological Sciences is 22.41%, but when we simulate men’s choices using fe-
male entrance probabilities, this probability increases to 30.07%. Therefore, it
is clear that gender differences in entrance probabilities affect major choice. In
particular, men have on average a higher probability of entering Engineering and
Architecture, and a lower probability of entering Health and Biological Sciences
(see Table 12). Therefore, men will choose Engineering and Architecture majors
in a higher proportion than they would choose them if this difference in entrance
probabilities did not exist. Likewise, women will choose Health and Biological Sci-
ences majors in a higher proportion than they would choose them if this difference
in entrance probabilities did not exist.
Table 16 also shows that the sign of the gender differences in choice probabilities
is the same for both simulations, except in the case of Social Sciences. Moreover,
the magnitudes of the differences are similar. For example, in the case of Engi-
neering and Architecture, simulated gender differences in choice probabilities are
16.24 or 17.79 percentage points, depending on the simulation.
For most majors, simulated gender differences in choice probabilities are very
similar to gender differences calculated using own-gender probabilities. Therefore,
for these majors, differences in preferences explain most of the gender difference
in major choice. Nevertheless, there are two important exceptions, which are
precisely the two most difficult majors. Using own-gender entrance probabilities,
men have on average a 26.28 percentage points higher probability of choosing En-
gineering and Architecture, but when we simulate choices controlling for gender
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differences in entrance probabilities, men have a 16.24 or 17.79 percentage points
higher probability. Therefore, for Engineering and Architecture, there is a sub-
stantial part of the difference in choices which is explained by gender differences
in the probability of entry. The same can be said about Health and Biological
Sciences.
5.4. Interaction between gender and other explanatory variables.
Given the presence of interactions between gender and other variables, the mar-
ginal effect of gender may differ for groups of students with different characteristics.
For example, gender differences in choice probabilities may be smaller or greater for
students who attended public secondary schools, in comparison with students who
attended private secondary schools. Table 17 shows simulated average marginal
effects for different groups of students for Model II.
[ TABLE 17 ABOUT HERE. ]
Table 17 shows there are significant differences in the effect of gender depend-
ing on the group of students under analysis. For example, comparing the effect of
gender for working and non-working students, we can see that in the cases of En-
gineering and Architecture, Natural and Earth Sciences, Humanities, and Health
and Biological Sciences, the difference in choice probabilities between men and
women is larger (in absolute value) for students who work than for students who
do not work. Nevertheless, this pattern is not uniform across majors. In the cases
of Technologies, Exact Sciences, Arts, Social Sciences, and Other Health and Bio-
logical Sciences, the gender difference in choice probabilities is smaller for students
who work, in comparison with students who do not work.
Similar analyses can be performed for other variables. In particular, it is in-
teresting to examine the effects of secondary education on gender differences. For
example, men have a 25.56 percentage points higher probability of choosing En-
gineering and Architecture if we consider the group of students who attended
private secondary schools, but the difference reduces to 21.34 percentage points
for students who attended public secondary schools. Likewise, men have a 19.82
percentage points lower probability of choosing Health and Biological Sciences in
the group of students who attended private secondary schools, but the difference
reduces to 11.13 percentage points for students who attended public secondary
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schools. Therefore, private secondary education leads to higher differences in the
choices of men and women in the two most demanding major groups. Nevertheless,
there are also major groups for which gender differences are larger in the group of
students who attended public secondary schools (e.g. Other Health and Biological
Sciences).
6. Conclusion
Gender differences in major choice have triggered an extensive literature trying
to decipher the reasons for the existence of such differences. The Brazilian case
is interesting, because in most public universities students choose a major before
taking a major-specific exam which determines whether they can enter the major
of their choice. This contrasts with the college entrance process in most other
countries (including the US), where students are first allowed entry into university
and then have to choose their preferred major. The singular characteristics of the
Brazilian case allow us to test whether differences in choices are due to differences
in the probabilities of entry or differences in the utility associated with the different
majors.
I have presented two econometric models, and estimated them using data from
the University of Campinas, a prestigious public university dependent of the State
of Sa˜o Paulo. The first model imposes independence between preference and entry
shocks, but can be estimated with standard econometric software. The second
model relaxes the independence assumption, but becomes harder to estimate, and
I have to resort to a Maximum Simulated Likelihood approach.
After estimating the second model, I find that the correlation between the
errors of the two equations is positive and significant: students who get a larger
preference shock for some major tend to have a higher entry shock for that major as
well. The significance of this coefficient means that the model without correlations
will produce biased estimators. Therefore, it is important to consider correlated
errors in the econometric design.
With respect to the effect of gender on entrance probabilities, there are several
interesting findings. First, the average gender effect on entrance probabilities is
positive for some majors and negative for other majors. Second, the effect of gender
on entrance probabilities depends on the ENEM grade. Nevertheless, it is difficult
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to generalize on the nature of the relation between gender effects and ENEM, as
it will generally depend on the specific major group under consideration.
In addition to gender, entrance probabilities are affected by other variables.
ENEM has a positive effect on entrance probabilities for both men and women.
Students who are already enrolled in another major have a higher probability
of entering all major groups except Arts, for which the effect is non significant.
Students who are exempted of the registration fee (which indicates that the student
comes from a poorer family) have a lower probability of entering all majors except
Arts, for which the effect is non significant.
An important issue being discussed in Brazil is what is the effect of private vs.
public education on the possibilities of accessing higher education. It is generally
argued that students of private schools receive a better education, which gives
them an advantage for entering college. I find that the effects of attending a
primary private school are generally non significant. I also find that students
who attended private secondary schools have a lower probability of entering the
most demanding majors (Engineering and Architecture, and Health and Biological
Sciences), and have a higher probability of entering Exact Sciences and Other
Health and Biological Sciences. In the case of Engineering and Architecture, and
Health and Biological Sciences, the negative sign of the coefficient may be partly
due to the PAAIS affirmative action program, which gives additional points to
students who attended only public secondary schools.
With respect to the effects of gender on major choice, I find that men have on
average a higher probability of choosing mathematically oriented majors (Tech-
nologies, Exact Sciences and Engineering and Architecture), and women have on
average a higher probability of choosing Natural and Earth Sciences, Arts, Hu-
manities, Health and Biological Sciences and Other Health and Biological Sciences.
The average effect of gender on the probability of choosing Social Sciences is non
significant.
In order to determine if gender differences in major choice are caused by dif-
ferences in preferences or probability of entry, I simulate women choices with male
probabilities of entry, and men choices with female probabilities of entry. I find
that preferences account for most of the difference in choices in majors with low or
medium minimum required grades. In the most demanding majors (Engineering
and Architecture, and Health and Biological Sciences), on the other hand, a large
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part of the difference in major choice is explained by differences in the probability
of entry.
Finally, I find that the effect of gender on major choice depends on education,
socioeconomic variables and family background. For example, for Engineering and
Architecture, and Health and Biological Sciences, the difference between men and
women is larger among students who attended private schools, in comparison with
students who attended public schools. Therefore, for these two major groups,
private secondary education leads to larger differences between men and women.
Nevertheless, there are also major groups for which gender differences are larger in
the group of students who attended public secondary schools (e.g. Other Health
and Biological Sciences).
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Appendix A: Model I estimation results for year 2008 127
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Table 4. Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Personal characteristics
Gender 1 if male, 0 if female
White 1 if white, 0 otherwise
Work 1 if currently working, 0 if not working
Age1 1 if age is 17 or less
Age2 1 if age is between 18 and 19
Age3 1 if age is between 20 and 23
Age4 (*) 1 if age is 24 or more
Education variables
Prim Sch Private 1 if attended only private primary schools
Prim Sch Public (*) 1 if attended only public primary schools
Prim Sch Mixed 1 if attended both private and public pr. sch.
Sec Sch Private 1 if attended only private secondary schools
Sec Sch Public (*) 1 if attended only public secondary schools
Sec Sch Mixed 1 if attended both private and public sec. sch.
Sec Sch Technical 1 if attended technical secondary school
Other Major 1 if already coursing another major
Socioeconomic factors
Reg Fee 1 if exempt from paying registration fee
Income Low (*) 1 if family income is up to 5 minimum wages
Income Medium 1 if family inc. is between 5 and 15 min. wages
Income High 1 if family income is above 15 minimum wages
Educ Father None 1 if father has some primary school or none
Educ Father Prim 1 if father finished primary school
Educ Father Low Sec 1 if father finished low secondary school
Educ Father High Sec 1 if father finished high secondary school
Educ Father Uni (*) 1 if father finished university
Educ Mother None 1 if mother has some primary school or none
Educ Mother Prim 1 if mother finished primary school
Educ Mother Low Sec 1 if mother finished low secondary school
Educ Mother High Sec 1 if mother finished high secondary school
Educ Mother Uni (*) 1 if mother finished university
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Table 4. Variable definitions (cont.)
Variable Definition
Socioeconomic factors (cont.)
Prof Father Professional (*) 1 if father is professional
Prof Father Non-manual 1 if father has job with non-manual tasks
Prof Father Manual 1 if father has job with manual tasks
Prof Father Other 1 if father has another kind of job
Prof Mother Professional (*) 1 if mother is professional
Prof Mother Non-manual 1 if mother has job with non-manual tasks
Prof Mother Manual 1 if mother has job with manual tasks
Prof Mother Housewife 1 if mother is a housewife
Prof Mother Other 1 if mother has another kind of job
Others
Year Vestibular exam year
Only in major choice equation
Rsn Major Ability (*) 1 if chose major because of personal ability
Rsn Major Job Market 1 if chose major because of job market prospects
Rsn Major Soc Contrib 1 if chose major to contribute to society
Rsn Major Pers Realization 1 if chose major for personal realization
Rsn Major Other 1 if chose major for other reasons
Rsn Univ Best for course (*) 1 if chose Unicamp because is best for course
Rsn Univ Free 1 if chose Unicamp because it is free
Rsn Univ Reputation 1 if chose Unicamp for its reputation
Rsn Univ Other 1 if chose Unicamp for other reasons
Only in probability of entry equation
Prep Course 1 if took a preparation course for vestibular exam
ENEM ENEM test grade
ENEM * Gender ENEM interacted with Gender
(*) Reference category in the estimations.
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Table 5. Summary statistics
Variable Male Female Total
Personal characteristics
White 0.751 0.769 0.760
Work 0.203 0.147 0.175
Age1 0.165 0.172 0.168
Age2 0.534 0.554 0.544
Age3 0.222 0.218 0.220
Age4 0.079 0.056 0.067
Education variables
Prim Sch Private 0.540 0.511 0.526
Prim Sch Public 0.297 0.338 0.317
Prim Sch Mixed 0.164 0.151 0.157
Sec Sch Private 0.650 0.640 0.645
Sec Sch Public 0.294 0.309 0.301
Sec Sch Mixed 0.056 0.051 0.053
Sec Sch Technical 0.112 0.065 0.089
Other Major 0.100 0.069 0.084
Socioeconomic factors
Reg Fee 0.068 0.127 0.098
Income Low 0.264 0.323 0.293
Income Medium 0.470 0.446 0.458
Income High 0.266 0.231 0.249
Educ Father None 0.059 0.067 0.063
Educ Father Prim 0.072 0.087 0.079
Educ Father Low Sec 0.075 0.082 0.079
Educ Father High Sec 0.285 0.300 0.293
Educ Father Uni 0.508 0.463 0.486
Educ Mother None 0.048 0.054 0.051
Educ Mother Prim 0.074 0.086 0.080
Educ Mother Low Sec 0.081 0.090 0.086
Educ Mother High Sec 0.312 0.320 0.316
Educ Mother Uni 0.484 0.450 0.467
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Table 5. Summary statistics (cont.)
Variable Male Female Total
Socioeconomic factors (cont.)
Prof Father Professional 0.487 0.453 0.470
Prof Father Non-manual 0.274 0.281 0.278
Prof Father Manual 0.105 0.118 0.111
Prof Father Other 0.134 0.148 0.141
Prof Mother Professional 0.320 0.296 0.308
Prof Mother Non-manual 0.261 0.269 0.265
Prof Mother Manual 0.043 0.043 0.043
Prof Mother Housewife 0.272 0.290 0.281
Prof Mother Other 0.105 0.102 0.104
Only in major choice equation
Rsn Major Ability 0.541 0.485 0.513
Rsn Major Job Market 0.090 0.060 0.075
Rsn Major Soc Contrib 0.087 0.126 0.106
Rsn Major Pers Realization 0.204 0.259 0.232
Rsn Major Other 0.078 0.069 0.074
Rsn Univ Best for course 0.418 0.373 0.396
Rsn Univ Free 0.174 0.203 0.189
Rsn Univ Reputation 0.232 0.254 0.243
Rsn Univ Other 0.176 0.169 0.172
Only in probability of entry equation
Prep Course 0.585 0.613 0.599
ENEM 89.987 83.208 86.540
For dummy variables, the mean is equal to the proportion of
individuals with that characteristic.
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